ACSBlog

  • March 12, 2015

    by Nanya Springer

    The Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”  This statement may seem simple enough, but U.S. Senator David Vitter is once again pushing legislation to upend the Constitution’s provision of birthright citizenship.

    According to Vitter, the 14th Amendment is misunderstood and contains a loophole that needs to be closed to prevent an influx of “birth tourists.”  Constitutional law experts say the Amendment is straight forward, and Vitter and his cohorts are trying to destroy a constitutional right.

    This is not a new debate.  The faulty arguments behind Vitter’s legislation were addressed and discredited years ago by scholars including Garrett Epps of the University of Baltimore School of Law and Elizabeth Wydra of the Constitutional Accountability Center, who authored an Issue Brief on the subject.  Take a look at the resources below for a thorough explanation of why new attempts to take away birthright citizenship are still wrong.

    Born in the USA?: The Historical and Constitutional Underpinnings of Birthright Citizenship (video)

    Born Under the Constitution: Why Recent Attacks on Birthright Citizenship Are Unfounded, Elizabeth Wydra (Issue Brief)

    Epps on “Da Vinci Code Originalism” and the Citizenship Clause (ACSblog)

    Here We Go Again: At Republican Debate, Pawlenty Denies Constitutional Text and History Establishing Birthright Citizenship, Elizabeth Wydra (ACSblog)

  • March 11, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Raph Graybill, Fellow, Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies (ISPS)

    This spring, western state legislatures will consider a series of laws demanding the end of public land management by the federal government.  The bills, which evoke the “Sagebrush Rebellion” anti-conservation movement of the 1970s, issue a state-law “demand” that the United States relinquish its title to American public lands and transfer ownership to states.

    Nearly two years after Utah passed its “Transfer of Public Lands Act” (TPLA), similar laws are under consideration in a majority of western states.  At stake is the core of American conservation policy.  Under state ownership, state governments could restrict public access, authorize commercial development or even divide lands for private sale.  Current federal environmental law effectively forecloses these possibilities, limiting privatization and preventing environmental degradation.

    Other outlets have addressed the policy wisdom of transfer demand laws, but very little work has been devoted to understanding their constitutional validity.  This post will address the legal arguments behind transfer demands with an eye toward understanding both the Constitution’s text and a newer, nontextual argument advanced by supporters.

    A legal analysis of transfer demands begins with the Constitution itself, and the plain text of the Constitution speaks directly to transfer demand laws.  The Property Clause, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, states, “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”  The text leaves little room for ambiguity over who may make decisions affecting United States land: Only Congress may initiate the sale or transfer of federal public lands.

  • March 11, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    Nina Totenberg reports for NPR that the Supreme Court has ordered a federal appeals court to take another look at the University of Notre Dame’s case against the Affordable Care Act’s birth control mandate.

    In The Washington Post, E.J. Dionne Jr. reflects on the legacy of Selma, and calls on the government to “honor Selma by restoring an effective Voting Rights Act.”

    Geoffrey R. Stone argues in the Huffington Post that the University of Oklahoma cannot constitutionally expel students for their racist rants on a fraternity bus.

    Conor Friedersdorf of The Atlantic discusses how, in light of recent problems with lethal injection, Utah may begin using firing squads to kill death-row inmates.

    In The New York Times, Adam Liptak writes that the Supreme Court may review an Alabama law that allows judges to override a jury’s sentencing recommendation in death penalty cases.

  • March 10, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    ACS President Caroline Fredrickson argues at Huffington Post that the dialogue of the “lean in” movement does not apply to the reality of many female workers in the United States.

    The Editorial Board of The Washington Post asserts that it’s time for the Senate to stop stalling and to confirm Loretta Lynch to lead the Justice Department.

    Gay Talese writes in The New York Times about his return to Selma for the anniversary of the 1965 march.

    David Savage argues in the Los Angeles Times that Chief Justice John Roberts likely holds the key vote in King v. Burwell.

    At the blog for the Brennan Center for Justice, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy explains why she is thankful that the Supreme Court declined to hear two cases on campaign finance disclosure.

    Yamiche Alcindor reports for USA Today that a Ferguson judge who was named in the Department of Justice report on the city has resigned.

  • March 9, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Thomas Nolan, Associate Professor of Criminology and Director of Graduate Programs in Criminology at Merrimack College

    The report from the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division on the Ferguson, Mo. Police Department is a damning indictment of an out-of-control, lawless, and racist police department gone rogue.  Given the context and history of policing in Ferguson provided in the DOJ investigation, it seemed inevitable that an unarmed African American teenager would be shot dead by a white Ferguson police officer following a confrontation over a “Manner of Walking in Roadway” offense (or theft of cigarillos if that is to be believed).  One is tempted to question how it didn’t happen sooner than August 9, 2014.

    The Ferguson Police Department (FPD) arrested 460 individuals for outstanding warrants between October 2012 and October 2014: 96 percent of those arrested were African American.  According to the DOJ report, from 2011 to 2013, African Americans accounted for 95 percent of Manner of Walking in Roadway charges, 94 percent of Failure to Comply charges, 92 percent of Resisting Arrest charges, 92 percent of Peace Disturbance charges, and 89 percent of Failure to Obey charges.  “Despite making up 67 percent of the population, African Americans accounted for 85 percent of FPD’s traffic stops, 90 percent of FPD’s citations, and 93 percent of FPD’s arrests from 2012 to 2014.”  The race-based enforcement tactics and strategies employed by the FPD have a disparate impact on African Americans that is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    The DOJ report also found that the FPD has engaged in a “pattern and practice of constitutional violations (that primarily target African Americans) in stopping people without reasonable suspicion, arresting them without probable cause, and using unreasonable force.”  The FPD’s policies and practices were found to routinely violate the Fourth Amendment in racially profiling African Americans and disproportionally singling them out for “pedestrian checks,” “Failure to Comply,” and illegal “Stop and Identify” offenses.  DOJ found that the FPD consistently uses excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that African Americans accounted for almost 90 percent of the use of force incidents from 2010 to 2014.  FPD used force involving a canine bite 14 times during this time period and in all incidents the person bitten was African American.   

    The FPD also engages in a standard (and unlawful) practice of arresting individuals for engaging in activities that are protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution: “people are punished for talking back to officers, recording public police activities, and lawfully protesting perceived injustices.”