Zarda v. Altitude Express: The Inexorable Progress of LGBT Workplace Equality and the Covert Creep of “Statutory Originalism”

*Professor Eyer’s Issue Brief on this subject, Sex Discrimination Law and LGBT Equality is available on the ACS website.

Since the 1970s, LGBT employees have argued that discrimination against them violates Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of…sex.”  Despite the fact that such arguments already had support under the growing body of precedent construing Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, the courts—unable to believe that Congress could have intended for LGBT employees to be protected—initially rejected those arguments. The Second Circuit’s recent decision in Zarda v. Altitude Express—the latest in a string of decisions recognizing that anti-LGBT discrimination in the workplace is discrimination “because of…sex”—further demonstrates that, stripped of such extra-textual assumptions about Congressional intent, anti-LGBT discrimination clearly is also sex discrimination.

Zarda is the second case in which a circuit has gone en banc to reconsider its precedents rejecting the argument that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is discrimination on the basis of sex.   Joining the en banc Seventh Circuit, the en banc Second Circuit in Zarda held on Monday that discrimination based on sexual orientation is unavoidably also discrimination based on sex. It thus becomes the second major decision in the last year—the first being Hively v. Ivy Tech— to recognize that L/G/B employees are, categorically, protected by federal sex discrimination law.  The Second and Seventh Circuits thus join the EEOC in its view that sexual orientation discrimination is, categorically, sex discrimination. (Many circuits and the EEOC had already reached a very similar conclusion with respect to gender identity.)

As both the majority and the concurrences in Zarda observe, this conclusion is virtually impossible to avoid, if one takes seriously existing Supreme Court and Circuit precedent. There is no question, for example, that an employer treats a gay man (like Zarda) differently “because….of [his] sex” when the employer terminates Zarda for dating men, while not taking the same action against a woman who engages in the same conduct.  So too, the decisions of the Supreme Court have made clear that gender stereotyping—requiring men or women to conform to a stereotype associated with their sex—is sex discrimination.  (And, as the Second Circuit recognizes in Zarda, “same-sex orientation ‘represents the ultimate case of failure to conform’ to gender stereotypes…”  (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. Coll of Ind. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).  Finally, the Second Circuit, like many other circuits, has long recognized in the race context that “associational” discrimination (discrimination because of the individual’s relationship with a person of a particular race) violates Title VII. As the majority and concurrences recognize, there is no principled basis for treating Title VII’s proscriptions on discrimination “because of…race” differently from its proscriptions on discrimination “because of…sex.”

For the most part, the dissents in Zarda take the well-worn tack of contending that Congress—and, the dissent emphasizes, the public in 1964—surely would not have expected Title VII’s sex discrimination proscriptions to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  But as the majority notes, this, while true, is irrelevant under the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation precedents, which make clear that—even if a particular instance was not what Congress had in mind (and might even have opposed)—if it is covered by the statutory text, it is included.

But while the core themes of the dissents are not new, it is worth noting that the primary dissent in Zarda—like the dissent in Hively—does take a novel approach in one respect: their embrace of so-called “statutory originalism.” Drawing on the idea of “original public meaning”—a concept developed by academics in the context of constitutional originalism—the dissents in both Zarda and Hively have attempted to repackage the familiar “Congress couldn’t have wanted this specific outcome” argument in new, more respectable garb.  (Note that the term “original public meaning,” while used in over 1,000 law review articles, appears in only 30 cases of any kind throughout the federal judiciary—and only 4, including Zarda and Hively in the statutory interpretation context.)

But this tactic is simply the same argument, dressed up in new language—and it is fundamentally inconsistent with the textualist approach to statutory interpretation that a majority of the Supreme Court endorses today.  While some have attempted to characterize statutory originalism as meaningfully distinct, in fact, as applied by its proponents in Zarda and Hively, it is simply an attempt to resurrect the discredited principle that one can carve out of the plain text specific applications that individuals at the time (be they Congress or the public) would have opposed. That is, the dissents argue that because the public would not have understood Title VII to encompass sexual orientation discrimination (and probably would have opposed it) their views should trump the text.  But this is not the approach to statutory interpretation that the Supreme Court (including prominent textualists like Justice Scalia) has endorsed—indeed it has repeatedly repudiated logically indistinguishable arguments. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) (rejecting arguments that male on male sexual harassment could not be actionable under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions because Congress surely did not have it in mind on the grounds that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed”).

