How Executive Privilege Would Throw a Wrench Into Senate Impeachment Proceedings

This blog was originally posted in The Washington Post. 

 

President Trump recently added a new complication to the struggle over the shape of his impeachment trial by declaring that he would invoke executive privilege to prevent former national security adviser John Bolton, and perhaps others, from testifying before the Senate. “Well, I think you have to for the sake of the office,” Trump told Fox News’s Laura Ingraham.

Such a claim has no constitutional merit, but it could throw a wrench into the Senate proceedings.

A privilege is simply a legal rule that permits someone to block production of evidence. Every privilege rests on a judgment that keeping certain things private is more important than insuring that legal decisions are based on full information. For example, to protect marriage, confidential communications between spouses are often privileged, even when enforcing the privilege means losing legally relevant evidence.

Privileges are of two general types: “common law” privileges and constitutional ones. Common law privileges — which can be created and modified by either judicial decision or legislation — regulate the admission of evidence in courts. Common law privilege rules do not bind Congress. By contrast, constitutionally based privileges, because they derive from the nation’s fundamental law, are not necessarily restricted to court trials and can bind Congress.

The term “executive privilege” covers several doctrines, the most important of which in the Trump impeachment context is a protection for presidential communications to and from close advisers. This privilege nowhere appears in the constitutional text but is nonetheless constitutionally based because it is implied by the separation of powers. Its rationale is that a president would be hampered in making executive decisions without candid advice from his subordinates, and this desirable candor would be inhibited by the prospect of compelled public disclosure. Therefore, neither of the other two branches should have easy access to presidential communications of this type.

Critically, however, executive privilege is qualified, not absolute. During Watergate, the Supreme Court held that President Richard M. Nixon’s executive privilege claim of privacy for taped conversations with his closest advisers was invalid against the need for evidence in a criminal trial of his subordinates. Lower federal courts have since found that presidential assertions of privilege in both courts and congressional hearings must yield to a showing that “the subpoenaed materials likely contain important evidence” and that “the evidence is not available with due diligence elsewhere.”

This standard might have been written for the present situation. Trump’s defenders claim the case against him regarding Ukraine is deficient because it lacks direct evidence that he conditioned military aid on a politically useful announcement of an investigation into the Bidens. That direct evidence could only come from the testimony of White House advisers, such as Bolton, and related documents, which have so far been withheld and as to which Trump threatens to assert privilege. Both the need for this evidence and its unavailability elsewhere are self-evident. Thus, even in an ordinary congressional hearing, the claim of privilege would fail.

Moreover, executive privilege may not apply at all in impeachment proceedings. All the cases finding even a qualified privilege arose where Congress was exercising its implied power of overseeing executive branch operations. Where the Senate is exercising its constitutionally specified “sole power to try all impeachments,” its right to demand all evidence relevant to the question of the president’s guilt would seem absolute. Even if there were a need test, a Senate decision to seek particular evidence satisfies it automatically.

Some have noted language in executive privilege decisions suggesting that protection of presidential communications is greater where the subject is national security or diplomacy. But there is certainly no warrant for the idea that a president’s misconduct is specially immune from scrutiny in the very areas where his corruption may prove most dangerous.

If a president could prevent Congress from hearing the best, and perhaps only, direct testimony about his own misdeeds by the simple expedient of saying the magic words “executive privilege,” the impeachment power would be effectively neutered. The Framers contemplated no such absurdity.

That said, a claim of executive privilege could create procedural havoc, depending on where Trump tried to assert it. If Trump’s counsel raised the issue during the Senate trial, it would be addressed by the chief justice, like any other objection, with a majority of the Senate having the last word. But if Trump went to court to seek to block testimony from his current or former aides, it could at least cause some delays.

My best guess is that a court would quickly determine that privilege rules in an impeachment trial are the sole province of the Senate, and would not order proceedings halted while that decision is appealed. But even a spectacularly expedited judicial decision could slow down the Senate’s work. That delay might not be in the president’s interest — he wants to be acquitted, after all — but it’s not inconceivable that the impeachment trial could take a detour to federal court.

