In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr. said that the Department of Justice notified defendants whose information had been “obtained or derived from” the Section 702 surveillance program. However, the DOJ’s claims were found to be untrue. Writing for The Intercept, Dan Novack reports on the implications of this “false assurance” to the high court.
Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer vetoed a controversial bill that would have allowed businesses to discriminate against gay and lesbian customers after politicians, business owners and even the 2015 Super Bowl host committee protested the controversial bill. Aaron Blake of The Washington Post comments on the governor’s decision.
A federal district court judge in Texas declared the state’s ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The ban, enacted in 2005 by popular referendum, was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment by U.S. District Judge Orlando L. Garcia. Manny Fernandez of The New York Times has the story.
The Supreme Court could soon rule on McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. David Early and Avram Billig at the Brennan Center for Justice break down the five decisions that have shaped campaign finance law.
Liz Watson at Womenstake explains how the Maryland Fair Employment Preservation Act would ensure that “all workers in Maryland have an effective remedy from supervisor harassment.”
More than a decade ago, the Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that the eighth amendment categorically forbids people with intellectual disabilities from being sentenced to death and executed. States were charged with the appropriate role of setting procedures to enforce and give effect to this Constitutional protection.
On March 3, 2014, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in the case of Hall v. Florida.
The question presented is narrow:
Whether Florida’s statutory scheme for identifying defendants with “mental retardation," as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing people with intellectual disabilities as articulated in Atkins?
As a note of reference “intellectual disabilities,” adopted since the Court ruled in Atkins, is the preferred clinical term over “mental retardation.”
At stake is whether Florida is obliged to honor the limits imposed by the eighth amendment and refrain from executing a man who falls within the class of people for whom the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. This inquiry goes to the heart of the deal struck in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg the Supreme Court held that the death penalty could be administered in a manner consistent with the Constitution. The Court’s ruling was premised on the reasonable expectation that states will work within the framework created by the Court as the final arbiter of constitutional standards for the practice. This premise cannot hold, however, if states continuously seek to circumvent these standards by erecting barriers to the recognition of constitutional rights.
On Mar. 3, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in a case that will decide whether Freddie Hall should be on death row. In an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, Prof. Marc Tasse argues that Florida’s standard for evaluating intellectual disability in death penalty cases is “unscientific and a breach of Hall’s constitutional protection as mandated in Atkins v. Virginia.” For more on Hall v. Florida, please see analysis by Prof. John H. Blume at ACSblog.
Consumers were victorious Monday when the high court rejected an appeal from washing machine manufacturers in a class-action lawsuit. Writing for Slate, Emily Bazelon explains why the decision is “surprising and good news.”
Republicans are calling for Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer to veto a bill that would allow businesses to discriminate against gay and lesbian customers. Reuters’ David Schwartz reports on growing frustration in the Grand Canyon State.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument this week on the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Adam Liptak at The New York Times reviews Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.
On the second anniversary of Trayvon Martin’s death, Charles D. Ellison of The Root reflects on Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law.
“I realize that my calling the United States a ‘colonial’ nation is repugnant to most Americans,” acknowledged Judge Juan R. Torruella of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at a recent Harvard Law School conference. “[B]ut do you think that the reality of this fact of life is any less repugnant to those of us who find ourselves in the degrading status of second-class citizens, merely because we reside as citizens of the United States in a piece of land that, although belonging to the United States and owing allegiance thereto, has been declared by judicial fiat to be an unequal part of this nation?”
In his keynote remarks, Judge Torruella, who resides in Puerto Rico, expressed frustration and indignance on behalf of the 4 million residents of U.S. territories who remain unjustly bound by the dead hand of the past.
In a series of infamous decisions at the turn of the twentieth century known as the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court established a judicial doctrine recognizing two kinds of territories: incorporated territories, including those acquired before the Spanish-American War, and unincorporated territories, including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam and others. The Court extended only certain rights to residents of unincorporated territories because, as one Yale professor reasoned in 1899, “[it would be unwise] to give … the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto Rico … the benefit[s] of [the Constitution].”
For more than a century, the Insular Cases have stood as controlling precedent, granting broad congressional authority for governing both kinds of territories and defining their relationship to the Constitution. American Samoa has long borne the brunt of this second-class status; as of 2005, it remains one of only two territories whose residents are labeled as “non-citizen U.S. nationals.” That reality may soon change, however, with a favorable ruling in Tuaua v. United States.
by James C. Nelson, Justice, Montana Supreme Court (Retired)
There is gathering national support acknowledging that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) citizens are simply that—citizens—with the same rights, privileges and obligations as other citizens. In response, some States, along with various fundamentalist religious and conservative organizations are fighting for a legally protected right to discriminate. This right to discriminate is grounded in the First Amendment’s “Free Exercise” clause. As the theory goes, being able to discriminate against LGBT citizens is necessary to preserve the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion for these States’ fundamentalist religious heterosexuals and conservative organizations.
This stratagem is not only patently specious; it is legally insupportable.
Contrary to the homophobic fear-mongering by religious fundamentalists and conservatives, there is no legal support for the notion that a State which has recognized the equal rights of LGBT citizens can force a religious organization to adopt those same views. If Religion X condemns gay people, the State cannot, require Religion X to perform a gay or lesbian marriage or change its doctrinal beliefs against homosexuality under threat of governmental penalty. Indeed, if the State attempted to do that, it would violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. And, of course, for that reason, no State has made any such demands on any sectarian organization.
Yet, in Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Ohio and Utah religious and conservative organizations and, in some cases, their supporters in the state legislatures are actively promoting the adoption of laws that would permit any individual or group to discriminate in a variety of contexts based on religious beliefs. Such laws would allow business owners, for example, to discriminate against LGBT customers in much the same fashion that businesses run by racists once discriminated with impunity against people of color. A government official could deny same-sex couples basic services and benefits based solely on that official’s religious beliefs. Indeed, Arizona has even proposed to allow the denial of equal pay to women and the abrogation of contractual rights in the name of religion. In other words, one’s personal religious beliefs trump legal obligations imposed generally upon and for the benefit of all.