Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe, in Exclusive Interview, Discusses New Book on the Roberts Court

The following interview of Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe about his book Uncertain Justice: The Roberts Court and the Constitution (Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz, Henry Holt and Co., 2014, ISBN 978-0-8050-9909-6) took place in the Ohio Room of the Capitol Hilton in Washington, D.C. on June 20 during the 2014 Convention of the American Constitution Society. The Interviewer is Frank Housh of the Housh Law Offices, PLLC, in Buffalo New York, Chair of the ACS WNY Lawyer Group and a member of the National Book Critics Circle.

Interviewer

Your book seems to consciously avoid some of the characteristics of books written for the legal profession, such as voluminous footnotes and block quotes.  Was this a book meant for the general public?

Laurence Tribe

It wasn't so much that I consciously was not writing a book for lawyers. I was consciously not writing a book only for lawyers. I definitely want the legal community to get a better understanding than it seems to have displayed about what makes the Supreme Court operate the way it does, what drives the decisions, why the standard sort of press accounts are such oversimplified caricatures. At the same time, I certainly wanted to speak to my own colleagues and the people who teach constitutional law with fresh insights. So I didn't want it to be only for non-lawyers, but I wanted it to be very broadly accessible. So that for me, as soon as someone like Doris Kearns Goodwin said that she thought everybody would enjoy my book it, find it thrilling and fascinating, that's what I was aiming for—because I think that lawyers too often speak only to one another and judges and there's a kind of clique and almost a sort of inside mentality of the high priesthood of the law that I wanted to break through.

Interviewer

I guess that's what I meant by the question. It seems that you were constantly trying to avoid legal speak, legalese, that often accompanies writing by lawyers for lawyers.

Laurence Tribe

Right. And all the talk of levels of scrutiny and intermediate review and so on, things that are substitutes for thought very often, and that are pigeon holes, but very few birds are pigeons.

Interviewer

I interpreted your book, especially the Prologue and Epilogue, as an attempt to write a historical perspective on the Roberts Court during its existence. Is that a fair statement?

Laurence Tribe

It's not a retrospective view as it would be if I was writing about the Hughes, Taft, Stone,  Warren, or Burger Courts. It’s a Court in process; it's a Court that's ongoing. We're living through it and the world that we're living through is being constantly reshaped in profound and dramatic ways in respect to issues of personal anonymity, issues of whom you can marry, who can carry a gun, who can vote, what kinds of government action can be based on race and in what way, and what are the limits of the President's powers. It is really a book about things that are very much in the news and that affect all of us, but that most of us in a society that is self-governing understand far too little about. So I wanted to do my bit in overcoming that knowledge gap, that understanding gap.

Interviewer

I got the sense in reading your book that you were seeking to frame the decisions of the Roberts Court thus far in kind of a historical perspective that is often impossible when we're in the midst of it, talking past one another about issues without our own sort of ideological biases. Is that what you were trying to do, and if so, why is that so important?

Laurence Tribe

I think because the Court is an ongoing institution, even though it changes dramatically and the whole tenor and chemistry of the Court changes even when just one of the nine members changes, it is still an ongoing institution.  It has its traditions, it has precedents that it doesn't always follow but which serve to frame the discussion, and it has grappled with problems that themselves have a very deep history: problems of race, which is central to the first chapter of the book, which deals with race and gender and sexual equality and equality for gays, is a problem that goes back to the founding of the republic.

Race is, if anything, our original sin. It's our compromise with slavery—we never fully solved that problem. That's why the subtitle of that chapter goes to the question of history. Chapter 1 is called Equality: Are We There Yet? It's a very different way of looking at the history of our country and how far we've come. Some people think we've basically overcome our problem of racial prejudice and that all we need to do, as the Chief Justice put it rather concisely, “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis on race.” QED.  As if it was that simple.  [note: the previous quote is the concluding sentence of Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)] .

There are other justices who think that only someone who is blind to our past and insensitive to our present could view the world that way and that we have miles to go before we sleep.  Both sides have some valid arguments to make. I think it's a terrible thing that people get so dug into their positions that they either think that the conservatives on the issue of race - who are not always conservative on issues of privacy, or guns, or speech, or religion - have to be either dishonest with themselves, or dishonest with us and they can't have a legitimate point of view.  And I think that's wrong.

