Well-heeled Win: Today’s First Amendment Disputes

This column is the third in an ACS special series examining the First Amendment Freedom of Speech and its role in the development and evaluation of public policies regarding the regulation of the internet, campaign finance, antidiscrimination laws, and other areas.

This is an abridged version of a piece originally published in Gateway Journalism Review.

Today’s conservative Roberts Court is a bastion of First Amendment freedom as was the liberal Warren Court half a century ago. But the winners are different. Establishment insiders win today whereas outsiders won most often during the Warren years.

On its 200th birthday in 1991, the First Amendment had developed into a powerful shield against government abuse of outsiders, leftists, anarchists, communists, labor unions, Jehovah’s Witnesses, atheists and non-Christians. It protected the press from government censorship and debilitating libel suits. It protected leftist flag burners and a dissident wearing a “Fuck the draft” jacket into a courthouse. And it protected little Mary Beth Tinker wearing an armband to school protesting the Vietnam War.

By its 231st birthday this month, the First Amendment winners are increasingly well-heeled. Corporations won the right to spend an unlimited amount of corporate money – millions, billions – to help their favored candidate win an election. Hobby Lobby won a decision based on religious liberty allowing it to refuse to provide contraceptive health coverage for its female workers. Conservative policy groups won a decision in an Illinois case blocking government unions from imposing mandatory union fees on non-members. And the court has lent a sympathetic ear to bakers and florists who say they won’t serve same-sex couples whose marriages violated their religious beliefs.

Beyond that, gun owners won greatly expanded rights under a Roberts Court’s reinterpretation of the Second Amendment. Corporations won decisions to force consumers and former employees into arbitration instead of class actions. Human rights lawyers lost their right to counsel foreign clients connected to terrorism about nonviolent conflict resolution. Polluters won a major victory cutting back on the government’s power to address global warming. And the court just took up a case that could impair the right to strike by subjecting unions to state lawsuits.

Gregory P. Magarian, the Thomas and Karole Greene Professor of Law at Washington University and a former Supreme Court clerk, puts it this way: “The court has put much more energy into expanding the free speech rights of politically or economically powerful speakers, while largely disdaining the First Amendment concerns of politically and economically disempowered speakers.”

Justice Samuel Alito is a leader of the shift. Mark Sableman, a St. Louis media lawyer at Thompson Coburn, pointed out, in a recent speech on the Supreme Court. Alito wrote the 2017 decision throwing out a federal law that banned disparaging trademarks that were offensive. Alito wrote, “Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” The ruling helped the Washington Redskins at the time in its effort to hold on to the Redskins name.

Alito also wrote the Hobby Lobby decision protecting corporate religious scruples. In addition, his replacement of Sandra Day O’Connor led to Citizens United opening the door to unlimited corporate political spending and to broader Second Amendment gun rights.

Magarian remarks, “Justice Alito is passionately committed to protecting rights and interests of people exactly like Justice Alito.”

Chaos in the Information Universe

Meanwhile, the Bill of Rights is at the vortex of a hurricane of chaotic supercharged speech. Just about everybody thinks the other guy is taking away their free speech rights.

Conservatives complain about a Woke culture, today’s version of political correctness, where conservative speakers are disinvited from college campuses by so-called “cancel culture.” Liberals complain that broadcast and Internet sites promote white supremacy, hate, misogyny and attacks on transgender people.

Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., accuses social media companies, such as Twitter, of taking orders from the government to take down false information about COVID-19 and vaccinations. Liberals respond that the MAGA universe threatens public health and the health of democracy by spreading lies about COVID-19, vaccinations and who won the 2020 election.

Gov. Ron DeSantis, mentioned as a presidential candidate, boasts Florida is where “woke goes to die,” and passed the so-called “Don’t say gay” bill, limiting what public school teachers can say about gender issues in school. At the same time, Pen America reports from July 2001 to June 2002 there were 2,532 instances of individual books being banned, affecting 1,648 unique book titles. In Missouri, Secretary of State Jay Ashcroft, a possible gubernatorial candidate, is seeking to cut off money from public libraries that offer books that might appeal of some sexual preferences of minors.

At a recent court hearing, DeSantis’ lawyer was asked what woke means. He responded: “it would be the belief there are systemic injustices in American society and the need to address them.”

At the center of the storm is today’s media, which bear only a passing resemblance to the media of 2000.

Think of the communications platforms and technologies that didn’t exist 20 years ago, or were in their infancy.

Artificial intelligence. ChatGPT. Virtual reality. Facial recognition software. TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, Google, SnapChat, NewsMax, Breitbart, One America News, Huffington Post, tweets, GPS, citizen journalists, aggregators, page views, click bait, impressions, shares, comments, friends, likes, deep fakes, the filter bubble, podcasts, Google Earth, Google Street Views, WikiLeaks, the Intercept, Politico and on and on.

The Internet enthusiasts of 2000 predicted a blossoming of democracy with millions of new voices suddenly having the equivalent of a printing press in their hand-held smart-phone. But instead, we ended up in a dense fog of information and disinformation that can cause citizens to get lost. The legacy press, after a golden age of uncovering Watergate and the Pentagon Papers, steamed right into the unseen iceberg of new technology and began taking on water.

The press is having a nervous breakdown.

Hackers and spies manipulate digital information. Hackers in St. Petersburg, working for Russian intelligence, pulled incriminating information from the Democratic Party’s digital files and leaked it – apparently via WikiLeaks – to the U.S. press to influence the 2016 election.

