Changes After Stockley Acquittal

by Kim Gardner, Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis

I am disappointed with the court’s finding in the shooting death of Anthony Lamar Smith. As the Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, I remain committed to holding people accountable for violating the law, regardless of their race, gender, occupation, or station in life. My job is to ensure a fair and transparent process and to vigorously present the evidence in the best manner possible, and my team did exactly that.  

While officer-involved shooting cases are extremely difficult to prevail in court, I believe we offered sufficient evidence that proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jason Stockley intended to kill Mr. Smith. However, in this case it was the judge’s duty to evaluate the evidence and deliver his findings. That’s how our system works.

In light of the verdict, it is time to take a harder look at how officer-involved shootings are addressed in our city. I understand and appreciate the many challenges that face our city’s police officers. It is very noble work. However, we need further examination and clarity in the laws that govern the use of deadly force by police officers.

I believe we must first change the way these cases are investigated. Police cannot continue to investigate themselves.

I am calling for an independent investigative body that works under the supervision of the Circuit Attorney that is solely dedicated to investigating the 25 officer-involved shooting cases that are under review by my office so the community has confidence that they are being handled fairly and objectively.

We are in trying times. I understand that some people are frustrated and angry. I am frustrated as well. There are things we can do.

We have the opportunity to show the world that, in the City of St. Louis, we can show our frustration in a strong yet peaceful manner. We can share what’s on our minds without destroying the very city we all want to make a better place. Destruction of our community is not the answer. Rather, we need to build alliance to reform the shortcomings of the current approach.

I am asking the community to use their energy and voice and join me in working with state and local lawmakers to establish better ways to seek justice in officer-involved shooting cases. I am asking for the community’s support in helping me secure the resources needed to quickly and objectively investigate these cases.

Presidential Pardons After Joe Arpaio

If Donald Trump issues a pardon to Joseph Arpaio he will likely be acting within his enumerated powers as president, but doing so in a manner that could undermine our legal system and the Constitution.

Arpaio is the former sheriff of Maricopa County, Ariz., who was found guilty in July of criminal contempt for defying a federal court’s order barring the illegal profiling of immigrants and Latinos by his officers. Though he faces potential imprisonment of up to six months, he has not yet been sentenced, nor applied for clemency through the Justice Department process in effect since the Reagan administration that requires applicants to wait five years after completing their sentence and undergo a thorough investigation before they can be pardoned. Nevertheless, Trump has signaled that he plans to pardon Arpaio preemptively because he approves of Arpaio’s harsh treatment of immigrants.

Given the broad clemency authority granted to the President under the Constitution, it is unlikely that such a pardon could be challenged successfully in court. Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests in the president the power to grant “[p]ardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of Impeachment.”

This provision has been interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court. In Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld the power of the President to issue a conditional commutation, relying on an expansive interpretation of the pardon authority:

[T]he language of that [pardon] clause itself, and . . . the unbroken practice since 1790 compels the conclusion that the power flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress. Additionally, considerations of public policy and humanitarian impulses support an interpretation of that power so as to permit the attachment of any condition which does not otherwise offend the Constitution. The plain purpose of the broad power conferred by 2, cl. 1, was to allow plenary authority in the President to "forgive" the convicted person in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, or to alter it with conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable.

Though it is highly unusual for a president to ignore completely the Justice Department process for processing pardons, there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents him from disregarding the established process and issuing pardons at any time. The power to pardon can be exercised before indictment or conviction, as President Gerald Ford did when he pardoned Richard Nixon for all federal offenses which he “committed or may have committed or taken part in.”

This authority also can be used to invalidate criminal contempt convictions, despite the potential of such pardons to undermine the judiciary. In Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1924), the Court rejected a separation-of-powers argument that the president cannot pardon criminal contempt of court. Chief Justice Taft reasoned that the possibility that the pardoning power could be perverted so as to destroy the deterrent effect of judicial punishment is not an adequate basis for limiting the President's discretion to grant clemency. "Our Constitution," Taft wrote for a unanimous Court, "confers full discretion to pardon on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it."  Id. at 121. If the power were abused, the remedy, according to the Grossman Court, would be resort to impeachment and removal.