Citizens United Made My Career: I Wish It Had Never Happened

Hear more from this author in the video recording of ACS's January 17 panel discussion: Revisiting Campaign Finance Regulation 10 Years After Citizens United.

Citizens United made my career. I would have preferred a healthy democracy. When I gave my job talks to become a professor of law, the topic was Citizens United. Since 2010, I have written 11 law review articles and 2 books (Corporate Citizen and Political Brands) about Citizens United and its aftermath. I’ve been invited to talk about Citizens United over 50 times around the nation including by ACS on January 16, 2020. Those who found it objectionable the day it was decided are still dismayed by it a decade later and still want to undo it or mitigate it.

Twelve years ago I was a junior lawyer at the Brennan Center when the Supreme Court took the Citizens United v. FEC case. I went out on maternity leave in 2008. When I came back to work, Citizens United was scheduled for re-argument at the Supreme Court. I spent the summer of 2009 helping to corral amici to write Supreme Court briefs and rushing home on the subway to relieve my childcare provider. But looking back I’m glad I was able to work on the amici effort. A brief from the Sunlight Foundation argued for transparency. The final opinion written by Justice Kennedy adopted many of the Sunlight Foundation’s arguments.

I attended the re-argument of Citizens United in the gallery of the Supreme Court with my fellow lawyers from the Brennan Center. I remember feeling like I was watching democracy die among high pillars and velvet drapes. Ted Olson said something lame. People laughed. Justice Scalia said something even more lame. People laughed harder. Elena Kagan, the solicitor general, backtracked on an absurd position that her predecessor, the acting solicitor general, had made in the first oral argument. People laughed again. By the time Seth Waxman got up to add a few points about Elihu Root, the oxygen had already left the room. The fix was in. It was a forgone conclusion that the Supreme Court was about to tear up decades if not centuries of laws that had kept corporations out of politics in federal elections and over twenty state elections. All we had to do between September 9, 2009, and January 21, 2010, was wait for the guillotine to fall.

While the case was pending at the Supreme Court for two years, I wrote a white paper about the worst-case scenario of what the Supreme Court could do in Citizens United. When the case came out, all I had to change were the verb tenses. The Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision gave all corporations the right to spend unlimited amounts of money buying unlimited political ads in all Americans elections henceforth.

Staffers in Congress noticed my white paper and invited me to testify. I told members of Congress that Citizens United presented two big problems for investors: a lack of transparency and a lack of consent. The transparency problem is now known under the umbrella of dark money which cannot be traced back to its original source, whether that source is human or corporate. The consent problem is that unlike shareholders in the UK, shareholders in the US are not given a chance to vote on corporate political spending.

Looking back at the decade between 2010 and 2020, I see that there were many ways for corporations to damage democracy and democratic norms—not all of which are traceable to Citizens United, but many which are.

The greed of corporations often makes them devalue the very people who work for them and corporations use their political clout to get their way. For example, corporate interests have worked to roll back increases in the minimum wage including urging the DC City Council to repeal an initiative by voters to increase the subminimum wage for tipped workers. Voters made it clear in June 2018 they wanted the higher wage. As Think Progress reported at the time, “the D.C. Restaurant Industry and its lobbyists have contributed more than $236,000 to the campaigns of current councilmembers and D.C. Mayor…” Businesses, including the National Restaurant Association, had the muscle to overrule their votes on wages by October 2018. The National Restaurant Association has also voiced its opposition to raising the federal minimum wage.

The fight over DC’s minimum wage wasn’t the only local election where corporations threw their weight around. In 2014, Chevron tried to buy a mayoralty and city council seats in Richmond, California. But this ended up backfiring when Chevron’s political spending became a national story and the Chevron-backed candidates lost.

Corporations also tried to put a thumb on the scale of justice in state judicial elections and empirical data from Professor Joanna Sheperd showed disturbingly: “There is a significant relationship between business group contributions to state supreme court justices and the voting of those justices in cases involving business matters. The more campaign contributions from business interests justices receive, the more likely they are to vote for business litigants appearing before them in court.”