Then, a month before the 2020 election, powerful social media platforms used the technology usually reserved to block distribution of child porn to block distribution of a New York Post story on Hunter Biden’s laptop. Twitter’s Jack Dorsey apologized, but after the fact.

If the media universe wasn’t chaotic enough, Elon Musk has bought Twitter and, as the chief “twit,” immediately began writing a series of false and misleading posts. One relayed false allegations about the attack on Nancy Pelosi’s husband. Another suggested his recently departed safety chief, Yoel Roth, was “in favor of children being able to access adult Internet service.” A third called for the firing of Dr. Anthony Fauci and his criminal prosecution for supporting research that killed millions. Musk tweeted: “My pronouns are Prosecute/ Fauci.”

Missouri’s Sen. Hawley leads the charge against social media companies, complaining that it is a violation of the First Amendment for Twitter or other social media companies to consult with the government about posts containing false information about COVID-19 and vaccines. Hawley maintains this consultation makes the private social media giants “arms” of the government and White House and therefore violates the First Amendment.

Legal experts point out that the First Amendment applies to government censorship of speech, not editorial decisions by private media companies. The First Amendment would only be implicated if the government were to strongarm a private media company into blocking a speaker.

Hawley also has introduced a bill to remove trademark protections from Disney Corp. for having criticized Gov. DeSantis’ so-called “Don’t say Gay” bill. He took this action as DeSantis moved to remove special tax advantages that Disney had enjoyed for its theme park.

Magarian, the Washington University First Amendment expert, says this may violate Disney’s free speech rights. “Corporations certainly are capable of expressing themselves, as Disney did when it spoke out against ‘Don’t Say Gay.’ Government, in turn, may not retaliate against any speaker’s political speech,” he said.

Jonathan Turley, a libertarian law professor at George Washington University and adviser to Fox News, testified recently that, “The calls for greater governmental and private censorship in the United States are growing at a time when free speech is under unprecedented attack. Such movements remain a type of dormant virus in our body politic.”

Turley is most concerned about college campuses canceling invitations to conservative speakers. “The extensive ‘canceling of speeches and events on campuses often involves rejecting the classical view that free speech protects all speakers, even those who are viewed as advancing harmful ideas.”

Charter to Say No

Loud chaos may be exactly what we should expect from the Bill of Rights. It is every American’s charter to say no.

“The Bill of Rights is a born rebel,” wrote Frank I. Cobb, a 20th century news reporter. “It reeks with sedition. In every clause it shakes its fist in the face of constituted authority…It is the one guarantee of human freedom to the American people.”

Magarian expressed a similar sentiment in the introduction to his book, Managed Speech: “If a democracy doesn’t make noise, it dies. We in the United States are supposed to be a self-governing people. . . Selfgovernment requires constant political debate. . . Those discourses can’t just comprise polite expressions of mutual affirmation by wealthy and powerful elites. The discussion we need is boisterous, angry, and hopeful. It’s aspirational, transgressive, and inclusive.

“It’s the steady hum of ideas in laboratories and studios, in chat rooms and comment threads, and most of all in the streets. It’s the shouts that forge social movements that shape our society, from revolutionary battle cries to abolitionist prophecies, from labor pickets to civil rights sit-ins, from blessings of same-sex marriages to whatever our shared future holds. . .

“It’s the exclamations, whispers, and laughter that make us the individuals we are, individuals who join together, govern ourselves. . . A democratic society needs to muster and sustain the broadest, deepest, noisiest public discussion we can all pull from our lungs.”

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William H. Freivogel is a professor at the Southern Illinois University School of Journalism, a contributor to St. Louis Public Radio and publisher of the Gateway Journalism Review.

“Expressing” Inferiority: 303 Creative and the (Re)Creation of a Discriminatory Marketplace

In 303 Creative v. Elenis, the Supreme Court seems poised to give businesses open to the public a constitutional right to discriminate. The objecting business, a web design company, says state law requiring it to offer wedding services on equal terms to gay people compels it to speak in favor of same-sex marriage in violation of the First Amendment. It claims that its argument is limited to “expressive” or artistic businesses—whether website designing, cake baking, or flower arranging.

But 303 Creative—and soon, I fear, the Supreme Court—gets it wrong. Service to customers communicates little, if anything. Because of our social expectations of first-come, first-served, a vendor signals no approval of its customers when it makes a sale. In requiring service on equal terms, the law compels no message. For this reason, the Supreme Court had long concluded that public accommodations law “does not, on its face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its content.” As court after court held, such laws regulated wedding vendors’ conduct—the sale of a wedding cake or website—not their speech.

What we have missed is that it is refusal of service that powerfully speaks. Refusal tells a would-be patron and the wider public that that person (or group) does not merit status as a consumer. For this reason, 303 Creative’s argument can’t be cabined to artistic or expressive enterprises. It is not the goods that express a message; it is the breaking of uniform conventions of equal service. And so, if the Court sides with 303 Creative, this right to “speak” may equally apply to all public accommodations.

First come, first served: Why Service Does Not Speak

Most spheres of life governed by civil rights laws—employment, housing, or credit—manifest selectivity. Hiring businesses are choosy and job applicants expect rejection and disappointment. By contrast, public-facing businesses—from ballparks to theaters, flower shops to website design studios—welcome all comers. People rarely anticipate or receive rejection, at least without a good reason—the tables are booked or tickets sold out. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court recognized this taken-for-grantedness as central to the consumer market, describing rights of equal access as assumed “by most people either because they already have them or do not need them.”