Whether the statutory originalism of the dissenters in cases like Zarda and Hively will become the new conservative approach to statutory interpretation more widely remains to be seen. (Certainly, it is at least in some tension with many conservatives’ rejection of purposivism as a statutory interpretation methodology). But we should not be fooled that it is simply an application of existing textualist statutory interpretation methods (including, for example, looking to contemporary sources like dictionaries for meaning).  Rather, as applied in cases like Zarda and Hively, it represents a new effort to achieve an old, discredited goal: ignoring neutral legal principles to carve out unpopular groups from the law’s protections.

Washington’s Conflicts Of Interest Don’t Stop At The High Court’s Steps

On April 16, the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court will take the bench for arguments in an obscure section of the tax code. Then, about an hour later, Justice Alito will leave the bench before the start of a patent infringement case, WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp.

The Chief won’t be putting his fellow Bush 43 appointee in timeout; rather, Alito will be recused due to his stock ownership in WesternGeco’s parent company, Schlumberger. According to his most recent financial disclosure report, Alito held between $1 and $15,000 in Schlumberger shares at the end of 2016. (Justices’ holdings are given in ranges, and the 2017 report won’t come out until June.)

Should a justice recuse himself – and leave the possibility of a 4-4 tie, keeping a lower court’s ruling in place and rendering the high court all but supreme – when he has such a small stake in a publicly traded company? According to the law, he must: a justice shall “disqualify himself [when he] has a financial interest in […] a party to the proceeding.” The statute doesn’t indicate the size of that interest.

The larger issue here is whether justices should own individual stocks to begin with, thereby inviting recusals that may deadlock the court on a regular basis. The answer is there’s no good reason, especially when you consider that only three of the nine – Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Alito – hold these types of securities and that their portfolios led to four dozen disqualifications last term. (The other six justices, by the way, invest primarily in real estate[1], fixed income and retirement accounts – i.e., instruments that are far less likely to induce a recusal.)

There’s a related situation that has recently come up and does not trigger a recusal, though probably should: when a justice owns shares in a company that has submitted a “friend of the court,” or amicus, brief supporting a party in the suit.

That’s exactly what happened in U.S. v. Microsoft, a case argued on Feb. 27 on whether the government can use a warrant to search e-mail stored by an American company on an overseas server. A victory for Microsoft would be a win for the entire tech industry – we know this because Amazon, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Google and Verizon submitted an amicus brief saying as much – and could positively impact its share price and the price of other tech stocks.

As it turns out, Breyer owns up to $100,000 in Cisco shares. Whether or not he sides with Microsoft in this case – and we won’t know until the end of June – it looks a bit fishy for him to sit on the suit while holding Cisco stock. (Lower court judges, by the way, are cautioned against hearing cases in which a company whose shares they own have submitted an amicus brief. The justices are exempt from these types of admonishments.)

No matter which side you favor in the patent infringement case or the overseas servers case, the justices’ portfolios shouldn’t be playing a supporting role, and there are several ways to solve the problem.

Congress could pass a law stating that all federal judges, including the justices, divest from individual securities during their time on the bench. A more immediate and realistic tactic would be to convince the three justices to sell their shares. They have started to, as three years ago, Roberts, Breyer and Alito collectively owned more than six dozen stocks, and now they’re down to 49.

But that’s not happening fast enough. Several publicly traded amici are already expected to weigh in on a case the high court has granted for argument next term on the applicability of certain parts of the Federal Arbitration Act.

At a time when Washington is a matryoshka doll of conflicts, one would expect the Supreme Court to do all it could to demonstrate it’s acting with integrity. Yet the justices – at least three of them – should do more, by divesting from the corporations whose cases and controversies reach their desks.

*Gabe Roth is executive director of Fix the Court, a national nonpartisan organization that advocates for greater openness and accountability from the federal courts system. Invite him to host an event

State Prosecutions After Trump Pardons - Mueller's Plan B?

*This piece was originally posted on Crooks and Liars.

"There's no limit to what can be accomplished if it doesn't matter who gets the credit."

Versions of this team-first principle have been attributed to, among others, Benjamin Jowett, Father Strickland, William T. Arnold, Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, Charles Edward Montague, and Edward Everett Hale.

It might not be possible to say conclusively who deserves credit for this insight - original-authorship credit, that is - but it is pertinent to Special Counsel Mueller's investigation, especially when his investigation focuses on Trump, his family, and their businesses.