Then there is the tax dodging. From 2010-2020 Apple was the poster child for dodging U.S. taxes. But Apple wasn’t alone. Corporations lobbied heavily for the Trump tax cuts. According to a study by ITEP, 60 companies paid zero taxes in 2018. Not surprisingly, the big winner from the Trump tax cuts were corporations. The last cut in the corporate tax rate had been in 1993. For a group that wants to have the rights of U.S. citizens, they don’t appear ready to do what every tax paying person does: chip in.

Business interests have also worked to undo campaign finance reforms that voters wanted. In November 2016, North Dakota voters voted for an initiative to provide public financing in elections. But the state legislature repealed the measure and the governor signed the repeal into law by February 2017.  The opponents of this change included American for Prosperity, a group linked to Charles Koch of the Koch Brothers and Koch industries.

And then there’s what I can only call the “Facebook problem.” Facebook is number 57 on the Fortune 500.  I’ve seen computer scientists at DEF CON to professors at the Association of American Law Schools lament the “Facebook problem.” And people characterize the problem in a variety of ways ranging from the way that Facebook allows advertisers to target subsets of the population, to the ways that Facebook allows for manipulation of its users, to Facebook’s disregard for users’ privacy. But all of these issues may be outweighed by the decision by Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerburg to allow lies in political ads during the 2020 election. This can only hurt democratic discourse.

Finally, as I detail in my book Political Brands, the Trump Organization brought a whole new level of corporate conflicts of interest into the White House including ongoing violations of the domestic and foreign emoluments clauses. If the original fear was corporate money flowing into the political system, the Trump Organization has shown that political money flowing into corporations can be just as problematic.

Could all of this have happened without Citizens United? Possibly. It’s hard to know the counterfactual. But Citizens United seemed to encourage corporations to be aggressive in politics and to be brazen about conflicts of interest that benefited corporations over workers, customers, investors, and citizens. After Citizens United, politicians always have to fear that if they go against corporate interests, that they will reap the whirlwind of corporate wrath in the next election.

Citizens United made my career. I wish it had never happened.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

What To Expect When You're Expecting Impeachment

This blog is one in a series of blogs in a symposium examining different legal aspects of the impeachment inquiry of President Trump. View the entire Impeachment Blog Symposium.

Note: This blog was originally published on 9/27/2019: House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced on Tuesday the commencement of an impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump.  The inquiry, when announced, was evidently, meant to be an umbrella that covers all the various investigations into presidential improprieties.  Subsequent posts will delve into the specifics of those investigations and whether they provide sufficient grounds for impeachment.  In this post, I will outline the mechanics of impeachment.

I. Constitutional Provisions

The operative provision – the one that sets forth the grounds for impeachment – is found in Article II:

The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors.

The Constitution divides the impeachment power between the House and the Senate, providing that “[t]he House of Representatives … shall have the sole power of impeachment,” while granting the Senate “the sole power to try all impeachments.”  This means that the House’s decision to impeach a civil officer is analogous to an indictment, which is then forwarded to the Senate for adjudication and disposition.

The Constitution says virtually nothing about the procedures the House and Senate are to employ in carrying out their respective impeachment roles.  Indeed, the Constitution is completely silent regarding the procedures in the House.  This means the general rule that the House of Representatives operates by majority vote applies to its power to impeach.  With respect to the Senate, the Constitution provides that where the President has been impeached, the Chief Justice shall preside over the trial and that conviction (of the President or any other civil officer) requires a vote of two-thirds of the members present.  The requirement of a two-thirds vote to convict has a pervasive influence on impeachments.  As a practical matter, it requires that impeachment must be a bipartisan undertaking, otherwise any impeachment by the House is an empty, symbolic exercise.   Moreover, the requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote operates to prevent impeachment from being used as a weapon to make the executive or judicial branch subordinate to Congress.