This lack of choosiness means a public business fails to express any message, let alone a discernable one, through service. Patrons discern no communication from a business pouring a coffee, selling a cake, or cutting a person’s hair. We take for granted that the first person in line will be served, and the wedding vendor will provide its usual goods if available.

Nor does service imply endorsement. When a server brings a meal to a table, they don’t explain “you seem like a nice Christian family.” When a photographer agrees to document a wedding ceremony, they don’t say that they support your wedding, let alone opposite-sex weddings generally. You understand that the price is right and the date is available.

Whether or not the goods are artistic—a tattoo or wedding website—the public perceives no message from the business. Indeed, where “expressive” services are involved, an audience is more—not less—likely to treat any message as that of the patron, not the seller. We think that a tatted back communicates the message of the bearer, not the tattoo artist, and that a website sends the invitation of the marrying couple, not the website designer.

To be sure, service once did communicate. When the social norm was to subjugate minorities, a business that seated people side by side would send a message of support for equality both to the marginalized group and to other consumers. But after the enactment of civil rights law, this same act expressed mere legal compliance. Today, reinforced by these laws, shared norms dictate that public businesses will serve all paying customers. We anticipate being able to purchase goods in all shops, not just some shops. The “general rule”—as the Court said in Masterpiece Cakeshop—is clear: “objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.”

Loud and clear: How Denying Service Expresses Inferiority

Refusal of service, by contrast, speaks to both the would-be consumer and a larger audience. Denied flowers for his wedding to Robert Ingersoll, Curt Freed understood the message that “our business is no longer good business.” Rejected by a bed and breakfast on their vacation, another same-sex couple heard that they were “inferior and unworthy of equal treatment in even a routine business transaction.” When a business open to the public turns a person away, it powerfully expresses—as these couples understood—an ideology of a group’s inferiority.

A long history teaches that mistreatment by public accommodations—unlike an average social interaction—sends a message that systematically alters a person’s standing among their fellows. As historian Thomas Sugrue observes, by the twentieth century, “[a]ccess to consumer goods—the right to buy—was a defining characteristic of what it meant to be an American citizen.” When Jim Crow-era businesses served white people before waiting place customers, they sent the message, in the words of one Mississippi man, “let him go first, you come last.”

It was not only black people who received a message about their place in the market and society. Before mid-century, Jewish people regularly confronted “no Jews allowed” and “fine Christian clientele” signs.  In the 1960s, proprietors forced gay men to sit alone with their back to other customers to eat a meal. As the Supreme Court observed in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, public accommodations discrimination treated gays “as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.” That same decade, women too were sometimes literally put in their place. At the National Press Club awards dinner, for example, female journalists were seated separately with the wives. Experiences of exclusion and subordination prompted “the realization that society thought—as one woman said—that ‘women don’t belong in the outside world.’” While the experience of these groups differed, public accommodations discrimination designated their proper (and limited) place.

The constant threat of refusal of service by public businesses only increases the clarity of the message: you are less than. As the Supreme Court has noted, public accommodations laws structure “an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” People will find themselves “invited to an establishment, only to find its doors barred to them.”

Of course, the free speech claim in 303 Creative and like cases could be equally framed around provision or denial of service. A wedding vendor could be said to speak through withholding a cake or invitations—sending a message that the would-be patron’s wedding is lesser. And, as I’ve argued, this denial would express a clear message of gay inferiority. But the desire to express such a message would make business owners less-than-sympathetic standard-bearers. So, objectors instead tend to argue that nondiscrimination compels speech in favor of same-sex marriage. On this construction, it is service to the couple—designing a website or a cake—that communicates. With this frame, objectors paint their free speech argument as narrow, applying only to the compelled provision of expressive or artistic services.

But it is denial of goods and services that most powerfully communicates a message. The “expressive” nature of the business does no work. The reality is that a free speech right to refuse to serve a marginalized group cannot be bounded. Defiance of social expectations of equal service to all speaks most clearly.

Conclusion

The line between speech and conduct may not always be clear. Unusual applications of public accommodations law—to parades, genuinely private membership clubs, or staffing of the Boy Scouts—may result in First Amendment protection. As I argued in an amicus brief together with Jim Oleske and Joe Singer, under the Court’s precedent, states may be prevented from applying antidiscrimination law where a regulated party is highly selective, does not engage in standard commercial transactions, and is an endeavor that is customarily associated with expressing a message of its own.

But states have long required nondiscriminatory service by businesses open to the public. Such obligations have co-existed with a wide array of beliefs. Business owners retained their “individual freedom of mind” and the component rights to speak and refrain from speaking. Nor was public accommodation law aimed—as Justice Thomas wrote in his Masterpiece Cakeshop concurrence—“to produce a society free of . . . biases.” Its overarching goal was to secure a consumer market of freely moving people and currency.

What is clear is that a constitutional privilege to discriminate would destabilize longstanding conventions of full and equal access to commerce and leisure. Such a decision would license public accommodations to serve only opposite-sex couples or other in-groups. Exceptions—however the lines are drawn—would undermine an identity-neutral marketplace where dollars and people flow freely without the friction of information and search costs. They quite literally would reduce the space for individual dignity.

*This blog post is an abridged version of Elizabeth Sepper, Free Speech and the “Unique Evils” of Public Accommodations Discrimination, 2020 U. Chi. Legal F. 273 (2020).

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Elizabeth Sepper is a Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law.

