ACSBlog

  • July 14, 2014

    by Jeremy Leaming

    John Seigenthaler, a champion of a free speech, human rights and a courageous journalist, died July 11 at the age of 86. Seigenthaler, The New York Times in noting his death said he pursued a “muscular approach to journalism as a crusading newspaper editor and publisher and as the founding editorial director of USA Today.”

    Seigenthaler was also a close friend to Robert F. Kennedy. According to The Tennessean, the newspaper Seigenthaler reported for and eventually became editor, RFK met Seigenthaler “because the young reporter had written a number of news stories about growing corruption in the organized labor movements, particularly involving Jimmy Hoffa and his Teamsters union.” The Times also noted that as reporter for The Tennessean Seigenthaler was dogged in exposing the corruption of Hoffa’s Teamsters and “hounded the union boss.” It was some of Seigenthaler’s reporting that would help revive a federal grand jury that indicted Hoffa for jury tampering.

    When RFK became attorney general during John F. Kennedy’s presidency, Seigenthaler (pictured) was tapped to help the Kennedys work with a growing civil rights movement. In spring 1961, Seigenthaler was dispatched by RFK to help some of the first Freedom Riders; waves of youngsters in buses headed to the Deep South in what would be become a deadly and high-profile attempt to draw attention to ongoing segregation in public places. Seigenthaler was injured trying to help some of the Freedom Riders who were being beaten by a mob of rabid racists in Montgomery, Ala.

    After RFK’s assassination in 1968 during a run for the presidency, it would not be long before Seigenthaler returned to journalism, eventually leading the editorial pages of the USA Today and much later founding the First Amendment Center, part of the Freedom Forum.

    U.S. Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.), one of the young student Freedom Riders who was beaten and jailed, told The Tennessean Seigenthaler “was a newspaper man at heart who represented the highest tradition of journalist integrity and reporting. He used the power of the pen to help make this country a better place. He was a skillful negotiator, the consummate professional, yet he was a humble, down-to-earth gentleman who was dedicated and committed to his family and friends.”

    [image via Curtis Palmer]

  • July 14, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago

    *This piece is cross-posted at Huffington Post

    A recent Washington Post article reported that the state constitutions of eight states -- Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas -- expressly prohibit individuals who do not believe in God from holding public office.

    The Arkansas constitution, for example, provides that "no person who denies the being of a God shall hold any office in... this State," the Mississippi constitution stipulates that "no person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office in this State," the Tennessee constitution states that "no person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and punishment, shall hold any office in... this state," and so on.

    Are such provisions constitutional? The history of such laws goes back to the very founding of our nation, for a central question facing the Framers of our Constitution concerned the appropriate role of religion in government. For more than a thousand years, it had been the norm for Christian societies to have an established religion. At the time of the American Revolution, nine of the 13 colonies still had an established church, and most colonies expressly limited the right to hold public office to members of their established church. Over the next decade, though, Americans increasingly questioned the appropriate role of religion in the affairs of government.

    A critical debate occurred in Virginia, where a lengthy struggle culminated in the adoption in 1785 of Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom. The preamble of Jefferson's bill condemned those "legislators and rulers" who have "assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as... true and infallible," and then "endeavored to impose them on others."

  • July 14, 2014

    by Nicholas Alexiou

    Katie McDonough discusses, at Salon, the first arrest under Tennessee’s SB 1391, which allows prosecutors to charge a woman with criminal assault if she used narcotics during her pregnancy and such consumption is believed to harm the fetus or newborn. The Tennessee law is the first of its kind in the nation and is widely condemned by medical organizations and addiction specialists for deterring pregnant women from seeking medical treatment.

    At Slate, Ian Thompson talks about the history of abusive surveillance in the U.S. against the LGBTQ community and how current bans on racial profiling federal law-enforcement agencies must be updated to prohibit profiling on the basis of religions, sexual orientation, gender identity and national origin.

    Paul Caron details the drop in June LSAT takers at the TaxProf Blog. The number of test takers in June fell 9.1% from the previous year, the lowest figure in 14 years.

    At Hamilton and Griffin on Rights, Leslie Griffin asks if there is a divide on the Supreme Court between the Catholic and Jewish justices.

  • July 14, 2014
    BookTalk
    The Wrong Carlos
    Anatomy of a Wrongful Execution
    By: 
    James S. Liebman

    by James S. Liebman, Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Shawn Crowley, Andrew Markquart, Lauren Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White and Daniel Zharkovsky

    Do states with the death penalty execute innocent people? That is the fundamental question at the heart of The Wrong Carlos, a book I recently published with student coauthors.

    It is also the question facing the American public following a series of devastating developments for death penalty supporters. March brought news of the 144th death row exoneration. In April, we learned that Oklahoma had botched Clayton Lockett’s execution, leaving him awake during a massive drug-induced heart attack. The Supreme Court found in May that Florida remains hell bent on executing defendants too mentally disabled to be condemned. And in June—for the first time—a majority of Americans indicated in a poll that they prefer life without parole to capital punishment.

    Death penalty supporters are left clinging to a single promise often made but never substantiated—a promise repeated by Justice Scalia in a 2006 opinion: Whatever else we do, we don’t execute the innocent.

    I began thinking about this question between 2000 and 2003, when colleagues and I issued our Broken System studies documenting judicial findings of accuracy-impugning error in two-thirds of all U.S. capital cases reviewed between 1973 and 1995.

    Our studies sparked a heated debate over two competing interpretations. Did the courts’ discovery of so many errors prove the system worked? Or do high error rates mean it is almost certain that courts miss other errors, allowing the innocent to be executed?

  • July 11, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Catherine Fisk, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law

    As I have argued elsewhere, in striking down an Illinois law authorizing the state to require unionized home care workers to pay their fair share of the cost of union representation, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Quinn disregarded its longstanding rule that it does not decide questions of state law and failed to reconcile the result with the First Amendment rights of government workers or the Court’s other cases on when compulsory fees constitute compelled speech. 

    First, under Illinois law, government-paid and government-regulated home health-care workers are state employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Harris disregarded state law when it invented a vague new category of non-“full-fledged” government employees who have greater First Amendment rights than other workers to refuse to pay the costs of union representation.

    Second, if under Garcetti v. Ceballos, and United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, government employees have no First Amendment rights to speak on the job on matters of public concern or to engage in political activity on their own time, why do some government employees have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay for services that their union is legally required to provide them?

    Third, the Court failed to explain why fair share fees differ from compulsory payment of lawyers’ bar dues, which the Court approved in Keller v. California State Bar.  To quote Keller, substituting only “home care workers” for “legal profession,” Illinois has an “interest in regulating [home health-care workers] and improving the quality of [home health-care] services.”

    Yet there is a way forward. As I argue with Ben Sachs, where unions are unable to require objecting workers to pay fees – whether it’s in right-to-work states or in work situations that fall under Harris v. Quinn – we should get rid of the rule of exclusive representation. Non-fee payers wouldn’t be subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, they wouldn’t have to interact with their employer through a collective agent, and they wouldn’t be required to pay anything to a union they didn’t vote for. Unions, for their part, would be required to represent only those workers who actually want representation.  Another possibility is that governments wishing to bargain with a single representative on behalf of their workers could agree to pay the cost of the representational services on behalf of all workers. No worker would then be compelled to pay anything to a union and the dissenting workers’ First Amendment rights would not be violated.