ACSBlog

  • May 18, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Putting aside the North Carolina vote embracing discrimination against lesbians and gay men, the struggle for marriage equality has seen more victories of late than defeats. Today, for example, Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, ruled that same-sex marriages recognized in other states, such as New York or Connecticut, will be lawfully recognized in Maryland. The case is Port v. Virginia Anne Cowan. The Maryland legislature earlier this year also passed a same-sex marriage law.

    But marriage equality, while an important component to equality, is hardly the pinnacle. As Andy Birkey notes for us in an extensive piece for The American Independent, it is still legal for public officials in the vast majority of states to exclude members of the LGBT community from jury service.

    The Constitution, Birkey notes, says criminal defendants are entitled to an “impartial jury,” and the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that jurors cannot be excluded because of gender or race. Sexual orientation and gender identity, however, remain open to discrimination.

    “Federal courts,” he writes, “have consistently declined to prohibit attorneys from openly discriminating against LGBT people during jury selection. And as recently as last year, the U.S. Department of Justice told a panel of judges that it ‘takes no position’ on whether the case law that prohibits attorneys from removing jurors based on race or sex should be extended to cover sexual orientation.”

    Only a few states have taken action to prevent government officials from yanking prospective jurors because of beliefs they are gay or transgender. California is the exception. When former Calif. Gov. Gray Davis enacted a law barring such discrimination, he said “No Californian should be deprived of the opportunity to share in our system of justices simply because they are gay or lesbian.”

  • May 18, 2012

    by Samantha Berkovits

    The Senate confirmed two district court judges this week: John Tharp Jr. for the Northern District of Illinois by a vote of 86-1, and George Russell III for the District of Maryland by voice vote. President Obama also made four more nominations for the district court vacancies: civil litigator Matthew W. Brann and U.S. Magistrate Judge Malachy Edward Mannion to the Middle District of Pennsylvania; County Court Judge Frank Paul Geraci, Jr. to the Western District of New York; and DOJ civil rights attorney Fernando Olguin to the Central District of California.

    Image previewSens. Sherrod Brown (D- Ohio), Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Lautenberg (D-N.J), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D- Vt.) spoke out against obstruction of federal judicial nominees. Senator Levin, in his floor statement, asked his colleagues “to carefully consider the threat to justice from the growing crisis of delay in our courts” and, in light of the current cases backlogs, reminded them that “justice delayed is justice denied.” Leahy focused his remarks on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. “There are three judicial emergencies in the Ninth Circuit, which is the busiest Circuit Court,” he said, and berated his colleagues for dragging their feet on the nomination of Paul Watford, who has strong bipartisan support, to a judicial emergency seat on that court.
  • May 18, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    A federal appeals court rejected a challenge today to the constitutionality of a key section of the Voting Rights Act, concluding that Congress is in the best position to determine how to combat persistent racial discrimination in elections.

    In a 63-page opinion, D.C. Circuit Judge David S. Tatel noted the persistence of “overt racial discrimination” in jurisdictions covered by Section 5, and called such discrimination “one of the gravest evils that Congress can seek to redress.” How best to combat this discrimination, he concluded, is “quintessentially” a legislative judgment.

    “[W]e remain bound by fundamental principles of judicial restraint,” Tatel wrote.

  • May 18, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The Montana Supreme Court late last year pushed back against the U.S. Supreme Court’s highly unpopular and wobbly reasoned opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, when it upheld the state’s longtime regulation of corporate financing of elections.

    Not surprisingly a cabal of corporations quickly asked the high court to overturn the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling in Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. State of Montana, which concluded the Roberts Court’s Citizens United opinion was not going to stand in the state’s way of ensuring that corporations do not overtake its elections.

    Writing for the majority upholding the Montana Corrupt Practices Act, Chief Justice Mike McGrath stated “when in the last 99 years did Montana lose the power or interest sufficient to support the statute, if it ever did. If the statute has worked to preserve a degree of political and social autonomy is the State required to throw away its protections because shadowy backers of WTP [Western Tradition Partnership] seek to promote their interests? Does a state have to repeal or invalidate its murder prohibition if the homicide rate declines? We think not.”

    Even the dissenting justice in the Montana case blasted the Supreme Court’s “corporate personhood” reasoning of Citizens United, writing, “Corporations are not persons. Human beings are persons, and it is an affront to the inviolable dignity of our species that courts have created a legal fiction which forces people – human beings – to share fundamental, natural rights with soulless creations of government.” 

    Then earlier this week came Jeffrey Toobin’s extensive piece for The New Yorker revealing the machinations of the Roberts Court to tear down the tradition of campaign finance regulation, and in the process provide yet another victory for corporate America. As Toobin writes Chief Justice John Roberts craftily took a case with a narrow question before the justices and expanded it allowing the Court’s right-wing bloc to overturn a long tradition of regulating corporate financing of campaigns. The outcome in Citizens United concluded that corporate entities have First Amendment rights to spend whatever they want on electioneering, and in the process ushered in the era of the “super PAC.”

  • May 17, 2012
    BookTalk
    Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law
    By: 
    Justin D. Levinson and Robert J. Smith (editors)

    By Justin D. Levinson, a law professor and Director of the Culture and Jury Project at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Robert J. Smith, a visiting assistant professor of law at DePaul University


    A young girl walks to school, eager for the opportunity to engage and learn, despite the so-called “achievement gap.” Later that morning, her mother reports to the courthouse, jury summons in hand, excited to participate in a civic responsibility. On the same day, her grandfather goes to the local Emergency Room, afraid that his chest pains might mean that has suffered a heart attack. Nearby, a non-profit serving underprivileged youth prepares to make its “pitch” to a local corporation, seeking a charitable donation that will allow it to survive and fulfill its mission. Each of these storylines, which by themselves illustrate separate challenges within the health, educational, and economic systems, share a troubling commonality: each depicts an area of social life that is characterized by racially disparate outcomes.

    Indeed, despite cultural progress in reducing overt acts of racism, stark racial disparities continue to define American life. Our new book, Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law, is for anyone who wonders, 58 years after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, why race still matters and is interested in what emerging social science can contribute to the discussion. The book explores how scientific evidence on the human mind might help to explain why racial equality is so elusive. This new evidence reveals how human mental machinery can be skewed by lurking stereotypes, often bending to accommodate hidden biases reinforced by years of social learning. Through the lens of these powerful and pervasive implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes, Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law examines both the continued subordination of historically disadvantaged groups and the legal system's complicity in the subordination.