ACSBlog

  • June 5, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    In the Los Angeles Times, ACS President Caroline Fredrickson discusses the importance of whether “sharing economy” workers are considered employees or independent contractors.

    Adam Liptak reports in The New York Times on the rise of the Supreme Court Justices as celebrities and takes a look at their significant number of public appearances, including the ACS National Convention.

    At The Economist’s Democracy in America blog, Steven Mazie looks at the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch and the implications of the ruling that a retailer could be held liable for failing to hire a Muslim teenager who wears a headscarf.

    Mark Joseph Stern of Slate writes that conservative Supreme Court justices voiced frustration at the Court’s decision not to hear a case that could have resulted in significant reductions in the constitutional protections for undocumented immigrants.

    At Salon, Valerie Tarico interviews a Texas abortion counselor and considers how to create a more productive dialogue about abortion.

  • June 4, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    Greg Sargent reports in The Washington Post that it looks more likely that the GOP will not have a contingency plan in place should the Supreme Court rule against the Affordable Care Act.

    At Salon, Simon Maloy explains how a Supreme Court ruling against the Affordable Care Act would prove difficult for GOP governors and create chaos in the healthcare system.

    Mark Joseph Stern discusses in Slate the Supreme Court’s “logical, humane decision” that ruled against the deportation of a permanent resident for a minor drug offense.

    At MSNBC, Irin Carmon writes that the North Carolina legislature has passed a 72-hour abortion waiting period.

    At the blog for the Brennan Center for Justice, Eric Petry considers a bipartisan bill that would provide a stopgap should the Supreme Court strike down redistricting commissions.

  • June 4, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Jill Adams, Executive Director, Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice, University of California, Berkeley School of Law

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium honoring the 50th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut.

    When it comes to our most intimate experiences and decisions, the right to privacy should arm the many, not just shield the few who can afford to pay for it.  We’ve learned in the years since Griswold v. Connecticut that privacy is not a panacea for the fulfillment of all people’s sexual and reproductive rights.  The right to privacy has not granted secure and reliable respect for decisions we make in our bedrooms and about our bodies.  This is especially disappointing in a country that places such a legal and cultural premium on matters of autonomy and individualism – particularly in the private sphere.

    Cast in the mold of Griswold’s privacy-based right to use contraception, the right to choose abortion declared in Roe v. Wade similarly presents an important avenue but imperfect vehicle for everyone’s guaranteed arrival at reproductive self-determination.  Courts have allowed the proliferation of countless contractions, exemptions, and restrictions on the rights to abortion and contraception, siphoning power out of the hands of individuals wishing to exercise their reproductive rights and into the hands of states, corporations, and institutions wishing to constrain or control them.

     
    Is privacy really a “right” if you can’t afford to exercise it?
     
    The abstract right to use reproductive health services  free from governmental interference rings hollow without the necessary, enabling conditions to ensure access to such services and the ability to make decisions about them free from coercion by person, system, or circumstance.  For low-income people, and other marginalized populations, the right to privacy may merely be a right on paper if it is not a right they can actually afford to exercise.
  • June 3, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Chris Edelson, assistant professor of government, American University School of Public Affairs. Chris is the author of Emergency Presidential Power: From the Drafting of the Constitution to the War on Terror, published in 2013 by the University of Wisconsin Press.

    Presidential candidates may find it easy to score political points by talking tough, especially when there are lots of things for Americans to be afraid of in the context of national security.  Governor Scott Walker, a candidate for the Republican nomination, is showing his ability to play this game.  However, while this approach may score Walker points with voters, the governor is playing a dangerous game when it comes to presidential power under the Constitution.  This is a scenario that has become all too familiar since 9/11.

    While campaigning in New Hampshire last weekend, Walker told voters that “I'm not eager to go into open-ended engagements, but I'm not afraid to lay down the law when we have to.”  He declared that “I just want people to know that while I'm ready to be firm, my first intention, my first instinct, isn't to send in military forces.  But I'm certainly not going to rule it out.”  He further explained that “In Iraq, people ask me, 'Would you put boots on the ground?’  I don't rule anything out.  The last thing you want to do is send a message to your adversaries, how far you're willing to go, how long you want to be there.  That's a foolhardy military strategy that sets up failure.  So I wouldn't rule it out.  But I wouldn't lead with it.”

    Walker’s rhetoric may remind some of dialogue from a John Wayne movie or Tom Clancy novel, but what’s more important is his assumption that it would be up to him, as president, to make these decisions unilaterally.  In this vein, Walker argued that “We need a commander-in-chief who understands going forward that radical Islamic terrorism is a threat to us all and will act to do something about it. . . . I'd rather take the fight to them instead of waiting until they bring the fight to us."  Note the first person references.  Walker’s model for decisions about the use of military force doesn’t seem to include much of a role for Congress.  Instead, he envisions a decision-making process dominated by the president.  Walker imagines himself making unilateral decisions as to when, whether, and how to use military force.

  • June 3, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Anthony S. Winer, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium honoring the 50th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut.

    Griswold v. Connecticut is justly celebrated for discerning the constitutional right to privacy, and thus constitutional protection for reproductive freedom.  It not only protected access to contraceptives, but also provided the foundation for the later cases constitutionally protecting access to abortion.  Moreover, Griswold helped instill constitutional respect for the broader concerns of “marriage, procreation, and family relationships,” and ultimately for the even broader concern of “personal dignity and autonomy.”

    However, where the privacy and personal autonomy of LGBT people are concerned, the legacy of Griswold is more nuanced.  Doctrinal developments following Griswold constrained gay rights in some respects, and in some respects fortified them.  And the way in which the Supreme Court has been treating LGBT rights recently may presage salutary changes to come.

    The most negative aspect of the Griswold legacy for LGBT people is that it did nothing to forestall the disaster of Bowers v. Hardwick.  This was the 1986 case in which the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law did not protect sexual relations between two men (nor presumably between two women).  When Bowers was decided, Griswold was already 21 years old, and Roe v. Wade had already passed its thirteenth anniversary.  Cases applying the right to privacy were not in short supply, but the Court majority could not bring itself to allow lesbians and gay men to share in the newly discerned freedoms.  There was no principled reason for Bowers to come out differently from the contraception or abortion cases.  Bowers seemed to create a “special case,” perhaps founded on homophobia, excluding lesbian and gay rights from the zone of privacy that protected others.