II. Procedure in the House of Representatives

A. Developing the Record

The Rules of the House of Representatives, like the Constitution itself, are largely silent on impeachment.  For example, there is no rule that expressly assigns jurisdiction for impeachments to a particular committee.  House precedents establish that impeachment resolutions are to be referred to the Judiciary Committee but leave open the possibility of assigning authority to investigate to other committees.  As a result, there is a great deal of discretion in the Speaker to assign investigation of presidential wrongdoing as she sees fit.  Impeachment investigations, in practice, have typically been assigned to the Judiciary Committee.  The investigations of both Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton were assigned to the Judiciary Committee.  Nonetheless. Speaker Pelosi’s decision to assign investigation of wrongdoing by President Trump in connection with Ukraine to the House Intelligence Committee is perfectly appropriate under the rules of the House.

The nature of the impeachment investigation can vary widely depending on the circumstances.  The House Judiciary Committee’s investigation of Richard Nixon was extensive.  The Committee hired 44 lawyers and employed a total staff of approximately 100 people.  The Committee conducted several months of hearings, many in closed session, and extensive independent research and analysis.  The Clinton impeachment, by contrast, saw the Judiciary Committee conduct a perfunctory process as the Judiciary Committee relied on the report issued by the Independent Counsel, Ken Starr, and did no independent investigation of its own.

Articles of Impeachment

The formal vehicle for accusing the President of having committed a high crime or misdemeanor is an article of impeachment.  The practice of the House has been for the Judiciary Committee to draft and vote on articles of impeachment.  Those articles or accusations that the Committee approves are then sent to the floor for consideration of the full House of Representatives.  It was the floor debates over the articles of impeachment proffered against Bill Clinton where the House Republicans had the opportunity to make their case to the public that he should be impeached.  It was the conduct of these debates that seems to have convinced the public that the impeachment effort was partisan.

View more legal analysis from the ACS network.

Once the House adopts articles of impeachment, it selects a group of managers to act as prosecutors in the impeachment trial to be held in the Senate.  The selection of House managers can happen in several ways, including direct election by the full House, adoption of a resolution naming the managers, or a resolution authorizing the Speaker to name them.  Under any method, the Speaker and the leadership effectively hold the power to designate the slate of managers.  There is longstanding concern with this method of prosecuting impeachments as the lawyering skills of House members are often not on par with the skills of the professional counsel retained to defend the subject of the impeachment.  The House managers could retain outside counsel to make oral arguments and conduct the examination of witnesses during the Senate’s impeachment trial, though House members are predictably reluctant to forego such a prime opportunity to appear in the national limelight.

The Nixon impeachment did not reach this stage because the bipartisan consensus in favor of removing him from office was so overwhelming that he resigned.  In the case of President Clinton, the House appointed 13 Republican members of the Judiciary Committee.  Their advocacy did nothing to dispel the broadly held sense that the impeachment of President Clinton was, in fact, a partisan affair.

III. Trial in the Senate

A. Initiating the Trial

The Constitution clearly contemplates that the Senate will in fact hold a trial upon Articles of Impeachment duly adopted by the House of Representatives.  The Constitution does not, however, by its express terms command the Senate to hold a trial.  Given the refusal of the Majority Leader to allow the Senate to consider President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland for the Supreme Court, one might anticipate that Senator McConnell would similarly refuse to hold an impeachment trial were the House to impeach President Trump (especially since the Constitution just as clearly contemplates that the Senate will consider a Supreme Court nominee and vote to confirm or reject the nomination).

The Senate has adopted Rules of Impeachment that do appear to require the Senate to hold a trial.  Rule III commands:

Upon such articles being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 o’clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such presentation, or sooner if ordered by the Senate, proceed to the consideration of such articles and shall continue in session from day to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be rendered, and so much longer as may, in its judgment, be needful.

Thus, the Senate’s consideration is automatically initiated by the House managers introducing the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and appearing at the bar of the Senate.  See Rules I, II.