First, recall that, during an interview with the New York Times, approximately three months after Mueller's appointment in May 2017, Trump identified his non-Russia-related finances and family's finances as a "red line" Mueller should not cross:

[NYT]: Last thing, if Mueller was looking at your finances and your family finances, unrelated to Russia — is that a red line?

[NYT]: Would that be a breach of what his actual charge is?

TRUMP: I would say yeah. I would say yes.

It's noteworthy that the Times interviewers framed the question as "...finances and...family finances, unrelated to Russia..." It appears they assumed that Russia-related finances are in bounds. This assumption seems questionable: would Trump actually permit or tolerate Mueller's investigating any aspects of his or his family's businesses?

Trump didn't allow the public to see his tax returns when he was a presidential candidate; he doesn't permit disclosure of them now so the public can assess, for example, how he benefits from the recent changes in U.S income-tax laws. It thus seems probable Trump would oppose a federal prosecutor's seeking to examine his Russia-related finances, even if Russian nationals or the government were to disclose publicly any prior or planned investments in Trump businesses.

Trump declined to say specifically whether he'd fire Mueller if he crossed that red line: "I can’t, I can’t answer that question because I don’t think it’s going to happen."

Regardless, Trump identified a red line and hasn't apparently erased or blurred it. And the actual location of that line in relation to Trump family finances unrelated to Russia is at issue again:

Special counsel Robert Mueller's interest in Jared Kushner has expanded beyond his contacts with Russia and now includes his efforts to secure financing for his company from foreign investors during the presidential transition, according to people familiar with the inquiry. This is the first indication that Mueller is exploring Kushner's discussions with potential non-Russian foreign investors, including in China.

Assuming Mueller is in fact interested in Kushner's finances beyond those specifically related to Russia, he also might be interested in how Ivanka Trump's business interests have advanced in China (recently buttressed by favorable intellectual property rulings there). He might also attend to the Trump Organization's recent negotiations over business development in India, led by Donald Trump, Jr..

If Mueller is investigating any of these matters - which is unknowable so long as his investigation remains largely leak-free - he's certainly been alerted to Trump's trigger, and the trigger of his defenders. Mueller's office has recently issued a new indictment concerning Russian election interferencea superseding indictment of Paul Manafortand a separate superseding indictment of Manafort and Rick Gates. The Special Counsel also has secured additional guilty pleas, from Rick Gates, as well as an identity-thief and a lawyer. As these developments have been announced, Mueller also might have noticed that Trump defenders are calling more loudly for presidential pardons of anyone in whom Mueller might be interested.

By this point, it seems fairly clear that Trump could issue presidential pardons to anyone targeted by Mueller (perhaps including Trump himself). Such pardons would protect the recipients from federal prosecution or - if already federally convicted - relieve them of fines and/or prison sentences. And, it doesn't require statistical expertise to predict confidently that Trump's daughter, son, and son-in-law are in the "high-probability-of-presidential-pardon" cohort.

However, as noted previously here, there are legally significant limits to Trump's pardon power. Most importantly for this discussion, he can't pardon people who've been charged or convicted under state criminal laws, even if their conduct amounts to a crime under federal law.

State Criminal Prosecutions After Pardons Under the "Dual Sovereignty Doctrine"

State law-enforcement officials (attorneys general and county prosecutors, usually), acting under State criminal laws, may prosecute conduct that is criminal under State law, even if that exact same conduct, by the exact same actors, has been presidentially pardoned under federal law. For example, under the "dual sovereignty doctrine," a homicide might be a federal hate crime and a state-law homicide. The perpetrator of the hate-crime could be presidentially pardoned, so that the crime could not be prosecuted under federal criminal civil-rights statutes, but the homicide could still be prosecuted as an ordinary murder under state law.

Presidential pardons for Trump family members could give them no protection against state civil suits or criminal prosecution for presidentially pardoned conduct that also violates state laws. This is why reports such as this one, of Mueller's office sharing information with at least one state Attorney General (Eric Schneiderman of New York), are significant.

AG Schneiderman has pursued Trump before: a lawsuit by his office (one of a number of such suits) helped extract $25 million from the Trump organization for former students of Trump University.