However, despite the fact that Trump likely has the authority to pardon Arpaio, it would be unwise to do so. First, such a pardon may be unnecessary to protect Arpaio, an 85-year-old man, from imprisonment because it seems unlikely that the sentencing court would impose jail time on someone as vulnerable as Arpaio.

More importantly, such a pardon would undermine respect for the rule of law and could promote future violations of the Constitution. Arpaio was convicted of violating a judicial order that barred his department from violating the constitutional rights of individuals by detaining them based on their “race or Latino ancestry.” By pardoning Arpaio’s knowing violation of this order, Trump would be sending a clear message that government officers can disregard the Constitution, so long as they do so in a manner that would please Trump and his nativist supporters.

The potential for subverting the Constitution raises a slim possibility that an Arpaio pardon could be invalidated by the courts. Though Schick v. Reed, discussed above, construed the pardon power broadly, the Court pointedly noted that the pardon power could not be used in a manner that would “otherwise offend the Constitution” or be “constitutionally objectionable.” 419 U.S. 266. As I have argued elsewhere, surely it would violate the Constitution for the president to impose blatantly unconstitutional conditions on a pardon or use the pardon power in racially discriminatory fashion. See Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 616-120 (1991). Professor Martin Redish has recently argued that such a pardon might also be overturned on Due Process grounds. However, such a judicial challenge would be unprecedented doctrinally, and would likely face significant justiciabilty and standing obstacles.

In the end, the most plausible remedy for such a wrong-headed pardon by Trump would be through recourse to political channels: impeachment and removal of the president by Congress, or repudiation at the voting booth by the people.

A Courageous Response to the Voice of Hate

*This piece was originally posted on StateAG.org

A bi-partisan group of 67 former Attorneys General of the states and jurisdictions today pointed to the example of one of their colleagues to remind us all of the moral imperative to respond directly to those who amplify the voices of hate. See the statement below issued by the former Attorneys General, and here is the link to former Alabama Attorney General Bill Baxley‘s response to the KKK: Did the Attorney General of Alabama Once Tell the Ku Klux Klan to 'Kiss My Ass'?

Statement by Former State Attorneys General

There are times in the life of a nation, or a president, or a state attorney general when one is called upon to respond directly to the voice of hate.

As former state attorneys general - we take the liberty of reminding Americans - as we remind ourselves - that events can call out the worst in us -- and the best.

In 1971 the twenty-nine year old attorney general of Alabama began his quest to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Birmingham church bombing which killed four little girls. It was a crime rooted in hate and his determination to prosecute the case gave rise to voices of leaders of hate. He faced political furor, lack of cooperation from federal and state government agencies and constant threats of physical violence and death. But he persisted. It took years but he obtained a conviction.

In 1976 when the grand dragon of the Ku Klux Klan wrote a threatening letter and demanded that Alabama Attorney General Bill Baxley respond directly to his letter, he did.

We commend his response (see link above) to the attention of all who seek to equivocate in times of moral crisis.