B. Trial Procedures

The Senate does not follow its normal rules of order during an impeachment trial.  Senators may not engage in colloquy, question witnesses, or otherwise participate in the presentation of the case.  The Senate Rules for Impeachment provide, in fulfillment of the constitutional requirement, that the Chief Justice shall preside over the trial when the President has been impeached.  See Rule IV.  The rules provide for pre-trial orders to be issued by the presiding officer, and for process to compel the witnesses to appear and give evidence.  During the proceedings, the Senators are required to remain silent and to function as a jury.  The trial itself functions largely in the manner of any ordinary trial, with lawyers on both sides making opening statements, presenting evidence, questioning witnesses, making motions and objections (ruled on by the Chief Justice), and making closing statements.  The Senate rules provide that the function of receiving evidence may be committed to a committee.  This process has been used for the impeachment trial of District Court Judges.  It has never been used for the trial of a President, and it is difficult to imagine the Senate seriously contemplating delegating this function to a committee.  After both sides make their closing statements, the question of conviction is presented to the Senate.  At that point, the Senate meets in closed session to deliberate.  When the deliberation is concluded, the Presiding officer presents the question, calls the name of each senator, and each senator must respond by saying either “guilty” or “not guilty”.  No speech is permitted and no other response is in order.  When called upon to vote on whether to convict President Clinton, Senator Arlen Specter attempted to vote “not proven” but this response was ruled out of order.

C. Punishment

If any civil officer, including the President, is convicted of having committed a high crime or misdemeanor, the Constitution imposes a mandatory punishment: removal from office.  Were the House to impeach and the Senate to convict President Trump, he would be removed from office as President.  But he would be allowed to run for the presidency again.  In fact, Judge Alcee Hastings was elected to Congress after having been impeached and convicted on corruption charges.  He is currently serving his thirteenth term as a Representative from Florida.

The Constitution, however, allows the Senate to impose as an additional punishment “disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”  The Senate may approve this punishment by a simple majority vote, but it has imposed this disqualification only twice (against Judge West Humphreys in 1862 and Judge Robert Archbald in 1913) in the nation’s history.

Kinkopf served as Counselor to Sen. Joseph Biden for the Impeachment Trial of President Clinton.

The Unbearable Incoherence of Senate Obstructionism

After the House of Representatives voted two articles of impeachment on Wednesday against Donald J. Trump, Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced a decision to delay sending those Articles to the Senate. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has made clear his preference for getting a brief impeachment trial over and done. In rendering the start of the trial at least temporarily uncertain, the postponement thus appears to be a strategic move to pressure Senate Republicans to allow subpoenas for witnesses and documentary evidence. McConnell has resisted calls for such additional factfinding, and Pelosi has said the delay is simply to help insure that she has chosen impeachment managers for the House well suited to the sort of process the Senate intends to pursue.

McConnell’s defense for opposing new witnesses is that it was the House’s job, not the Senate’s, to determine the facts that would conclusively demonstrate Trump’s guilt or innocence. Investigation, according to McConnell, is solely the job of the House.

Collusion between the White House and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell in planning the Senate impeachment trial has already raised questions as to how Senate Republicans view their constitutional role. McConnell’s dismissing the Articles as “shoddy” is of a piece with statements by Senate Judiciary Committee chair Lindsey Graham that he is “not trying to pretend to be a fair juror” and would not read the transcripts of House witness testimony because “I’ve written the whole process off. . . . I think this is a bunch of B.S.” Although Senate trial rules require the impeachment jurors to take an oath to do “impartial justice,” McConnell has confessed, “I'm not impartial about this at all.” One wishes Senator Lindsey Graham would introduce McConnell to former Congressman Lindsey Graham, who bemoaned, during the run-up to the Clinton impeachment, that “[p]eople have made up their minds in a political fashion that will hurt this country long-term.”

McConnell’s statements, however, inaccurately conflate the House role in impeachment—in essence, an indictment—and the Senate’s role in actually conducting a trial. Impeachment is a civil and not a criminal process, as recently reaffirmed by House Judiciary Committee staff. Yet to some extent, the respective roles of the House and Senate can usefully be analogized to the roles of a grand jury and trial court in criminal proceedings. Grand juries may indict based on a finding of probable cause, that is, on a determination that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a trial. Trial courts do not exclude evidence on the ground that it was not presented to a grand jury.