Mueller, therefore, could hand off to Schneiderman the fruits of his investigation of Manafort, assuming there is a basis in New York law to investigate and sue or prosecute him. Similarly, Mueller could hand off other targets to Schneiderman - assuming, again, there exists a basis in New York law for action by Schneiderman.

There appears to be such a basis in New York. In fact, there might be multiple bases.

New York's AG has substantial powers under state law to sue civilly and/or prosecute a variety of financial crimes, including those involving fraud. Schneiderman may commence investigations, for example, under the Martin Actthe Executive Law, and the General Business Law. These three laws afford him jurisdiction to pursue fraud involving securities, real estate, and other forms of business transactions.

Not all of these laws might apply specifically to Manafort (or to any or all Mueller's other targets). However, it appears that several of the transactions alleged in Mueller's February 22 superseding indictment of Manafort and Gates would fall within Schneiderman's jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.

Beginning at page 20 of the superseding Manafort/Gates indictment, under the heading, "The Financial Institution Scheme," paragraphs 26-44 allege fraud involving the procurement or use of loans on real estate situated in New York. The description of the scheme begins here:

26. Between in or around 2015 and the present, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, MANAFORT, GATES, and others devised and intended to devise, and executed and attempted to execute, a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property, by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, from banks and other financial institutions. As part of the scheme, MANAFORT and GATES repeatedly provided and caused to be provided false information to banks and other lenders, among others.

27. ...MANAFORT and GATES defrauded the lenders in various ways, including by lying about MANAFORT’s and DMI’s income, lying about their debt, and lying about MANAFORT’s use of the property and the loan proceeds...

Paragraphs 28-44 allege various fraudulent acts to procure loans on residential real estate located in Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Bridgehampton - property physically sited within Schneiderman's jurisdiction. The allegations don't name the lenders that supplied the funds on these properties, but they also could be located within New York. From the standpoint of a state civil investigation or criminal prosecution for fraud in New York, it's probably sufficient that the properties themselves are located in the State.

Schneiderman criminally prosecutes residential mortgage fraud, including what appear to have been conspiracies to commit such fraud. See, for examples, this case, which involved "submitting refinance applications which contained false information," and this case, which involved "preparing false documents used to obtain residential mortgage loans."

Thus, Manafort's recent statement about vigorously defending himself in lieu of pleading guilty (perhaps intended to remind Trump of the value of pardoning Manafort), ultimately might be of limited value to him if Mueller hands off the prosecutorial baton to Schneiderman. Presidential pardons of others, including Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, and Donald Trump, Jr., similarly might afford only limited legal protection to them.

In short, the conduct of the Trump family, and the conduct of other targets of Mueller, might be productive investigative terrain for Schneiderman for civil suits, criminal prosecutions, or both, because it appears neither Mueller nor Schneiderman will care who gets the credit.

Russian Indictment and Extradition

On February 16, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III unsealed a 37-page indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three entities principally with conspiring against the United States to infiltrate the 2016 election through a sophisticated and complex scheme that included the use of stolen identities of American citizens to surreptitiously influence and infiltrate social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Although each United States intelligence agency has definitively stated, without equivocation, that Russia meddled in the 2016 presidential election, those agencies were constrained to explain how Russia did so with any detail because of legal restrictions on classified material. Yet for the first, time, this indictment provides extensive detail about how one aspect of this Russian meddling in the 2016 election occurred.

This indictment, however, likely will never see the inside of a courtroom. None of the defendants have been arrested and, assuming that all 13 of them remain in Russia, the United States is essentially powerless to extradite them and bring them to justice.

Extradition

International extradition is a complex web of laws, treaties, and agreements. For the most part, the extradition of an individual residing in (or visiting) one country (the Resident Country) to another country that has charged that individual with one or more crimes (the Extraditing Country) is governed by treaty. Most democratic countries have treaties with each other to extradite individuals charged with crimes in another country as long as the two countries share “dual criminality,” which is the principle that the charged conduct violates a criminal law in both countries.  There are, of course, additional exceptions, such as whether an individual is charged with a crime that could carry the death penalty; countries that don’t have the death penalty generally will not extradite anyone who may face the death penalty based on the charges against him or her. Once extradited, the doctrine of “dual sovereignty” prohibits a country from adding any additional charges to the original indictment.