Acknowledging Error: How State AGs Can Address Historic Injustice

This is the third piece in a month-long blog series that celebrates Black History Month.

Many lawyers may be unfamiliar with a source of law that nonetheless plays an important role in how their governments function: state Attorney General opinions.  In most states, the Attorney General has a duty to give formal legal opinions, on request, usually addressing unsettled questions of state law.  These opinions generally are not binding on courts, but courts often treat them as persuasive authority, and they provide guidance to state government officials in areas where courts have not yet spoken.  However, like other forms of law, Attorney General opinions can cause harm or reinforce inequity.

The Maryland Office of the Attorney General, at the direction of former Attorney General Brian Frosh, recently took an important step to address that inequity by formally overruling racially discriminatory and now-rejected legal principles found in certain past Attorney General opinions.[i]

The Maryland Constitution requires the Attorney General to “[g]ive his opinion in writing . . . on any legal matter or subject” upon request.[ii]  Since 1916, our Office has collected and published these opinions in annual bound volumes, creating a permanent record of the views of Attorneys General spanning more than a century.  State and local officials across Maryland sought these opinions, and relied on them in determining what the law required of them.[iii]  Unfortunately, some of these opinions relied on, promoted—or at the very least unquestioningly accepted—racially discriminatory legal principles that we now recognize as unconstitutional.[iv]  In particular, a number of opinions accepted the idea of segregation in public facilities and public education under the doctrine of “separate but equal,” repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).[v]  Another line of opinions adhered to the notion that the State could bar individuals from marrying on the basis of their race, a doctrine  rejected in Loving v. Virginia (1967).[vi]

Of course, nobody reading those opinions today could believe that the discriminatory legal principles they cite, or implicitly accept, are consistent with the Constitution.  But those statements remain in our volumes of opinions, volumes that we still cite for other principles of law, and lawyers and members of the public can still find them in law libraries throughout the State and on our Office’s website.

That’s why Attorney General Frosh (inspired by a similar project of former Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring[vii]) recognized the importance of identifying and formally repudiating these outdated opinions to the extent they relied on racially discriminatory legal principles.  Our Office, with the invaluable assistance of two summer law clerks, conducted a thorough review of each volume of our past opinions dating back to 1916: a time when Maryland’s primary and secondary schools were fully segregated; when none of the State’s public institutions of higher education admitted Black students; when Baltimore City was still defending in court an ordinance that segregated the City’s neighborhoods by race; and when attempts to add a disenfranchising “grandfather clause” to the State constitution were still in recent memory.[viii]

Our research identified 22 opinions, with dates as recent as 1967, that cited, relied on, or accepted without question one of the two racially discriminatory legal principles mentioned above.  Based on that research, we were able to release a new opinion, this past November, that formally overruled the unconstitutional legal principles contained within those 22 opinions.  As Attorney General Frosh put it in the official opinion:

Although, as a practical matter, those aspects of the opinions were long ago rendered unenforceable by changes in the law, we recognize that the opinions continue to serve as a reminder of the history of racial injustice perpetuated through the legal institutions of our State government. We thus formally overrule the portions of those opinions that upheld or relied on the erroneous view that the State could prohibit interracial marriages and impose the segregation of public facilities under the doctrine of “separate but equal.” Renouncing these unfortunate opinions cannot change the past, but we hope that it will serve to reinforce our Office’s current commitment to equality under the law.[ix]

Maryland’s current Attorney General, Anthony Brown, who is also our State’s first Black Attorney General, has said that “[t]he pursuit of equity and justice is where we in the Office of Attorney General stand every day.”[x]  The first step toward promoting equity in the law is to recognize and confront the ways in which our legal institutions have bolstered, and continue to bolster, inequity.  Thus, even though nobody would think the discriminatory principles in those old opinions were still good law, explicitly rejecting them still served an important purpose.

For us to rest on the idea that others have pointed out our errors, as the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly did in Brown and Loving, would not be good enough.  We owed it to history and to the State we represent to acknowledge those errors ourselves.

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[i] 107 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 140 (2022).

[ii] Md. Const., Art. V, § 3(a)(4).

[iii] See, e.g., 46 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 44, 44-48 (1961) (advising the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Harford County that he should continue to enforce the State’s ban on marriage between a white person and a Black person), overruled by 107 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 140.

[iv] See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., 41 Opinions of the Attorney General 120, 127-29 (1956) (advising, even after Brown v. Board of Education, that “training schools,” a type of juvenile correctional institution, should remain segregated), overruled by 107 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 140.

[v] 347 U.S. 483.

[vi] 388 U.S. 1.

[vii] Va. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 21-103, 2022 WL 173637 (2022).

[viii] See 107 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. at 141 & n.2, 147; see also Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 Md. L. Rev. 289, 313 (1983).

[ix] 107 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. at 152.

[x] Anthony G. Brown, Prepared Swearing-In Remarks (Jan. 3, 2023), https://www.agtransition23.com/transition-updates/prepared-swearing-in-remarks.

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Section 230 Requires a Balanced Approach that Protects Civil Rights and Free Expression

This column is the first in an ACS special series examining the First Amendment Freedom of Speech and its role in the development and evaluation of public policies regarding the regulation of the internet, campaign finance, antidiscrimination laws, and other areas.