Former Attorneys General,

Robert Abrams, New York
Ronald Amemiya, Hawaii
Jeff Amestoy, Vermont
Bruce Babbitt, Arizona
Thurbert Baker, Georgia
Paul Bardacke, New Mexico
Steve Beshear,  Kentucky
Bruce Botelho, Alaska
Margery Bronster, Hawaii
Charlie Brown, West Virginia
Richard Bryan, Nevada
Charles Burson, Tennessee
Bonnie Campbell, Iowa
Steve Clark, Arkansas
Walter Cohen, Pennsylvania
Robert Cooper, Tennessee
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Maryland
Fred Cowan, Kentucky
Frankie Sue Del Papa, Nevada
Jerry Diamond, Vermont
Richard Doran, Florida
John Easton, Vermont
Rufus Edmisten, North Carolina
Drew Edmondson, Oklahoma
Tyrone Fahner, Illinois
Lee Fisher, Ohio
Karen Freeman – Wilson, Indiana
Terry Goddard, Arizona
Chris Gorman, Kentucky
Slade Gorton, Washington
Jennifer Granholm, Michigan
Scott Harshbarger, Massachusetts
Peter Harvey, New Jersey
Hubert H . Humphrey III, Minnesota
Drew Ketterer, Maine
Oliver Koppell, New York
Peg Lautenschlager, Wisconsin
Joseph Lieberman, Connecticut
Michael Lilly, Hawaii
Alicia Limtiaco, Guam
Bill Lockyer, California
David Louie, Hawaii
Robert Marks, Hawaii
Brian McKay, Nevada
Jeff Modisett, Indiana
Betty Montgomery, Ohio
Mike Moore. Mississippi
Jim Petro, Ohio
Jeffrey Pine, Rhode Island
Warren Price III, Hawaii
Hector Richard, Puerto Rico
Clarine Nardi Riddle, Connecticut
Dennis Roberts, Rhode Island
Stephen Rosenthal, Virginia
Stephen Sachs, Maryland
James Shannon, Massachusetts
Mark Shurtleff, Utah
William Sorrell, Vermont
Robert Spagnoletti, District of Columbia
Robert Stephan, Kansas
Mary Sue Terry, Virginia
James Tierney, Maine
Anthony F. Troy, Virginia
Jim Guy Tucker, Arkansas
Paul Van Dam, Utah
Bob Wefald, North Dakota
Grant Woods, Arizona

*Bill Baxley practices law in Birmingham, Alabama

Trump’s Travel Ban and Our Careless Court

by Dr. Caroline Poplin, Counsel & Medical Director, Guttman Buschner & Brooks PLLC

This Supreme Court apparently believes it should never question a presidential claim of national security, no matter how weak, no matter how broad, even if it involves refugees fleeing war and persecution.

Lest we forget, the United States was founded by the Pilgrims, a heretical Protestant group fleeing threats of imprisonment and execution in Jacobean England.

In Trump’s first executive order, popularly called the Muslim travel ban, the president suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days, halted admission of Syrian refugees indefinitely and reduced the total number of refugees to be admitted for 2017 to 50,000 from the 110,000 authorized by President Obama.

After confusion at airports and hostile receptions by federal courts, President Trump substituted a second executive order. His new order eliminated the clause specific to Syrians and the exception for religious minorities. In all other respects, it was unchanged.

Two months later, the Fourth Circuit upheld, 10-3, a Maryland District Court decision enjoining the travel ban on immigrants (the refugee ban had not been challenged) as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On June 12, a Ninth Circuit panel per curiam upheld the Hawaii District Court decision enjoining the entire travel ban, including the refugee section, as a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, without reaching the constitutional issue. Of note, both appeals courts mentioned Korematsu.

The United States applied to the Supreme Court post haste for relief. Now with its full complement of justices, on June 26, the Court, in a per curiam decision, casually reversed the decisions of both circuit courts along with underlying district court decisions with exceptions for immigrants or refugees who have a “bona fide relationship” with a U.S. person or entity. An entity apparently means a school or business. The fearful Court explicitly excludes U.S. resettlement agencies who contact foreigners seeking entry “to help them avoid the ban.” The Court allowed limited exceptions as a matter of “equity.” As most readers know, Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch would have upheld the ban in its entirety.

Immigrants come for a better life, education or a job, or to rejoin their families. Delay may be inconvenient, even costly, but it is generally not life-threatening. This is not so for refugees. By definition, they are fleeing “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group social group, or political opinion,” according to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 101(a)(42), tracking the  United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) to which the U.S. acceded.

Anyone who has seen recent film clips of Aleppo in Syria, Mosul or Baghdad in Iraq, Yemeni cities devastated by air attacks (perhaps by Saudis flying U.S. bombers) or executions of dissidents in Iran can understand the urgency of the refugees’ plight. You would think the Supreme Court might take judicial notice of such indisputable facts when balancing “equities,” but apparently not.

The Supreme Court was unmoved – in fact, oblivious.