You'll never get past the divisions and the impasse if you don't get inside the other side's head and try to see the world through their eyes. And, likewise, for many of them, the idea that somebody should be willing to use race in order to overcome racism, in order to encourage racial integration and diversity, is deeply wrong. I mean, someone like Justice Thomas who believes that you do racial minorities no favors when you put a thumb on the scale based on race that permanently marks them with a stigma and makes people think they haven't deserved the things that they achieve.  Justice Sotomayor sees the world very differently. Unless one looks at that history and the experiences of the individual justices to get past the demonizing of both sides and stereotyping and caricaturing of both sides, we are not going to understand where the Court has come from and therefore will have very little sense of where it will go next.

Interviewer

That's an interesting observation. I am reminded of the conversation that we saw last night with Justice Sotomayor [June 19, 2014 ACS Convention, A Conversation Between US Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Professor Theodore M. Shaw, click here for video]. So often, what is written about the Court are psychological analyses of the Justices. An example is Justice Clarence Thomas.  Writers have speculated that his opinions somehow reflect a trauma and anger related to his background and his relationship to affirmative action. While I don't agree with a great deal of what Justice Thomas says, I don't think it’s fair to him to suggest that what he writes and believes is a merely a function of his individual experiences. Justice Sotomayor said, "I am who I am," but first and foremost, she's a lawyer.

Laurence Tribe

Right, and I think the attempt to subject Justices to armchair psychoanalysis, especially amateur armchair psychoanalysis, isn't likely to get us very far. But at the same time, the attempt to understand where they're coming from without having a very rich sense of where they've been and what they say about what they've experienced, which is often very revealing—it was revealing with Justice Sotomayor, it's been revealing with Justice Thomas—and without it, it's not likely to get us very far. When Justice Sotomayor says "I am who I am," her experiences and the way she has assimilated and internalized them shaped her understanding of the world, she is simply being more self-conscious and candid than some people are, who seem to think they can approach the world as though their mind is a blank slate, as though they were just computers programmed by some intelligent designer, which I think is self-deception.

On the other hand, each of these Justices is trying to remain faithful to a set of traditions and fundamentally to the law. But none of them regards the law as simply a nuisance to be kicked aside when it's inconvenient, or a play-thing to be manipulated at will, although outsiders who are unsympathetic with the views they don't agree with often tend to accuse Justices of acting that way.

Interviewer

As we speak, professor, they're having a discussion on the Convention floor about the Windsor decision. Many people have tried to explain the comparative speed that the LGBT community has had in earning certain civil rights compared to minorities and people of color. I am reminded of the portion of the book where you discuss the Justices watching pornographic movies in the basement (Chapter 4, page 121). And some of the Justices just could not relate to it on a fundamental, human level. Do you that think it's possible that's one of the reasons that Windsor came, perhaps earlier than many expected, because when more gay people publicly declared their sexuality it became part of our shared experience?

Laurence Tribe

I think there's no doubt that recognizing that the sky didn't fall when some people discovered their own children or their good friends, were gay and that their lives were not reducible to a particular sex act was a moment of understanding.  Similarly, when people of the same sex got married in Massachusetts, the state’s highest court was inspired to render its decision in the Goodridge case (note: Goodridge v. Department of Health, is a 2003 decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court holding that denying marriage licenses based on sexual orientation violated the Massachusetts Constitution) principally by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, saying that it was an unconstitutional denigration of the equal liberty and dignity of gays and lesbians and bisexuals for the state to criminalize sodomy. Even if it did that on a supposedly gender neutral basis, it was a way of signaling the second-class status of gays and lesbians.

When the Supreme Court did that in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, the dominoes began to fall: Massachusetts recognized gay marriage—lots of people said that would be terrible, the institution of marriage would disintegrate, but nothing of the sort happened. Children who were already living with same-sex parents were much better off. They were no longer confused about why their parents were not married and the parents of their friends were.  State after state began moving in that direction.

The next dramatic step was the one that the Supreme Court took in Windsor, again led by Justice Kennedy, when the Court said that at least in those states that have come to recognize that same-sex marriage is on equal footing with opposite-sex marriage, the federal government has to treat the married couples in those states not like second class citizens, but as fully married people. And that made a difference to lots of and lots of benefits that otherwise would've been denied.

When that happened, and when Justice Scalia claimed in dissent that it is inevitable that states will conclude and courts will conclude that same sex marriage is now required by our Constitution even though the majority in Windsor didn't go so far as to actually say so, I think he was making an accurate prediction -- and to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy -- because unanimously, every lower court that has considered the issue has now said there's no conceivable basis for treating same sex couples less well.