In the United States, the extradition process goes through the diplomatic channels of the Department of State.  Although each treaty may contain different protocols, the typical first step is to submit a provisional arrest warrant (PAW) to the Resident Country to request the arrest of the individual pursuant to charges in the United States. If the Resident Country executes the arrest, then the individual may challenge the extradition process in the courts of the Resident Country prior to extradition.  Once the Extraditing Country makes a final decision to extradite the individual pursuant to its own procedures and regulations, the Resident Country relinquishes any control or involvement in the ultimate prosecution of the individual in the Extraditing Country.

A number of countries, however, including, for example, France, Germany and Japan, will not extradite their own citizens for prosecution in other countries regardless of the crime alleged. In those situations, or in the event that there is no extradition treaty or agreement between the Resident Country and the Extraditing Country, the Extraditing Country may file a “red notice” with Interpol, which lodges the arrest warrant in an international database that flags an individual charged with a crime whenever he or she crosses an international border. This is often done while the charges remain under seal so that the charged individual is not aware of the pending charges against him until he is flagged at a border crossing. If that occurs, the Extraditing Country has some time – often 60 days – to initiate the extradition process and the charged individual proceeds through the extradition protocols of the court system in the country where he or she was arrested under the process described above. (Of course, if the charged individual travels to the Extraditing Country voluntarily, that individual can be arrested and prosecuted without the need for extradition.)

Extradition with Russia

Perhaps not surprisingly given the tenor of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the United States and Russia do not have an extradition treaty. In addition, Russia is one of the countries mentioned above that will not extradite its own citizens. So, assuming that the 13 defendants charged in Mueller’s recent indictment remain in Russia, there is no possibility that they will be extradited to the United States. In 2013, as but one example where this process occurred, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York charged Alimzhan Tokhtakhounov – who was better known for being the alleged mastermind of the bribery scheme designed to fix the pairs figure skating competition at the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics – with leading an international racketeering, money laundering and gambling enterprise. American prosecutors alleged that Tokhtakhounov was a “vor,” which means “thief-in-law” and is the equivalent of a mafia boss in Russian organized crime circles. Although nearly all of Tokhtakhounov’s co-defendants were arrested, including some who lived in Trump Tower, Tokhtakhounov continued to live openly and notoriously in Russia.  There, he sat down for interviews with American media outlets and even appeared as a guest at the 2013 Miss America pageant presided over by none other than Donald Trump.

In recent years, Russia has increasingly made extradition difficult even for Russian nationals arrested on American charges in other countries that do have extradition treaties with the United States. The first high profile example of this was the case of Viktor Bout, a Russian national who was arrested in 2008 on terrorism charges out of the Southern District of New York. Russia intervened on Bout’s behalf and argued to the Thai courts that the charges were political in nature and that, as a result, Bout should not be extradited to the United States. Initially, the Thai criminal court agreed with Russia and denied Bout’s extradition. The United States appealed that decision and ultimately, more than two years after his arrest, the Thai high court reversed the lower court’s ruling and allowed for Bout’s extradition to the United States, where he was tried and convicted of conspiring to kill Americans, among other charges.

More recently, Russia has developed a new tactic to prevent its citizens from being extradited from other countries to the United States, particularly in hacking cases. In several of those cases, after a Russian citizen has been arrested pursuant to a PAW from the United States in a neutral country, Russia has itself filed charges against that same individual and requested extradition back to Russia. Although the Russian charges pale in seriousness to the American charges and Russia’s extradition request post-dates that of the United States, this tactic can be effective because countries generally prefer to extradite individuals to face charges in their own country rather than another foreign country.

The Mueller Indictment and Extradition

With this backdrop, and particularly considering the political nature of the charges in the Indictment, one can surmise that Mueller understood that the only way to arrest and prosecute any of the 13 defendants would be to arrest them in the United States. Although the Indictment details travel to the United States by some of the defendants – albeit using fraudulent means in several instances – Mueller and his team likely recognized that future American travel was unlikely in light of the overt nature of his investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election.

Mueller could have chosen to file the Indictment under seal, lodged a red notice, and waited for any of the 13 defendants to travel outside of Russia, a far more likely scenario than any of them traveling to the United States. But even assuming the Russian government did not alert the defendants to the red notice against them – which is unlikely – Mueller and his team would be staring down the barrel of a prolonged extradition proceeding against non-governmental actors that would usurp time and resources without any guarantee of success.

So why unseal an Indictment charging 13 people with interfering in the 2016 election without any legitimate hope of bringing them to justice? I see two principle reasons.

