Rights of detainees

  • July 21, 2010
    Guest Post

    David Mortlock is the author of a recent article on this topic in the Harvard Law & Policy Review.
    The United States has yet to settle on a definition of enemy combatant. The Supreme Court spent the past decade determining whether and how detainees could challenge their detention but explicitly avoided the question of whether they could be detained in the first place. The debate has divided not only political rivals, but also, as the New York Times recently detailed, seniors official in the current Administration.

    A handful of district and circuit courts have begun to examine the scope of the President's authority to subject enemy combatants to military detention without charges, a jury trial, or any of the other trappings of criminal detention. Some parties have taken the position that the President lacks detention authority in the fight against a terrorist group, while others argue that the President may detain even unwitting supporters of al Qaeda. The courts have reached a number of different conclusions.

    In my article, Definite Detention: The Scope of the President's Authority to Detain Enemy Combatants, I suggest that Congress has authorized the President to subject members of al Qaeda and the Taliban to military detention, whether or not they engage in combat. However, the President may not use military detention for mere supporters or sympathizers of those groups. This membership model could also be used to determine the appropriate time for release. Namely, detainees could be freed when they sever their membership in al Qaeda or the Taliban.

    Nonetheless, the debate is far from over. While a number of district courts have adopted this membership model, the D.C. Circuit recently suggested in dicta that an individual could be subjected to military detention merely for supporting the Taliban. The decision indicates that this debate could continue for many years.

  • July 20, 2010
    Guest Post

    Susan Herman, president of the American Civil Liberties Union, is the author of a recent article in the online edition of the Harvard Law & Policy Review.
    When Liz Cheney released an ad charging that attorneys who had defended terrorism suspects were not fit to work in the Department of Justice, individual lawyers and the organized bar reacted with across-the-board outrage. Some, like former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, took the occasion to argue that the same protection and understanding is due the government lawyers who wrote the memos condoning torture by American agents, because the attacks on the lawyers are "all of a piece."

    In my essay, The Limits of Advocacy: Lawyers for Terrorists/Lawyers for Torturers, I discuss why the role of the defense attorney and the multi-faceted role of the government lawyer are not equivalent. I also discuss the reasons why we have developed clarity about the role of defense attorneys since the dark days following 9/11: the military lawyers who led the way, the organized bar gradually stepping up to the task of defending the Guantánamo detainees, and the Supreme Court deciding a series of cases making a strong statement about the essentiality of the rule of law and lawyers, even at Guantánamo.

    By way of contrast, we have little clarity about our shameful brush with torture - partly because the courts have found a dazzling array of procedural excuses for refusing to hear cases about torture and extraordinary rendition, depriving the victims of their day in court. There is a great deal we do not know about what happened and who was responsible, but there are now few voices calling for accountability. President Obama urges us to just turn the page. I argue that it is a mistake to go forward without first looking back, suggesting that the model of a truth commission might be useful to us.
  • May 11, 2010

    "Proposals like Sen. Joe Lieberman's to take away a suspect's citizenship put the nation on a dangerous path," writes UC Irvine School of Law Founding Dean Erwin Chemerinsky (pictured) in the Los Angeles Times. Chemerinksy, a frequent ACS participant, took to the pages of the Times amid persistent critiques of the federal response to an attempted bombing in Times Square, including a proposal by Sen. Lieberman to strip terrorism suspects of citizenship.

    Chemerinsky writes:

    Those who commit terrorist acts can and should be severely punished; stripping them of their citizenship and failing to inform them of their right to remain silent serve no additional purpose.

    There is no reason to believe that advising terrorism suspects of their rights obstructs effective law enforcement. Take the case of Faisal Shahzad, accused of placing the car with explosives in Times Square. He spoke to authorities before being given his Miranda warnings, and continued to speak after. In fact, police have demonstrated over decades that they can function effectively even when suspects are advised of their rights. If there is a public safety emergency, current law permits questioning without Miranda warnings. Those determined not to speak will refuse to do so whether or not they have been informed of their rights.

  • March 24, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Maj. (Ret.) Eric Montalvo, Esq., Partner at Puckett & Faraj, PC, in Washington, D.C. and former Marine Corps Judge Advocate General (JAG). Eric currently specializes in national security law, military criminal law, and military administrative law. He has handled several Military Commission cases including U.S. v. Al Bahlul, U.S. v. Hawsawi (the alleged 9/11 co-conspirator), and the case of the U.S. v. Jawad, fighting for and securing the release of one of the youngest Guantanamo Bay detainees in 2009.

    The Supreme Court on Monday declined to review the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling in Kiyemba V. Obama (Supreme Court docket 09-581). The D.C. Circuit Court held that the judiciary may not review executive branch decisions regarding when or where to transfer detainees that it is prepared to release from Guantanamo Bay. This case is now informally referred to as "Kiyemba II." Ten current Guantanamo detainees who have been cleared for release object to being returned to their country of national origin out of fear or concern for their safety and well-being.

    In Kiyemba I, the Court granted certiorari on the question of "whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction has the power to order the release of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay "where the Executive detention is indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into the continental United States is the only possible effective remedy." In the vacation and remand to the D.C. Circuit Court the Supreme Court held that "no court has yet ruled in this case in light of the new facts, and we decline to be the first to do so."

    The Court's ruling creates uncertainty in the system which is already wrought with indecision and indefinite consternation. The Supreme Court has created an exception to the general rule that a court loses jurisdiction where there is no case or controversy and a court's decision will no longer have an impact on plaintiff. The Court has recognized that some questions may involve proceedings that are frequently repetitive, but come to a conclusion prior to the normal life cycle of litigation effectively depriving the Court of jurisdiction. The Court may assume jurisdiction where there was injury that was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The classic example of the Court utilizing this exception is in the abortion line cases. These cases present such a circumstance and allow the government to alter the justiciability issue simply by changing the facts in the 9th inning.

  • March 22, 2010

    The U.S. Supreme Court passed on a chance to hear the second Kiyemba v. Obama, a case involving four of the Chinese Muslims, or Uighurs, detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Denying certiorari this morning, the Court let stand a lower court's decision that federal judges have no authority to review the executive branch's determinations where and when to send detainees cleared for release.

    The Court previously granted review in Kiyemba I, in which Uighurs challenged their continued detention at Guantanamo despite being cleared for release. Upon news that the executive branch found countries willing to accept each of the Uighur detainees, however, the Court remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In Kiyemba II, non-Uighurs who are also slated for release to countries previously announced by the administration also joined the case.

    Among the most promising plaintiffs to join Kiyemba II was Ahmed Belbacha, according to reports. Belbacha, who the executive branch says it will release to his native Algeria, alleges that his life was threatened by terrorists there. He also contends that the Algerian military considers him a desserter, and he was tried and convictied in absentia for terrorism-related charges carrying a 20-year sentence. "Caught between domestic terror groups and a government that has already decreed a harsh sanction for him, Mr. Belbacha cannot safely return to Algeria," his attorneys told a district court earlier this month.