I think Justice Ginsburg's image, which didn't make it into any of the opinions, about civil unions as "skim milk marriage" began to catch hold. That, coupled with generational change, now means that everyone recognizes the inevitability of a federal Supreme Court holding that no state can constitutionally discriminate against same-sex couples by denying them marriage licenses.

Interviewer

I've always agreed with the proposition that the objections to gay marriage were maybe exactly the same as the objections to the miscegenation laws, that blacks and whites can't marry because it will harm the institution. My wife and I were joking that in New York we've had gay marriage since 2011 we're waiting for the denigrating effect on our own marriage.   It is an absurd proposition, but it was used as a justification against miscegenation and gay marriage.

Laurence Tribe

You know, it feels absurd to me too. But, I think we have to recognize that there are still lots of people who, for reasons they can't fully articulate, think that the very essence of marriage is a man and a woman. They are people who would say when the man and the woman are of different races, that doesn't matter, although, as you point out, a generation or two ago, that mattered to a lot of people. But you have to persuade people ultimately that it shouldn't matter.

You can't simply look at them and say "you're evil," or "you're bigoted," and that's why there are some aspects of the Windsor opinion that I think Justice Scalia may have criticized justly, because the opinion was written in a way that made it seem as though the people who favored the Defense of Marriage Act – an act that, after all, included the Congress that passed it and President Bill Clinton who signed it - had to be fundamentally homophones and bigots. They have been people who were uncomfortable with gays and lesbians, but to accuse them of being sick in the same way that some straight people accuse gay people of being sick I think isn't a way of advancing the dialogue.

Interviewer

That's certainly a fair point, professor, but isn't it fair to say that individuals who advocated for an anti-miscegenation law and individuals who still object to the marriage of people of the same sex, that they do have a prejudice and  bias?

Laurence Tribe

I think that's almost by definition true. They are biased against same-sex marriage, against same-sex sexual activity. They're biased against it because they think it's wrong, they think it's evil. In many cases their religion teaches them that it's evil. Now I may say, and I do say, that I don't agree with that teaching, but I have to respect that that's their view.

But I think the Court's position ultimately should be that you're entitled to that view privately and no one is making you marry someone of the same sex. But, unless you can show that someone is hurt in some way when people are allowed to marry those they love regardless of sex, you just can't allow your personal views to carry the day. That's why the issue is in so many ways easier than abortion. With respect to abortion, at least some people genuinely believe that an abortion kills an innocent human being and you really can’t respond to that argument by saying “Oh, it’s just a piece of protoplasm. Get over it.” That is a deeply divisive issue that will continue to divide the country as long as we have natural pregnancy and as long as basically half the human race is required to gestate the entire human race.

Interviewer

Let me ask you about the books’s discussion of Citizens United (Chapter 3 - Follow the Money).

Laurence Tribe

Look, I think it’s one of the more interesting and challenging chapters in the book. When people accuse the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United of being incomprehensible other than as an expression of some bizarre view that corporations are human beings and that it’s perfectly alright that money should dominate our politics, I think they completely misunderstand where the Court was coming from.

The Court’s decision didn’t depend upon the view that corporations are persons. It was relying on the fact that the First Amendment protects speech and not just speakers.

The court is particularly suspicious of government action that regulates the source or the magnitude of speech. That suspicion is not so hard to understand when the government is regulating campaign speech which may be a form of self-dealing on the part of politicians who may be making it harder for challengers to unseat them with sources of money from the right or from the left. Being suspicious of that is perfectly understandable. And being suspicious of any attempt by government to orchestrate the appropriate amounts of speech or influence from various sources is understandable.  So that’s why Citizens United was such a hard case. It was a hard case because there are powerful constitutional values on both sides.

Interviewer

In my mind, the area with the potential for self-dealing by elected officials isn’t campaign finance, but redistricting.

Laurence Tribe

I completely agree. I think the problem of political gerrymandering is one of the sources, not the only source, but one of the sources of severe political dysfunction. Demographic changes have tended to cluster people of similar views in similar areas, has also helped to polarize the political system. And I think when the Supreme Court - and this is before Robert became Chief – decided that political gerrymandering is simply beyond the capacity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it made a very fundamental mistake that I hope it will rectify at some point.

Interviewer

Another observation—in New York where the state constitution specifically invests the Legislature with the right to do their own districts and state districts, they’ve simply been unable to come to a consensus, so a federal judge in Brooklyn, formulated the districts which I think were, by all accounts, very fair.