First, this Indictment explains in great detail the extensive and sophisticated nature and scope of Russia’s “information warfare” that infiltrated the 2016 election, which had not previously been publicized. Part of the Special Counsel’s mandate is to investigate and uncover any and all Russian involvement in the 2016 election, and this Indictment, which provides the first definitive explanation for at least one way that Russia meddled in the election, will serve as the document of historical record as to this aspect of Russia’s intervention in the election. That is an important public service, regardless of whether anyone ultimately goes to jail because of it.

Second, Mueller has been under constant attack from the President and his allies about the legitimacy of his investigation. The evidence outlined in this lengthy Indictment, explained in unusually painstaking detail, demonstrates for the first time in black and white that Russia did, in fact, meddle in the 2016 election. And while there are no allegations of a conspiracy to do so with any Americans (more commonly referred to as “collusion”), those who refuted the intelligence agencies’ unequivocal declarations that Russia interfered in the election no longer have a valid basis to do so. Mueller has enhanced the legitimacy of the Special Counsel’s role and mandate through these charges, and the focus now moves from whether there was interference by Russia in the 2016 election to whether and to what extent any Americans knowingly conspired with Russians to do so. To Mueller, that is undoubtedly a worthy cause.

*Daniel S. Goldman spent 10 years as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, where he was Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Unit and Senior Trial Counsel in the Securities and Commodities Fraud Unit.  He has provided legal commentary on MSNBC and RNN/FIOS1.  

A Problem Congress Should Solve

*This piece was originally posted on Microsoft On the Issues

Today we’ll make our arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in what everyone agrees is an important case for privacy rights around the world, for international relations, and for building trust in the technology we all rely on every day.

We believe we have compelling arguments and we look forward to the opportunity to make them before the nine Justices of the Supreme Court.  But while attention today will focus on the Supreme Court, we believe the most important work should take place in the Capitol building across the street, by the U.S. Congress.

In 2013 U.S. law enforcement served on Microsoft a search warrant for customer data stored in our datacenter in Ireland. While we don’t believe that U.S. law grants the Government the right to reach across borders to obtain private information, we do believe that the U.S. should work with the Irish government to obtain the data they want. Unilateral actions like this will undermine privacy protections of customers everywhere, and are a recipe for international tensions, conflict and chaos.

Everyone agrees that new technology poses new problems that need to be solved. We’ve argued since the day we filed this case in 2013 that we need modern laws to govern today’s technology. We can’t rely on laws written three decades ago, before the internet as we know it was invented. Ultimately the courts – including the Supreme Court – can decide only whether the Department of Justice’s approach passes muster under current law. The courts are not able to write a new law. Under the U.S. Constitution, only Congress can do that, using its tools to craft a nuanced solution that balances all the competing concerns by enacting a statute for the 21st century.

Strong momentum for new laws

The good news is that there is strong momentum for a legislative solution. Earlier this month the CLOUD Act was introduced in Congress. It has bi-partisan support in both houses of Congress, as well as support from the Department of Justice, the White House, the National Association of Attorneys General and a broad cross section of technology companies. The CLOUD Act creates both the incentive and the framework for governments to sit down and negotiate modern bi-lateral agreements that will define how law enforcement agencies can access data across borders to investigate crimes. It ensures these agreements have appropriate protections for privacy and human rights and gives the technology companies that host customer data new statutory rights to stand up for the privacy rights of their customers around the world.

Standing up for national sovereignty

While we are encouraged by the momentum for legislative solutions, we also look forward to today’s oral argument before the Supreme Court.  We believe we have compelling arguments and we’re grateful for the breadth and depth of the support we’ve received in the case.  In January, 289 different groups and individuals from 37 countries signed 23 different legal briefs supporting Microsoft’s position that Congress never gave U.S. law enforcement the power to ignore treaties and breach Ireland’s sovereignty by reaching into Ireland to obtain the data they are seeking. The U.S. Government argues that it can reach across borders based on a law enacted in 1986, before anyone conceived of cloud computing. We don’t believe there is any indication that Congress intended such a result.

This is not to say that law enforcement should never access emails in other countries. We’ve said repeatedly that there are times when this is necessary to protect public safety, but that it should be governed by modern laws that respect people’s privacy rights and the sovereignty of other countries.