On Tuesday, February 21, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Gonzalez v. Google, a case involving whether online platforms get legal immunity when they make targeted content recommendations. In 1996, Congress passed Section 230, providing online platforms with limited immunity from liability for publishing third-party content. This will be the first time the Supreme Court weighs in on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, joined by five civil rights organizations, filed an amicus brief highlighting for the Court the ways in which censorship and discrimination manifest online, and urging the Court to adopt a balanced interpretation of Section 230 that does not impede enforcement of critical civil rights laws or the free expression of diverse voices. As amici, we recognize that the internet is particularly important for people of color and others historically excluded from the halls of power because it enables circumvention of traditional economic and political gatekeepers. Section 230 allows people of color, women, LGBTQ communities, people with disabilities, and religious minorities to leverage online platforms for self-expression, community building, civic engagement, and entrepreneurship. Modern civil rights movements, perhaps most notably the Movement for Black Lives, have benefited from reduced gatekeeping on social media.

Our brief cautioned that limiting Section 230 immunity could lead to greater censorship of diverse voices online. Without Section 230, online platforms would minimize the risk of liability for illegal content by engaging in heavy-handed cost-effective censorship instead of carefully reviewing every piece of content. Current content moderation systems already disproportionately silence Black people and other historically marginalized populations, even when they do not violate platform rules. Increased censorship by platforms seeking to evade liability would further silence diverse perspectives on important issues like racial and gender justice.

We also noted that as we conduct more and more of our daily lives online, automated decision-making systems risk reproducing discrimination at scale.  Our brief discussed how providing overbroad immunity to platforms would jeopardize enforcement of decades-old anti-discrimination laws like the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Specifically, we argued Section 230 does not immunize defendants for civil rights violations or other illegal conduct that do not involve publishing; and even if the conduct involves publishing, Section 230 does not shield it if the defendant “materially contributed” to the illegality. This two-step process follows the consensus of the lower courts, where there is no circuit split, and helps ensure that online platforms are held accountable for civil rights violations.

Step One: No Immunity for Non-Publishing Activity

Offline, a publisher (such as a newspaper or book publisher) is legally responsible for any content they publish—including content from third parties such as letters to the editor. Online, however, Congress decided in Section 230 that websites and other entities that publish third-party content online—such as tweets or YouTube videos—generally should not be liable if their users post unlawful content.

But Section 230 immunity is not absolute. Internet companies are not always immune when they use third-party information. Rather, the critical question for immunity is whether the claim brought against the internet company treats it as the publisher of third-party content. Section 230 states, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Thus, it is not sufficient for a defendant to simply be an online publisher in some aspects of their business.

The “publisher” question matters because many civil rights violations that occur through the internet have nothing to do with publishing. There is now extensive documentation of discriminatory decision-making that is conducted or enabled by tech companies, including through discriminatory algorithms. Mortgage approval algorithms disproportionately deny applicants of color compared to similarly-situated white applicants; they are up to 80% more likely to deny Black applicants. Mortgage lenders, often using algorithmic pricing, have charged Black and Latino borrowers higher rates than similarly situated white borrowers, costing Black and Latino borrowers $765 million in additional interest annually. Tenant screening algorithms frequently produce flawed reports and disproportionately result in denials of housing to applicants of color. Algorithms used for hiring can “reproduce patterns of inequity at all stages of the hiring process.” Facial recognition technologies have been consistently found to produce inaccurate matches on the basis of sex and race. Sweeping surveillance and data collection also raise significant civil rights concerns. This type of conduct is not publishing information to an audience; it is processing data to make a decision or for some other purpose.

Existing case law supports this position. Lower courts have rejected Section 230 defenses where the unlawful conduct did not derive from publication. The Ninth Circuit put it most clearly in Barnes v. Yahoo: “[W]hat matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.” More recently, in Henderson v. Source for Public Data, the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230 “does not provide blanket protection from claims . . . just because they depend in some way on publishing information.” In Henderson, claims against a background check company for failure to provide Fair Credit Reporting Act disclosures did not treat the company as a publisher because the claims did not hinge on the impropriety of the background checks themselves. Similarly, Section 230 did not bar a product liability claim against Snapchat for encouraging dangerous behavior through its app’s design because the claim was not based on Snapchat’s publishing activity.

Section 230 must not undercut bedrock anti-discrimination protections given the real risks posed by algorithmic technology online. Just because a platform is operating online and using data generated by third parties does not automatically mean Section 230 immunizes its activity. If a claim seeks to hold a platform liable for engaging in discrimination, and publishing is not a core element of the claim, Section 230 does not apply.

Step Two: No Immunity for Material Contributions to Illegality

Critically, Section 230 only protects against liability for content produced by others, not content produced by the defendant themselves. The second prong of the Section 230 analysis acknowledges that even if a platform is engaged in publishing, it can still lose immunity if it “materially contributes” to the illegality. Material contribution entails “being responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly unlawful,” as the Sixth Circuit put it.

The material contribution test is essential for the protection of civil rights. Complex algorithms are not passive conduits that treat all content or users equally. Datasets often explicitly reflect race, sex, disability, and other protected characteristics, or these characteristics creep in via proxies. Data drawn from a society with a history of systemic inequity reflects that inequity. In turn, algorithms that draw on this data threaten to replicate and perpetuate inequity. Facially neutral tools can still produce discriminatory outcomes.