Laurence Tribe

It might be good if we had a less political system for drawing district lines - something we could delegate to a computer, not something where human judgment is necessarily required.  The benefits could be sufficient to outweigh the dangers. And I do agree that if we ask what are the sources of political dysfunction, they’re not simply decisions like Citizens United.

One of the reasons I think it’s hard to get the Supreme Court to uphold any particular version of campaign finance control is that every version before it was loophole-ridden.  The idea that legislative reform would sufficiently enhance American democracy to justify the compromise of First Amendment values that occurs when the Court lets the government decide who may speak is quite unrealistic.

Interviewer

Perhaps a corollary to that is the near-forgotten fact that the broadcast airwaves are owned by the public.  Do the individuals who broadcast on the airwaves owe a duty to the public to give all the players in a political dialogue a voice even if one party can pay for all of the ads?

Laurence Tribe

That’s another very hard issue in which giving the government the power to decide whether the government is being sufficiently fair and equal is itself very dangerous.  The Supreme Court in the famous Red Lion Case (or maybe I should say the infamous  Red Lion Case), Red Lion vs FCC, held that, even though newspapers cannot be forced to run a reply to an attack or to give balanced coverage, that those who get a license to broadcast are in a different category.  But the FCC got rid of that rule partly because of all of the problems it caused. Many people now believe the rule would and should be held unconstitutional today, not because the airwaves are not public but because giving the government the power to control who can use which frequency and in what way and when an attack deserves a response and when you have given fair and equal response time and whether you are really being fair and balanced, is putting the government in the position of the grand censor.

Interviewer

If the government can’t make those decisions, then who? As a democracy, isn't it incumbent on the government, despite all of its failings and potential for self-dealing?

Laurence Tribe

You could say that about all speech. If the government is not to decide which speech is acceptable and which speech is dangerous—who is to decide? The answer is: the speaker. If a hundred people want to contribute whatever they can afford to propagating a message, whether it's an anti-Hillary message, or an anti-Sarah Palin message or an anti-McCain message, if they want to do it in a corporate form, or in the form of an association, I think the answer to, "if not the government, who?" is: the people themselves.

Interviewer

Which Justice said "the appropriate response to objectionable speech" is more speech?

Laurence Tribe

Well, so many Justices...Brandeis, Holmes, Black, Douglas. It's right. It is, however, a slight oversimplification in this context. That is, the values of free speech are bound up in the values of self-government. When the Supreme Court went as far as it did in Citizens United and said "there's no problem of corruption here," then it was really overstating and oversimplifying.

It may not be “corruption” in the sense of “under the table” bribery, but everyone knows that people who bundle huge amounts of money either personally or through Super PACS, on behalf of politicians get their phone calls answered more quickly, they have more access, they have more influence.  That in itself is corrosive to democracy. That's not healthy. The trouble is that the cure may be worse than the disease. Giving the government the power to say "Well we're going fine-tune this in order to make democracy work better," is in itself terribly dangerous.

Interviewer

My final question, professor, is what do you hope your readers will take from your book?

Laurence Tribe

First of all, I hope they'll enjoy it. Doris Kearns Goodwin says they'll find the baseball stories fascinating. Jeff Toobin says they'll learn a lot. People who are much more conservative than I am on many issues like Ted Olsen say it's even-handed. Novelists say it's fun. So the first thing I hope they'll learn is that learning about the Constitution is not a painful pill to take and to swallow in order to become a better citizen. It turns out that becoming better informed and better educated can be enjoyable. But on top of that, it can be useful—because in the end, so many of these decisions depend on the individual views of nine human beings.

They are, after all, just human beings. They have different perspectives on the Constitution that can't be summarized by their political party or by how right or left they are on various particular hot-button issues. And because of that, the President who names them and the Senate that confirms make an enormous difference on a personal day-to-day level that we don't think about often enough when we pull the lever or punch the ballot for President or for Senate. This should be an issue much more salient in people's minds when the political process focuses on the selection of a new Justice.

 

ACS Staff Members Stephanie Rydell and Rachael Hancock contributed to the preparation of this interview.

Attorney General Calls for End to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws

by Jesse Grauman

Attorney General Eric Holder this week offered welcome support for ending the practice of felony disenfranchisement. Arguing that “permanent exclusion from the civic community does not advance any objective of our criminal justice system,” Attorney General Holder called for “clear and consistent reforms to restore the voting rights of all who have served their terms in prison or jail, completed their parole or probation, and paid their fines.”