Just as with a grand jury and a trial court, the different fact-finding roles of House and Senate are reflected in the degree of consensus required for deciding the outcome of their respective tasks of decisionmaking. In the criminal process, a grand jury may indict without unanimity; criminal jury verdicts in most jurisdictions are required to be unanimous. In the impeachment process, the House equivalent of an indictment requires concurrence only by a majority of representatives. Conviction in the Senate and the consequent removal from office require a vote of two-thirds. These differences recognize that the fact-finders confront different tasks in the two settings. The differences are also appropriate given that conviction—whether on impeachment or on indictment—carries far graver consequences than even solemn accusation.

McConnell can also not determine unilaterally whether witnesses may be called. In a trial of the President, it is the Chief Justice of the United States who presides. Under the Senate’s impeachment rules, “the Presiding Officer on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence including, but not limited to, questions of relevancy, materiality, and redundancy of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the Senate.” The rules further set out the precise text for testimonial subpoenas.

Whether these rules will actually govern is uncertain. The Senate may vote on a new set of rules, which seems an unlikely prospect. And even if the current rules are maintained, they permit individual Senators to call into question the rulings of the presiding officer—that is, the Chief Justice—which would then be put to a vote of the Senate. It is uncertain how a majority of the Senate would vote on procedural matters.

The procedural stance of the lead Republican actors has been peculiar throughout the impeachment investigation. House Republicans insisted they were being excluded from secret hearings, even though Republican committee members were not only attending those hearings, but questioning the witnesses. President Trump complained bitterly that House Democrats were denying him the opportunity to defend himself and then declined their invitation to do so. Against that background, it should perhaps be unsurprising for McConnell to complain that fact-finding has heretofore been insufficient, but that no further fact-finding should occur. Yet votes by Republican Senators to preclude witnesses would be politically more difficult than ultimate votes to acquit, especially were the Chief Justice to approve the Democrats’ requested subpoenas.

In Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton made the case why the Senate was the ideal institution for trying impeachments. “Where else than in the Senate,” he asked rhetorically, “could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?” Hamilton would not have recognized in today’s Senate—at least thus far—the qualities of dignity, independence, and impartiality he anticipated. The majority seems far too “[]awed and []influenced” by the President whose excesses they are supposed to help check and balance.

Facial Recognition Regulation – A Year in Review

Over the course of the last year, lawmakers at the federal, state, and local levels have introduced, and in a few notable cases enacted, a variety of proposals to regulate facial recognition technology. These proposals range from all out bans on government use of facial recognition to narrowly drawn prohibitions on very specific uses of the technology. While any given proposal may leave significant gaps in regulation, the combination of federal, state, and local regulation has the potential to form a robust system of protections. Absent sweeping federal regulation—which seems unlikely in the current political climate—continued action at every level of government is needed to protect our civil liberties.

There are good reasons lawmakers have turned their attention to facial recognition technology. For starters, many facial recognition models show significant bias against marginalized groups. Time and time again, studies have shown that facial recognition tools are less accurate when applied to women and people with darker skin, including in commercial systems used by federal law enforcement agencies. Specific uses of facial recognition raise additional problems—such as automated gender recognition, which regularly misidentifies transgender people. As facial recognition technology proliferates, so do the consequences of misidentification, from being denied boarding for a flight to being wrongfully arrested.

Inaccuracy isn’t the only issue with facial recognition, though. Like many technologies promising improved efficiency, facial recognition can act as a force multiplier for already flawed and unjust systems. This is especially true where facial recognition technology is used to match subjects to existing criminal databases—a common use case for law enforcement agencies. Black and latinx people are more likely to be arrested, and therefore more likely to be included in criminal databases, than white people, even where there are similar levels of criminal conduct. When facial recognition is used match images against these databases, the overinclusion bias towards black and latinx individuals is amplified by the power of modern technology.