Publishers can make material contributions by transforming benign third-party content into something illegal. For example, Meta recently settled a Fair Housing Act lawsuit brought by the Department of Justice that alleged that Facebook’s advertising algorithm disproportionately targeted housing ads toward white users and away from Black users, even when advertisers never selected such targeting. Similarly, in the Roommates.com case, the Ninth Circuit denied Section 230 immunity when a rental housing website required users to disclose protected characteristics and roommate preferences in order to steer users towards people who matched their discriminatory criteria. By inducing discriminatory content, a publisher “becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others.” As noted in Henderson, Section 230 provides no shelter for publishers who “cross the line into substantively altering the content at issue in ways that make it unlawful.”

A platform can also materially contribute to illegality when it affirmatively furthers a third party’s illegal conduct. In National Coalition on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl, defendants sent tens of thousands of voter intimidation robocalls. They were sued for violating the Voting Rights Act and KKK Act. The court held that their robocall service provider was not entitled to Section 230 immunity because it allegedly helped the defendants target the robocalls to Black neighborhoods.

The material contribution test asks the right question: Is the publisher responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly unlawful? In the civil rights context, this means that platforms should be considered “responsible” when they take benign content and transform it into discriminatory conduct, or when they take illegal conduct and affirmatively help exacerbate the harm.

*    *    *

The internet’s promise of equality and free expression remains yet unfulfilled. The law demands a more nuanced interpretation of Section 230 that can bring us closer to an equitable internet that protects both civil rights and free expression. Accountability for civil rights violations by online platforms is critical to achieve equality in a data-driven economy. The Supreme Court must strike the right balance.

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Dariely Rodriguez is Chief Deputy Counsel at the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

 

 

 

 

David Brody is Managing Attorney of the Digital Justice Initiative at the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law

 

Frederick Douglass Was My Founding Father

This is the second piece in a month-long blog series that celebrates Black History Month by highlighting the contributions of Black thinkers and leaders to the development of American constitutional thought.

Only two national holidays celebrate individual Americans. Presidents Day honors George Washington (born February 22nd) and Abraham Lincoln (born February 12th) and Martin Luther King Jr. Day honors Dr. King (born January 16th) and his contributions to civil rights. There is no corresponding holiday honoring Frederick Douglass, a towering figure in U.S. history, who celebrated his birthday on February 14th.[i]

Washington is lauded as the “father of the nation,” Lincoln is credited with preserving it, and King is praised for holding it to its constitutional ideals. And yet, we would do well to pay equal or arguably greater attention to Douglass, the figure, perhaps more than any other, who laid the intellectual and political foundation that put America on course to become a multiracial democracy.

Consider some counterfactuals. What if we’d had Lincoln without Douglass? Although Lincoln personally opposed slavery, he was far from an abolitionist. For most of his career, Lincoln recoiled at the idea of free Blacks living alongside whites (“What next? Free them, and make them politically and socially, our equals?”) and declared his opposition to Black people having the right to vote, to serve on juries, and to hold office.

Until the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln did not imagine that slavery would end in the United States within his lifetime. It’s not hard to imagine that, without Douglass (and other abolitionists) pushing him and pushing the slavery debate to its boiling point, Lincoln would likely have steered the nation towards another 50 years of Southern appeasement.

Without Douglass, even Dr. King’s legacy would be in doubt. There could be no March on Washington without the Emancipation Proclamation, which preceded it 100 years prior. There could be no Civil Rights Act or Voting Rights Acts without the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which forever transformed American conceptions of citizenship, equal protection, and suffrage.

Of course, these counterfactuals share a fatal flaw. They rely too heavily on the Great Man theory of history, which tends to overemphasize the contributions of individuals—usually white, male ones—in shaping the course of human events, underestimating the way events shape us.

We can’t know for sure whether, in the absence of Douglass, abolition and equality for Black Americans would have progressed more or less quickly. We can only point to the indelible fingerprints that Douglass did leave on the nation’s psyche—and the tools and methods he left for future generations of freedom seekers.

Progressives are generally familiar with Douglass’ history as a fierce critic of injustice, underlining the flagrant inconsistencies between America’s founding myths and its practices. It’s become something of a ritual in social justice circles. Every Independence Day, someone will resurface Frederick Douglass’s iconic question: “What to the Slave is the 4th of July?” and its equally iconic answer—"a day that reveals to him, more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim.”

Fewer are familiar with Douglass’ full-throated defense of the Constitution as a “glorious liberty document,” within the same speech and the positive vision of what America could be that he strived to promote throughout his life.

Douglass described the Constitution as a document with “principles and purposes entirely hostile to the existence of slavery,” a constitutional vision set him apart within contemporary discourse. Meanwhile, Lincoln held the more widely shared viewpoint that the Constitution restrained the federal government from abolishing slavery. On the eve of the Civil War, as a last-ditch effort to compromise with the South, Lincoln supported a constitutional amendment that would have made this interpretation explicit, permanently enshrining slavery in the Constitution.

Douglass’s approach was also distinct from that of white abolitionist radicals, led by William Garrison who denigrated the Constitution a “pact with hell” because it contained provisions protecting the power of slaveowners. Because he considered the republic irreparably tainted, Garrison refused to engage in electoral politics and called for dissolution of the Union. While this stance was in theory more radical than Douglass’ (and perhaps more accurately reflected the founders’ intentions), in practice, both Lincoln’s and Garrison’s interpretations conceded that there would be no abolition of Southern slavery in the foreseeable future.

It was certainly not lost on Douglass that many of the so-called founding fathers had owned slaves or that oblique references to slavery were peppered through the document.[ii] He simply refused to let these inconveniences stand in the way of using the Constitution as an instrument to push for justice and equality—especially when more favorable readings were available. As Douglass put it, “nothing but absolute necessity, shall, or ought to drive me to such a concession to slavery.”