While the degree of felony disenfranchisement varies by state, eleven states permanently disenfranchise at least some formerly incarcerated persons unless the state’s government approves the restoration of voting rights on an individual basis. Three of those states – Iowa, Florida and Kentucky – permanently disenfranchise all formerly incarcerated persons with felony convictions absent individual rights restoration.  An additional 24 deny the right to vote to those who have been released from prison but remain on parole, and 20 of these states disenfranchise those on probation as well.

As a result, approximately 5.8 million Americans are prohibited from voting as a result of felony disenfranchisement laws. These laws have a disproportionate impact on African-Americans, with nearly one in 13 African-American adults barred from voting, including one in eight African-American men nationwide and one in five African-Americans in Florida, Kentucky and Virginia.

These disparate impacts are not only due to the massive racial disparities that exist in our criminal justice system. Rather, many such laws were passed in the aftermath of Reconstruction as a means of denying the franchise to African-Americans. Eleven states passed felony disenfranchisement laws for the first time, or significantly expanded existing laws, in the decade after the Civil War, and states with larger proportions of nonwhites in their prison populations have been more likely to pass such laws. Indeed, in 1985, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a felony disenfranchisement provision in Alabama’s state constitution in Hunter v. Underwood, finding that the provision, although neutral on its face, was enacted with discriminatory intent. As the Court noted, “the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 [when the measure was passed] was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks” and the president of that convention stated that its goal was “to establish white supremacy in this State.”

Attorney General Holder placed the primary onus for reform on “state leaders and other elected officials,” and given that state laws are the source of felony disenfranchisement, they are the logical place to turn.  Indeed, some states have taken commendable steps, with a total of 23 enacting reforms since 1997. In addition, advocates have voiced support for a federal legislative response such as the Democracy Restoration Act, which would ensure that formerly incarcerated persons can vote in federal elections but would not address restrictions on voting in state or local elections.

Some argue that the Constitution itself bars felony disenfranchisement laws, even in the absence of the racially discriminatory intent found in Hunter.  In 1974, however, the Supreme Court declined to find felony disenfranchisement laws unconstitutional in Richardson v. Ramirez.  The Court based its holding on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires the reduction of a state’s congressional representation if the state denies the right to vote to male inhabitants 21 or older for any reason “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.”  Although this section was enacted to persuade Southern states to grant the vote to African-Americans by threatening to penalize the states with the loss of representation, the Court found that the “other crime[s]” exception permits states to deny voting rights to individuals with felony convictions.  Three justices dissented, with Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that “Section 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was not intended and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment,” most notably the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice Marshall would have found that felony disenfranchisement laws must still be subjected to strict scrutiny under Equal Protection analysis, and that the law at issue in Richardson failed that test because it was not necessary to promote a compelling state interest.

Although Richardson has not been overturned, scholars have argued that constitutional grounds still exist for challenging felony disenfranchisement laws. Stanford Law School Professor Pamela Karlan, now on leave serving as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, has advocated for a view that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits lifetime disenfranchisement because such a penalty is grossly disproportionate and does not comport with contemporary standards. Gabriel Chin, professor of law at UC Davis School of Law, has argued that the Court’s holding in Richardson should be revisited because Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was implicitly repealed by the Fifteenth Amendment, which rendered Section 2’s indirect approach to African-American suffrage a nullity by expressly guaranteeing that the right to vote may not be abridged on account of race. Janai Nelson, professor of law at St. John’s University School of Law, has proposed that felony disenfranchisement laws constitute impermissible viewpoint-based restrictions on freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the extent that they are motivated by beliefs as to how formerly incarcerated individuals may vote.

Whether the ultimate solutions will be found at the federal or the state level, and whether they will come through legislation or litigation, it is welcome to see prominent policymakers on both sides of the political aisle – from Attorney General Holder to Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) – bring attention to the issue of felony disenfranchisement. Those who have served their sentences under the law and paid their debts to society should not be further punished by being forever denied the fundamental right to participate in the political process.

The Carliner Award: Not Just for the Victorious

by Kara Hartzler, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.; Member, Board of Directors, ACS San Diego Lawyer Chapter; Recipient of the 2013 ACS David Carliner Public Interest Award

When I applied for the David Carliner Public Interest Award last year, I didn’t do it because I had a stunning track record of court victories, a list of successful published decisions, or a résumé chock-full of wins. I did it because I am a giant loser.