Indeed, in response to a second opinion from the Hawaii District Court, the Court, in one paragraph, accepted the District Court’s expansion of the definition of close relatives, but doubled down on the refugee ban. Despite Judge Watson’s description of the current elaborate vetting procedure – which can take up to two years and involve formal contracts the State Department signs with U.S. resettlement agencies – only refugees with family connections already in the United States can enter. The Court felt no need to explain its action.

That reminds me and no doubt many others of the St. Louis.

In 1939, the St. Louis, an ocean liner with more than 700 frantic German and Austrian Jews aboard fleeing the Nazis, was turned away from the U.S. because the quota for German-Austrian “immigrants” for 1939 was filled. There was a waiting list of years. The U.S. State Department directed the “immigrants” to return to Europe and take their places on the list. Desperate cables to President Roosevelt were unavailing. – The ship returned to Europe (although not to Germany) and many of the refugees eventually perished in Hitler’s highly efficient death machine. Reportedly, Roosevelt declined because of the possibility of German spies among the passengers (i.e. “national security”) and a coming election during a time of anti-immigration sentiment.

The St. Louis incident and the State Department’s policy of turning away thousands more wartime refugees (including Anne Frank’s family) on spurious grounds remain a dark stain on America’s history.

The Circuit Courts carefully reviewed the government’s arguments: The Fourth Circuit opinion (excluding the dissents) was 79 pages; the Ninth Circuit’s was 81. The Ninth Circuit in particular analyzed the background of Section 1182(f) of the INA, which the president invoked, along with other provisions of the statute and the text of the president’s order. It also cited a number of cases – including United States v. Robel 389 U.S.258, 263-64 for the proposition that “National security is not a ‘talismanic incantation’ that, once invoked, can support any and all exercise of executive power under Section 1182(f).”

Nevertheless, that is precisely what the Supreme Court does. It makes its decision in one sentence, citing one case (barring one man, a Marxist professor, under different provisions of the INA, who had been invited to speak): “The [lower] court instead should have upheld EO-2 because it rests on the “facially neutral and bona fide” justification of protecting national security Kleindienst v. Mandel 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).” The quoted phrase itself is strange: usually “facially neutral” is the beginning of the analysis and not the end; it refers to justifications that may be fair on the surface but create disparities in the real world, which could raise constitutional concerns. "

Then the Supreme Court “balances the equities” for American residents and institutions (except American resettlement agencies) only. Apparently, for this Court, including the so-called moderates, some of whom are only two generations removed from refugee status, the rest of the world’s population does not exist. The Court lives in a vacuum, where justice is determined by the narrow, dictionary meaning of words on a page.

This Court would have upheld Dred Scott.

The Court has gone off for a three-month vacation. The justices will refresh and relax while refugees struggle and die. What’s the rush?

This Court could not care less.

 

Plan A and Plan B If Donald Trump Fires Special Counsel Bob Mueller

Congress needs to be prepared to take immediate action if President Trump fires special counsel Robert Mueller, former White House ethics chief Norm Eisen said Monday.

Citing Capitol Hill response to Richard Nixon's 1973 "Saturday Night Massacre" firing of the Watergate special counsel as a model, Eisen said members of the House and Senate would need to quickly launch hearings into potential obstruction of justice, take steps to assure that Mueller's records and staff are preserved --  and demand that Trump appoint a new special counsel right away to continue his work.

"We're talking about a whole other level of firestorm here," Eisen said, "and I do believe the president's hand would be forced by the abandonment of support from his own Congress and the risk of a full-blown investigation being powered forward in Congress."

Call that Plan A.

But if Republican leaders even under those circumstances refuse to act against their own president – or if Trump refuses to appoint someone new -- Plan B is for the American public to make itself heard.

"We need to be ready for that," Eisen said. "I anticipate that we'll see, as we did at the very beginning of the administration, huge public outcry."

Eisen's comments came during an American Constitution Society webinar in which he and Ohio State University law professor Peter Shane explored the various ways Trump might take Mueller off the playing field, and the possible legal and political ramifications.

Neither predicted Trump would force Mueller out – "I don't think Trump himself knows yet," Eisen said – but considering his record of violating presidential norms, they both said it was a distinct possibility.