Rather than focusing on the founder’s intentions, Douglass centered the polity and purposes set forth in the Constitution’s preamble. Douglass noted that, by its own terms, the Constitution’s protections transcended lines of race, gender, or even citizenship.

"We, the people"—not we, the white people—not we, the citizens, or the legal voters—not we, the privileged class, and excluding all other classes but we, the people; not we, the horses and cattle, but we the people—the men and women, the human inhabitants of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”

Douglass found similar support for abolition in the terms of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, which refer to persons without reference to color or other status.

Centering his own common sense and lived experience, Douglass declined to give anyone else, even the Supreme Court, the last word on interpreting the Constitution. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision, in which the Court declared that Black Americans were not citizens and were therefore ineligible for the Constitution’s protections, Douglass’ reminded his listeners, “the Supreme Court of the United States is not the only power in this world.”

Incredibly, despite the devastating ruling, Douglass declared that his hopes for abolition were “never brighter” and predicted that “this very attempt to blot out forever the hopes of an enslaved people may be one necessary link in the chain of events preparatory to the downfall and complete overthrow of the whole slave system.” Even more incredibly, he was right.

Although Douglass’ interpretation of the Constitution was not widely shared before the war, it gained support over the course of the Civil War and in its aftermath. Under heavy pressure from Douglass and the abolitionists, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, even though in the leadup and aftermath of the proclamation, many in the legal community expressed serious doubts of his constitutional authority to do so.

By 1865, Douglass’ expansive view of the anti-slavery constitution had found considerable support in Congress. Both houses passed a bill that would require Southern states to abolish slavery in order to be readmitted to the Union, claiming the requirement was within the United States’ constitutional authority “to guarantee a republican form of government to every state.” While Lincoln would veto the bill as unconstitutional, it set the tone for Radical Reconstruction, an unprecedented federal effort to secure the rights of Black Americans through a mix of legislation and constitutional amendments.

Douglass’ theory of the Constitution was most readily reflected in the language and text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which famously extended the equal protection of the law to “all persons” and enshrined the principle of birthright citizenship in the Constitution, overturning once and for all the shadow of Dred Scott and planting the seeds for a truly multiracial democracy.

One can find echoes of the eighteenth century’s battle over the potential and limitations of the Constitution in current debates. Analysts report that the United States is at its most divided since the Civil War. The nation reels in the wake of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, a deeply polarizing decision which, like Dred Scott, relied upon the purported intentions of the founders to limit constitutional rights.

A considerable segment of progressives and radicals believe that our country’s institutions are irreparably tainted and should be cast off entirely. Meanwhile, progressives in positions of power frequently bemoan the injustices that they would like to see eliminated, but point to constitutional or institutional limits that prevent them from taking action.

In this moment of national crisis and opportunity, President Biden speaks often about “restoring the soul of the nation” and has made a point of referring back to Lincoln, including in his State of the Union address.  If we are to repair the nation’s divides and restore its soul, however, it’s not Lincoln whom we should look to, but to Douglass.

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[i] Like many people born into slavery, Douglass never knew the exact day of his birth. He chose to celebrate his birthday on Valentine’s Day based on one of his few clear memories of spending time with his mother—her presenting him with a heart shaped piece of cake. In his life as in his politics, he chose to place love at the center of everything.

[ii] Some examples include clauses that prohibited Congress from ending the African slave trade before 1808 but did not require that it ever be ended, counted slaves for the election of the president through the electoral college and the three-fifths clause, and, guaranteed that fugitive slaves would be returned to their owners.

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Taonga Leslie is ACS' Director of Policy and Program for Racial Justice.

Reclaiming the Abolition Amendments

This is the first piece in a month-long blog series that celebrates Black History Month by highlighting the contributions of Black thinkers and leaders to the development of American constitutional thought.

Black people have been excluded from the decision-making process at nearly every significant moment in constitutional law. We were not present for the drafting of the Constitution itself, or for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. We did not gain a voice on the Supreme Court until 1967—and by that point, our interests were about to be pushed to the margins by an increasingly right-wing judiciary. Only eleven senators have ever been Black. Our role in constitutional law tends not to be that of the decision maker, but of litigants against the government, employers, or landlords. Very often, we are the ordinary people seeking to vindicate our rights—yet the standards set to adjudicate those rights (including the so-called “originalism” currently dominant on the Supreme Court) frequently center the perspective of an “ordinary person” who looks nothing like us. Centering our understandings of the Constitution—and particularly the Reconstruction amendments, in what they meant to newly enfranchised Black citizens (and their abolitionist white allies in Congress)—would dramatically expand our view of what the Constitution makes possible, and provide powerful tools to support modern movements for liberation.

Even prior to the Civil War, Black thinkers like Frederick Douglass departed from mainstream interpretations to highlight the potential of the Constitution as an abolitionist document, by underlining the fundamental tension between slavery and democracy. During the Civil War, Black Americans played a key role in ensuring the Union’s victory by defying slavery and abandoning plantations to work in service of the Union Army. After the war, Black Americans moved swiftly to make their freedom tangible. As Dorothy Roberts describes it:

"four million formerly enslaved people grabbed the opportunity Emancipation afforded them to create their own economic, social, and political lives independent of white domination. They gathered their family members, established farms and businesses, and ran for public office. Black Americans elected to southern legislatures helped to install egalitarian state constitutions, enact civil rights legislation, and establish public education. . . . Thus, by resisting white domination and acting like citizens, [B]lack people have secured greater freedom apart from official recognition of their rights, thereby changing the Constitution’s meaning to encompass their freedom."