In my work as a lawyer at a non-profit immigration rights organization in Arizona, losing was the name of the game. The vast majority of our clients had no way to fight their cases and were merely biding their time before an immigration judge would order them deported. Even the ones who did have a way to fight their cases were usually greeted by an insurmountable trifecta of bad precedent, hostile judges and an agency appellate body with a not-so-subtle agenda. I lost case after case and quickly learned to advise my clients of two things: the law as it was on the books versus the law as it would be applied to them. On any given day, the best I could hope for was a batting average that was a fraction as good as the worst major league baseball player.

And in my current job as an appellate attorney for the Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., my win/loss ratio has actually declined, if such a thing is possible. Despite practicing in front of the Ninth Circuit—a court derided by conservatives as a liberal bastion of judicial activism—I have yet to win a single criminal case. It’s a really good thing I went for a JD rather than an MBA because any CEO worth his salt would have tossed me out on the street long ago.

But somehow that didn’t keep me from being awarded the 2013 ACS David Carliner Public Interest Award. Here’s why: the award wasn’t created for winners. By its nature, progressive social change comes very slowly and is fought like hell by those who oppose it. And those who fight like hell to oppose change are not even as effective in defeating it as those who are indifferent to it—those who refuse to consider a new interpretation of the law simply because they’ve never heard of it before.

One of the biggest disillusionments of being a lawyer is realizing that a particular legal argument’s chance for success has very little to do with the merits of the argument and everything to do with the time and place in which it’s presented. Usually, a novel legal argument has to lose at least a dozen times or more before it wins—even though the version that’s ultimately successful was cut and paste from the very same draft that was laughingly derided the last time around.

And that’s where David Carliner comes in. Every time I’m at the bottom of the hill, looking Sisyphus-like at the new boulder I have to roll up it, I say: c’mon, Kara, is this really harder than challenging bans on interracial marriage in 1954? Is this really harder than defending LGBT rights pre-Stonewall? Is this really harder than defending the right to travel to Communist countries at the height of the Cold War? David Carliner did all those. And even if he didn’t win every case, he seeded the legal landscape with the ideas necessary so the next person could. So if you think you have a bigger boulder to roll than he did, you’re kidding yourself. Quit whining and get back to work.

The bottom line is this: the Carliner Award is not for winners. It’s for people who gut it out in the shadows. It’s for people who butt their heads against a seemingly impenetrable wall countless times and come back after every concussion.

The thing they never taught you in law school is that being a progressive lawyer isn’t just about the substance of your argument. It’s also about being stubborn enough to outlast your adversary and make yourself a giant thorn in the side of the system day after day.

Calling all Carliner Award hopefuls: losers strongly encouraged to apply.

Exploring the Limits of Presidential Power

by Chris Edelson, Assistant Professor of Government, American University School of Public Affairs

In March 2009, about a month after President George W. Bush and Dick Cheney left office, Scott Horton declared that “[w]e may not have realized it, but in the period from late 2001-January 19, 2009, this country was a dictatorship.  That was thanks to secret memos crafted deep inside the Justice Department that effectively trashed the Constitution.”  Some of the most infamous of these memos were drafted by John Yoo, an Office of Legal Counsel attorney from 2001-2003.  Yoo and others – most notably, Cheney’s counsel, David Addington – advanced the unitary executive theory, a theory of presidential power Cheney had personally favored for decades.

The unitary executive theory, as implemented by the Bush administration, was claimed to justify effectively unchecked presidential power over the use of military force, the detention and interrogation of prisoners, extraordinary rendition and intelligence gathering.  According to the unitary executive theory, since the Constitution assigns the president all of “the executive power”, he can set aside laws that attempt to limit his power over national security.  This is an enormous power: critics charge that it effectively places the president above the law.  Advocates of broad presidential power argue it is necessary to defend the nation against the threat posed by terrorism.

In the fall of 2009, I was designing a new class on presidential national security power—what I call “emergency presidential power”.  I call it “emergency” power because presidents have often claimed the need for extraordinary power during emergency or crisis—whether real or contrived.  Such power has sometimes been wielded unilaterally, sometimes with congressional authorization—or, perhaps it would be better to say, claimed authorization.

I was interested in providing a way for students to understand and assess the ways in which presidential power has been used since 9/11.  In order to do this, I wanted to begin by providing historical context, starting with the origins of the Constitution and continuing by examining the historical use of emergency presidential power before the September 11 attacks.  This would provide a useful way to understand what had happened after 9/11, and to consider whether the Bush administration had acted legitimately.