Even for those individuals fortunate enough to avoid or opt out of facial recognition systems, there is a very real risk of chilling free speech. The chilling effect of government surveillance is well-documented and is backed up by empirical research. Facial recognition technology, in combination with the proliferation of government-controlled video feeds in the form of surveillance and police body-worn cameras, presents concerns of a constitutional dimension. In addition to chilling free speech in contravention of the First Amendment, government use of facial recognition technology may violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and—due to the issues of bias described above—the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fortunately, progress is being made. At the local level, 2019 was something of a banner year for the regulation of facial recognition. Since January, San Francisco, Oakland, and two Boston area suburbs have banned municipal use of facial recognition technologies. State governments took up the issue as well. California recently enacted a law placing a three-year moratorium on the use of facial recognition with police-worn body cameras. Michigan is considering a bill that would prohibit law enforcement from using facial recognition in conjunction with any real-time video feed. Proposed legislation in Massachusetts would go even further, placing a moratorium on all government use of facial recognition technology without express statutory permission.

Progress at the state and local level doesn’t obviate the need for federal legislation though. After all, a state-by-state or city-by-city approach could leave significant portions of the population without protection from the harms associated with facial recognition. Moreover, only the federal government can regulate federal agencies such as the FBI and ICE, both of which are known proponents of facial recognition technology. In fact, it was the secretive and potentially unlawful use of facial recognition by these federal agencies that prompted a series of hearings in front of multiple congressional committees earlier this year.

Over the course of the 2019, at least half a dozen bills that would limit the use of facial recognition technology were introduced in Congress. However, none of these bills have yet made it out of committee. Moreover, some of these proposals are extremely limited in scope. Take, for example, Senate bill S.2878. Titled the “Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act of 2019,” it certainly sounds impressive. It seems to check many of the right boxes: a warrant requirement for the use of facial recognition, suppression of evidence as a remedy, and mandatory reports on the extent of government use of facial recognition. However, its scope is limited to the use of facial recognition for “ongoing surveillance,” defined as the tracking of an individual’s physical location for a period of more than three days.

Civil liberties advocates may find the protections provided by S.2878 underwhelming for a couple of reasons. First, the proscribed use of facial recognition—tracking an individual’s physical movement through public spaces—is not yet widespread. Rather, the most common police use of facial recognition is to match images or video stills against government databases. Second, under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Carpenter, tracking using facial recognition likely already requires a warrant. This doesn’t mean S.2878 is not helpful; it could take years for courts to recognize constitutional limitations on facial recognition surveillance, and a narrow bill like S.2878 may be more politically viable than omnibus facial recognition legislation. Still, we should recognize S.2878 for what it is: a narrow fix that, constitutionally speaking, is literally the least we can do.

Another federal proposal that is more immediately applicable is H.4021, which would require federal agencies to get a warrant before running facial recognition matches against government identification databases. An even more sweeping proposal is H.3875, which would prohibit the purchase of facial recognition technology with federal funds. However, H.4021 and H.3875 have not picked up bipartisan support, making their prospects for advancement dim.

Ultimately, it seems clear that advancing the causes of privacy, free speech, and equal protection will require a combination of approaches. Local and state governments have proven more responsive to growing concerns about misuse of facial recognition, but federal action is necessary as well to check the power of the FBI, ICE, and other powerful federal investigative agencies. At every level of government, choices must be made about what uses of facial recognition should be prohibited. While real-time facial analysis and physical tracking are certainly dangers to civil liberties, lawmakers must not lose sight of the more mundane, but also more common, uses of facial recognition as well. A complete ban, or at least a moratorium, on government use of facial recognition may be the safest route for the time being—at least where there is sufficient political will for such regulation. Failing that, a robust network of laws regulating various uses of facial recognition technology at multiple levels of government is essential for the protection of our civil liberties.

Research on Graduate Assistants and Right to Unionize Challenges NLRB Proposed Rule

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This originally appeared at Labor Online, the blog of the Labor and Working Class History Association website.