"Trying to keep track of all the rule-of-law concerns raised by this administration is like a game of Constitutional whack-a-mole," Shane said.

The rule of law is not just about following bright-line rules and heeding explicit court orders, Shane said. It is more about a culture of deference to the integrity of the legal order.

President Trump's hostility toward Mueller's investigation into Russian interference in the election and possible collusion with the Trump campaign "has to be seen as a relentless attack on those sorts of practices," Shane said.

Firing Mueller is made more complicated for Trump by the special counsel rules set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 600.7, a federal regulation that says that "The Special Counsel may be disciplined or removed from office only by the personal action of the Attorney General."

And according to that regulation, even the attorney general needs to have a legitimate reason. "The Attorney General may remove a Special Counsel for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies."

Attorney General Jeff Sessions, of course, has famously recused himself from all special counsel-related matters, leaving Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein as acting attorney general for that matter.

So Trump would technically have to order Rosenstein to fire Mueller. If Rosenstein refused and resigned, then the duty would pass to Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand. And if she resigned, the duty would traditionally continue to pass down through the top ranks of the Justice Department – except none of those positions has yet been filled with a Senate-confirmed nominee.

According to an Executive Order Trump signed in February (then oddly revoked and reissued in March), the line of succession would then jump to Dana Boente. In addition to being the unconfirmed, acting chief of the department's national security section, Boente remains the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, a job for which he won Senate confirmation in 2015. (That is also how Boente ended up briefly serving as acting attorney general in February, after Trump fired Sally Yates, the Obama appointee who was acting attorney general at the time.)

But all that is assuming that Trump chooses to heed that rule – which is notably part of the Code of Federal Regulations, not a legislative mandate in the U.S. Code  -- in the first place.

Eisen and Shane noted that Trump could potentially decide to fire Mueller directly – all by himself – asserting a particularly extreme view of what some hawkish constitutional lawyers call the "Unitary Executive Theory," and refusing to allow his executive power to be bound by, in this case, a mere executive-branch regulation.

("I can't emphasize strongly enough that I think this theory is wrong," Shane said.)

But that could easily lead to a messy federal court battle, making the more likely scenario a reprise of the "Saturday Night Massacre," where the top two officials in Nixon's Justice Department resigned rather than fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox. The solicitor general at the time – Robert Bork – became acting attorney general, and followed Nixon's orders.

Neither Rosenstein nor Brand is seen as likely to be willing to go along with Mueller's discharge, Shane said.

But how much will today's Congress follow the Watergate script at that point?

As Eisen noted, Cox's firing led to Nixon coming under such immediate and enormous congressional and public pressure that a mere 11 days later Nixon himself named a new Watergate special prosecutor: Leon Jaworski. And Jaworski took up where Cox had left off.

Eisen said that if Trump ousts Mueller, "I think you'll see bipartisan outcry for appointment of a new special counsel."

But that is Plan A.

And if you think the Republican Congress still won't act against Trump, or you can't imagine that Trump – after calling Mueller's investigation a "witch hunt" – would turn around and appoint someone new to lead it under any circumstances whatsoever – then the situation will call for Plan B.

Trump's Transgender Ban Ignores Common Decency, Public Opinion

First came schools, next came the military.  Four months after the U.S. Department of Education withdrew guidance aimed at protecting transgender students’ rights to use the bathrooms of their choice, President Trump this week tweeted a surprise announcement that banned transgender people from serving in the military.

The president’s latest attack on the LGBTQ community flies in the face of common decency toward the estimated 16,000 transgender troops currently serving our country. Research also tells us that the majority of Americans have supported equal job opportunities for gays and lesbians for at least 40 years. ACS has advocated for Trans rights and in March, convened thought leaders around the country to discuss the challenges LGBTQ people continue to face.

Without further details from the White House, it's hard to predict the political and policy implications of the ban. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the press that there will be no change in policy for now. It’s no wonder since Trump didn’t bother to inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the transgender ban was coming. On Capitol Hill, some of the president’s GOP allies are questioning his move. Meanwhile, his action has left transgender troops in limbo.