I did not intend to present a specific argument as to the best way to define emergency presidential power.  Instead, I wanted to present students with the evidence and the arguments made by both sides.  How had the Bush administration justified its actions?  How had critics responded?  Who had the best case—taking the text of the Constitution, historical evidence, judicial precedent, and interbranch practice into account?  As I planned for the course, I looked for a textbook I could use.  When I couldn’t find anything that looked like an exact fit, I decided to design my own materials.

Over the past four years, those materials developed into Emergency Presidential Power: From the Drafting of the Constitution to the War on Terror.  The book begins with foundational materials – the Constitution itself and its origins, the Federalist Papers, Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation and the related Pacificus-Helvidius debate – followed by presidential practice since Washington.  I discuss the odd history of the sole organ doctrine, the question as to whether Lincoln constitutionalized Lockean prerogative, Roosevelt’s actions during World War Two, Truman during the Korean War, and Nixon’s use of power against his critics and political opponents. Historical discussion sets the stage for examination of the post 9/11 presidency, beginning of course with the Bush administration.  Along the way, I have added chapters about the Obama administration.  As a candidate, Barack Obama criticized the Bush administration’s approach to emergency power and promised to restore the rule of law.  As president, Obama and executive branch lawyers have found ways to justify broad presidential power, for instance by unilaterally authorizing military action in Libya and ordering the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and AQAP member who the administration said had taken an operational role in planning attacks against the United States.  (The Syria episode took place too late to include in this book).

The book provides students, and anyone interested in the debate over the scope and limits of emergency presidential power, with the raw materials needed to make sense of the debate.   It is essential, of course, to understand scholarly perspectives, and I explain the differences between scholars like Louis Fisher, who emphasizes checks and balances, the need to place presidential power under the rule of law, and Adrian Vermeule or Eric Posner, who argue that presidential power cannot be, and should not be, restrained by the rule of law.

Harold Koh is a scholar who earned a reputation as a critic of unrestrained presidential power and, before 2009, would have been associated with the Fisher camp.  In 2008, Koh predicted that, when it comes to the rule of law, “the last eight years are far less important than the next [eight] years.”  I think he was right, but I am not sure yet what the verdict is.  More than five years after Koh made his statement, the question today is whether the Obama administration (in which Koh served as an executive branch lawyer) has, in fact, taken a substantively different approach than the Bush administration when it comes to defining presidential power.   That will continue to be a central question as President Obama finishes his second term, and when future presidents take office.  As the amorphous “war on terror” continues on, with no clear end in sight, the essential problem for constitutional democracy will be whether executive branch officials, lawyers, and scholars can find ways to ensure that presidents have the ability to defend the nation while also ensuring that power is limited by the rule of law.  I hope that this book provides some ways to think about this problem, and to arrive at some satisfactory solutions.

ACS’s ‘Toward a More Perfect Union’ Provides Ideas, Proposals for Second Obama Term

by Jeremy Leaming

Nearly a week after providing a staunchly liberal vision for a second term –– leading law professors, attorneys and other advocates are providing via an ACS project ideas and proposals for the administration’s second term. (Regarding the tone and vision of the president’s second Inaugural Address, some apparently believe the president was merely defending New Deal programs and policy the Clinton administration had supposedly advanced.)

The ACS project, “Toward a More Perfect Union: A Progressive Blueprint for the Second Term,” was recently launched with three Issue Briefs:

Former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Colgate Love looks at why the presidential pardon power “has lost its vigor, its integrity, and its sense of purpose,” and argues why it should be reinvigorated, as well as offering examples, many from the states, for reforming the process.

Brookings Visiting Fellow Russell Wheeler examines the Obama administration’s record of filling federal judgeships during his first term and puts forth ideas for fixing a judicial nominations process that has become increasingly rancorous and ineffective. In a Brookings’ Up Frontblog post, Wheeler, a leading expert on the federal bench, explains, in part, why the process needs reforming. “First, judicial vacancies, which declined in Clinton’s and Bush’s first terms, increased during Obama’s. Empty judgeships hamper the federal courts’ ability to do their jobs – to sort out contractual disputes and other matters that, left unresolved, contribute to economic uncertainty, as well dispose of criminal complaints and adjudicate claims of discrimination and civil liberties violations.”