On November 20, 2019, National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Professions, Hunter College, City University of New York submitted comments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in response to its proposed rule to exclude graduate assistants and student employees from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The comments include history, empirical evidence, and legal precedent.

This year marks the first half-century of unionization and collective bargaining involving student employees in higher education in the United States.  In 1969, the New York State Public Employment Relations Board certified a union to represent a bargaining unit at the City University of New York (CUNY) that included teaching assistants, research assistants, and research associates.

Union representation of CUNY graduate teaching and research assistants has continued until the present day in a bargaining unit that includes faculty and other professionals.  Similarly, teaching assistants at Rutgers University have been continuously represented in a bargaining unit with faculty since the early 1970s.  The longevity and stability of the combined units at the CUNY and Rutgers University undermine claims by other institutions that the unionization of graduate assistants will impair faculty-graduate student relations.

In the same year as the original CUNY certification, a collective bargaining relationship for teaching assistants only was established at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  Negotiations between the university and the Teachers’ Assistants Association led to a written contract, signed on April 17, 1970, that set the terms of employment for approximately 1,900 teaching assistants. The earliest known certification of a union to represent student food service workers on campus was issued on April 28, 1970 to AFSCME Council 75 for a bargaining unit at the University of Oregon.

Over the next five decades, a large body of state and Canadian provincial legal precedent developed finding that graduate assistants and other student employees had the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining at public institutions.  In Florida and Missouri, state appellate courts have ruled that graduate assistants have a state constitutional right to organize, underscoring the importance of state constitutions as sources of labor rights.

In contrast, the NLRB has flip flopped over the decades concerning whether the same rights exist under federal labor law.  The last NLRB ruling was in the Columbia University decision, which found graduate and undergraduate assistants had the right to organize.  During the NLRB’s decisional oscillation over the years, it has largely ignored public sector history, precedent, and collective bargaining experience at public colleges and universities.

The purpose of the NLRB’s proposed rule is to overturn the Columbia University decision through regulation rather than adjudication.  If the rule is adopted more than 81,000 graduate assistants at over 500 private institutions will be excluded from NLRA coverage, and it would constitute the largest per se exclusion of an occupation since Taft-Hartley.

In the National Center’s comments we presented data from the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics and the United States Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, demonstrating that the NLRB’s proposed rule would exclude from NLRA coverage at least 81,390 graduate assistants working at 518 private institutions in occupations recognized by those other federal agencies, and treated as distinct from the classification of graduate student.

Our comments examined the terms of 42 current collective bargaining agreements involving graduate and undergraduate student employees in the United States. Ten of the contracts are with private institutions of higher education and the remainder with public institutions.

We found that bargaining unit composition subject to the contracts vary from graduate assistants only (66.67%), units with graduate assistants and professional staff (19.05%), units of graduate assistants and faculty or units of graduate assistants, faculty, and professional staff (2.38%).  Our findings are set forth in Figure 3.

Student Employee Bargaining Unit Composition

We also examined the substantive terms of the 42 agreements.  We found that the most common contract provisions (100%) address wages and grievance-arbitration procedures. The next most common provisions are non-discrimination, and terms of appointment clauses, which are found in 41 agreements (97.62%), followed by management rights and union security provisions contained in 40 agreements (95.24%). Over 90% of the 42 agreements address health care benefits (39), health and safety (38), union access (38), and no-strike clauses are included in over three-quarters of the agreements (32). More than 80% of the contracts have provisions concerning employee leave (37), workload (35), and workplace discipline (35). Academic freedom is specifically addressed in over 30% of the agreements, and intellectual property is a negotiated topic in over a quarter of the contracts. Retirement is a subject in 19% of the contracts. Our findings are set forth in Figure 4.

Graph: The most common contract provisions for student employees (100%) address wages and grievance-arbitration procedures

The deadline for submitting comments to the NLRB concerning its proposed rule regarding graduate assistants and other student workers ends on January 15, 2020. Those interested in responding to the National Center’s comments can submit a reply to the NLRB on or before Wednesday, January 29, 2020.