To Black Americans, the Reconstruction Amendments guaranteed their right to establish and protect this new society. A proper understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments’ original public meaning must be consistent with that project.

The Meaning of the Abolition Amendments

For the freedmen and their abolitionist allies, the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery meant not merely to eradicate the prior institution of chattel slavery, but to prevent its return or replacement in all but name. In arguing for the Amendment’s passage, Sen. Henry Wilson—a lifelong abolitionist who had himself spent 10 years in indentured servitude—declared that it would “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.” To this end, the Amendment was designed to encompass not only the conditions of subjugation but also the badges and incidents of slavery. Congress made some of those badges and incidents—including restraints on marriage, family relations, speech, property, education, and status within the legal system clear in their debate, but reserved the power to legislate against additional ones.

The Fourteenth Amendment went farther, clarifying that abolition was to mean equality before the law. The Citizenship Clause embedded the abolitionist concept of birthright citizenship in the Constitution, pushing back against Southern state efforts to restrict Black liberties after slavery’s abolition. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to be the heavy lifter of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the Bill of Rights (and unenumerated rights) to apply against the states. The Due Process Clause meant to extend the mid-19th Century concept of due process, including substantive due process, to all those within the United States. The Equal Protection Clause was meant to have its emphasis primarily on protection— in addition to guaranteeing that whatever protection state and federal governments offered be applied equally, it also imposed a positive duty on them to protect all people within their borders from private violence and exploitation.

The Fifteenth Amendment did not deal in abolitionist terms of art, and it’s fairly straight-forward. It was meant to clarify that the protections the Constitution guaranteed to all citizens included the franchise. Congress recognized that Black people’s interests could only be meaningfully advanced if they were able to advocate for themselves, and the franchise is a critical component of that.

Finally, it’s worth noting that all of these amendments included powerful enforcement clauses.  Congress gave itself the power to legislatively enforce all three, setting a high floor for enforcement of constitutional rights.

The Power of the Abolition Amendments

I’ve said in prior writings that the Abolition Amendments have the power to uphold the entire canon of progressive constitutional decisions, and that’s important. But I want to make it clear just how much more powerful they are than that. The Thirteenth Amendment’s power to redress badges and incidents of slavery could provide the basis for police and prison abolition, and for ending felon disenfranchisement. It supports the strong protection of reproductive rights on a much stronger basis than Roe ever did. It would also provide a basis for the enactment of property reparations, both for slavery and subsequent systems of subjugation.

A full reading of the Fourteenth Amendment could produce similarly powerful results. Rather than the current patchwork of legislative enactments, the Citizenship Clause should be read to extend birthright citizenship to the territories. The Privileges or Immunities Clause would extend broad protection against state interference with any general rights of citizenship—whether or not they were clearly established as such in 1868. The Due Process Clause, given its abolitionist reading, would extend significantly more substantive procedural rights than it does now. For instance, the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule would be untenable under an abolitionist reading. The Equal Protection Clause would see perhaps the largest change, as it would come to support race-conscious remedies so long as Black people remain disadvantaged in American society. Furthermore, it would establish the government’s duty to protect people, whether against domestic violence, rising sea levels, polluted drinking water, or a pandemic.

The Fifteenth Amendment, while less radical than its cousins, would still be substantially more powerful under an abolitionist reading. Critically, it would shape the analysis of any voting legislation to evaluate whether the policy materially disadvantages communities of color, and provide a basis for striking down those that do. Gerrymandering, polling place closures, voter ID requirements, and other restrictions on the right to vote would be subject to considerably greater scrutiny than they currently receive.

Congress gave itself broad powers under the Reconstruction Amendments; broad enough to support the creation of abolition democracy.

What Abolition Constitutionalism Can Accomplish

Simply stating a theory of abolition constitutionalism won’t be enough to achieve the transformations described above. We have to start by believing it. We’re currently in a position where constitutional law—as it is—represents a deeply harmful system, supporting a wide range of abuses against Black people, trans people, unhoused people, Jewish people, and all sorts of marginalized communities that make powerful, conservative white people uncomfortable. But that isn’t what constitutional law has to be. It can be a tool for liberation, if enough of us believe and make it one.

Originalism didn’t spring immediately from Robert Bork’s 1971 law review article into jurisprudence—the process took over a decade to begin in earnest, and the theory didn’t really rise to dominance until the Roberts Court. The originalists like to imagine that their theory represents the law as it truly is, and so long as they hold a majority on the Supreme Court, it will be. But we can adopt a better way of approaching constitutional law in preparation for the day when the originalists don’t hold a majority. The tools of abolition are already in the Constitution, if we choose to give them meaning and power.

I’m asking you, dear reader, to believe in those tools, and your ability to give them meaning. Many of you who will read this piece are, or soon will be, lawyers. There are times when the legal profession can feel tedious or disconnected from the major challenges facing our society. But we must remember that in this profession, we have the ability to use our words to change the world. We have to believe in the power within the Constitution to build a better approach to constitutional law. And we have to believe in ourselves, and our power to shape a more just and equitable society.

Brandon Hasbrouck is Associate Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University. His scholarship and advocacy centers movements and works in solidarity with them to advance transformative understandings of our Constitution.

Learn more about Professor Hasbrouck and follow him on Twitter @b_hasbrouck.