University of Michigan Law School Professor David M. Uhlmann urges the Obama administration to exert great presidential leadership on climate change. Uhlmann, director of the law school’s Environmental Law and Policy Program, noted the small steps the Obama administration took during its first term. But, citing the work of climate scientists, Uhlmann warns that if our country fails “to limit greenhouse gas emissions, searing heat, widespread drought, destructive storms, and massive flooding will become commonplace.” Moreover, Uhlmann argues that climate change will be a “legacy issue” for the president – “either because he helped chart a course toward a sustainable future or because America failed to act while it was still possible to prevent catastrophic climate change. Uhlmann’s Issue Brief goes on to provide ways for the president to act, even without the help of Congress, to put the nation on a path toward sustainable resources.

During his second inaugural, the president reminded us that “preserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective action” and unlike too many of his predecessors lauded the noble goal of advancing equality. Obama also took a shot at right-wing economic policy that is all about coddling the superwealthy at the expense of everyone else.

The president also called for collective action on climate change.

“We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to ourselves, but to all posterity,” Obama said. “We will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would betray our children and future generations. Some may still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but none can avoid the devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and more powerful storms.”

He continued the “path towards sustainable energy sources will be long and sometimes difficult. But America cannot resist this transition, we must lead it.”

The ACS Project is not only intended for the administration. We hope the work inspires, informs and sparks discussion. The forthcoming Issue Briefs to conclude the series will focus on homeland security, bolstering liberty through ‘mutual aid,’ immigration reform, the indigent defense system, modern tools for advancing equal opportunity and an examination of the FEC’s actions, or lack thereof, to regulate the financing of federal elections.

Our Liberal Constitution


By Adam Winkler, a professor at the UCLA School of Law, and author of Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America. This post is part of an ACSblog Constitution Day Symposium.


Over the past three decades, conservative legal commentators have promoted a narrative about our Constitution that puts our hallowed text at odds with the goals of liberals. The Constitution, this story goes, is a profoundly conservative document whose words and principles tilt favorably towards the policy goals of today’s Republican Party: Small government. Law and order. Hostile to gay rights. Opposed to campaign finance law and affirmative action. Favoring nearly unbridled executive power in matters of war and foreign policy. If only jurists stuck to history – by interpreting the text by way of original intent or, alternatively, original meaning, rather than the living constitutionalism favored by Warren Court liberals – we would see the Constitution in its true light.

There’s just one problem with this story. It’s not true.

The Constitution was designed by the Framers to be a radically progressive document. The founding generation was comprised of revolutionaries, people who sought to make a new system of government that broadened rights rather than limited them. Their handiwork was itself thoroughly reformed by another group of progressives: the radical Republicans who added the Reconstruction Amendments. Over and over again, the Constitution has been revised by people inspired by liberal ideas, from the populists who sought the direct elections of senators to woman rights proponents who fought for the right to vote. Taken as a whole, the Constitution is anything but a conservative document. And while its words and principles don’t favor any political party, many of its core ideas support the policy goals of modern-day liberals.

Take, for instance, the argument that the Constitution favors small government. It is undoubtedly true that the framers wanted to circumscribe the power of government; that’s why we have the separation of powers, federalism, and a Bill of Rights. Yet often ignored is that the Framers crafted the Constitution to expand the powers of government so that Congress could effectively solve national problems. The document the Constitution replaced – the Articles of Confederation – hobbled government too much and the men who met in Philadelphia sought to rectify that error.

While the federal government is indeed one of limited powers, as it should be, when acting pursuant to an enumerated power, federal authority is plenary. Some critics of the modern Supreme Court say Congress has assumed a much broader power under the Commerce Clause than originally intended because of misguided interpretations of the Supreme Court. Yet what has grown is not so much the formal power as the amount of commerce among the several states. The framers didn’t envision Congress’s current authority – because they couldn’t have imagined the current national economy.

Nor is the document favorable to the law and order views that have animated so much of the conservative backlash against the Warren Court’s criminal justice rulings. Look at the Bill of Rights. Almost all of its provisions are protections for accused criminals. The Constitution was designed to make it hard to convict someone of a crime, not make it easy. And while the drafters of the 14th Amendment never thought about how its words would apply to questions of gay rights, the text makes no distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation and demands equal protection of the laws and due process for everyone. Affirmative action? No Congress has adopted more racial preferences than the Congress that proposed the 14th Amendment for ratification.

One could go on and on. The basic point remains the same. Our Constitution is deeply imbued with liberal values. We don’t need a living Constitution to advance the principles of equal citizenship. All we need is to stay true to our Constitution’s text and the bold, progressive principles it embodies.