As we stand before the Justices tomorrow we’ll make four key points:

  • Data has a real, physical location: We are not alone in arguing that it does. Fifty-one prominent computer scientists explained in their legal brief that emails are stored in known physical locations, on hard drives, in datacenter facilities. When the U.S. Government requires a tech company to execute a warrant for emails stored overseas, the provider must search a foreign datacenter and make a copy abroad, and then import that copy to the United States. This creates a complex issue with international consequences. It shouldn’t be resolved by having the courts take the law to a place it was never intended to go.
  • The Government’s approach infringes on the sovereignty of other countries and risks a significant conflict of law between friendly nations: The international ramifications are clearly illustrated by the list of governments who joined amicus briefs or made public statements in the case, supporting key parts of Microsoft’s position. The list includes Ireland, France, the European Commission, European privacy regulators and members of the European Parliament, to name just some. Other countries want to be in control of when and how law enforcement agencies access data belonging to their citizens. When one country seeks private emails stored in another country, international treaties and norms require bilateral cooperation, not unilateral actions. The risk of foreign relations clashes is all the more acute because state and local U.S. law enforcement—not just federal officials—can invoke the Stored Communications Act, the law the DOJ is using in this case.
  • The Government’s approach puts at risk the privacy rights of people around the world including in the United States: People deserve to have their privacy protected by their own country’s laws. If the U.S. Government obtains the power to unilaterally search and seize the private communications of foreign citizens that are stored exclusively in foreign countries, then other governments will be emboldened to do the same to us. Foreign countries will demand that tech companies copy and transmit to them the private emails of U.S. persons without regard for local law and without the knowledge or consent of the local government or the account owner.
  • The Government’s approach is bad for the U.S. economy and American jobs: U.S. companies are leaders in cloud computing. This leadership is based on trust. If customers around the world believe that the U.S. Government has the power to unilaterally reach in to datacenters operated by American companies, without reference or notification to their own government, they won’t trust this technology.

Today is an important day. We are looking forward to the opportunity to make our case. And at the same time, we hope that members of Congress will keep moving quickly to create the modern laws that everyone agrees are needed.

What’s Tenure Got to Do With Janus v. AFSCME?

For the fourth time in six years, the Supreme Court yesterday took up the question of whether a state may require public sector employees to pay for the collective representation a union provides as part of the state’s chosen system of labor management relations. And yet again, at argument, Justice Kennedy came in swinging against a strawman – teacher tenure.

As the Solicitor General of Illinois explained the interest that state has in a “stable, responsible, independent counterparty” in bargaining, the Justice sarcastically queried whether that interest extended to promoting “teacher tenure.” In raising the issue, Justice Kennedy was returning to a well-trod theme. In all three of the arguments since Knox involving fair share fees, Kennedy has viewed tenure –inexplicably – to be somehow relevant to the constitutionality of fair share fees.

To set the record straight, tenure is a creature of state statutes, not collective bargaining agreements. Beginning in the early 20th Century, long before any state had extended collective bargaining rights to public sector employees, states adopted teacher tenure laws, which provide teachers with a modicum of job security after they have done their jobs successfully for an extended period – usually for three years or more. These laws improve public education by, as one court has explained, "preventing the removal of capable and experienced teachers at the political or personal whim of changing officeholders."

The concerns that motived states to enact tenure laws were well founded. For example, during World War I, Quaker teachers were fired because of their pacifist objections to the war. In the midst of job scarcity during the Great Depression, women teachers were often fired once they were married. In response to civil rights movement, several southern states voted to revoke teacher licenses for membership in the NAACP and other organizations that supported school integration. And, after the Court handed down its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, many of those states repealed tenure laws to allow white officials to fire black teachers in newly integrated schools.

When much later in the 20th Century, states began to extend collective bargaining rights to public employees, tenure rights were carved out of the bargaining process altogether either by statute or by subsequent decision. The California Supreme Court’s 1996 Round Valley decision (914 P.2d 193), holding that collective bargaining agreements must give way to contrary provisions of the California Education Code – including its tenure provisions – is but one example, and others are canvassed in NEA’s Janus amicus.

While the question of whether the Supreme Court should throw out a half century precedent that undergirds almost half of the state’s labor management systems is certainly politically fraught, and even doctrinally difficult given the potential ramifications for the Court’s Pickering and Garcetti precedents, the question does not call for – and should not be answered by – views on the merits of tenure laws, which are neither bargained, nor charged to feepayers.