Privacy rights

  • April 5, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Amanda Frost, associate professor of law, American University Washington College of Law

    Plaintiffs have won a rare victory against the government in a case involving the state secrets privilege. On April 1, 2010, Federal District Judge Vaughn Walker ruled in favor of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., a now-defunct Islamic charity that had sued the government for intercepting its employees' international telephone conversations without obtaining a warrant. Al-Haramain claimed the government's warrantless wiretap violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), a federal law that limits the government's ability to eavesdrop on its citizens. The case is one of several challenging the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping program. The government has responded to all such lawsuits by arguing because its surveillance activities concern national security, the state secrets privilege requires dismissal of claims that it violated FISA.

    Yet FISA was enacted for the very purpose of preventing the government from eavesdropping without a warrant, and it provides a mechanism by which individuals or groups who believe they have been victims of an unlawful government wiretap can seek redress in the courts even when the claim relies on classified evidence. Under FISA, if a plaintiff establishes a "colorable basis" for believing that it has been subject to unlawful surveillance, the Court can then examine classified evidence in camera to determine whether the surveillance occurred, and if so whether it was lawful.

  • March 5, 2010
    Guest Post

    By David H. Gans, Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights, and Citizenship Program at the Constitutional Accountability Center. He is the lead author of the report, The Gem of the Constitution: the Text and History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and co-author of CAC's brief in McDonald. This article is cross-posted at CAC's blog, Text & History.

    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which raises the question whether the Second Amendment's guarantee of a right to bear arms applies to states and local governments. Going into argument, incorporation of the Second Amendment right seemed a given - after all, states already have to obey virtually every right in the Bill of Rights. The critical question was whether the Court would breathe new life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and honor the part of the Fourteenth Amendment's text that clearly protects substantive fundamental rights from state infringement.

    The Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to be the centerpiece of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was written out of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases. The decision has been regarded as one of the worst in the Court's history, and roundly condemned by the Amendment's framers in the 1870s, Justice Harlan in the early 20th century, and Justice Black in the 1940s. The overwhelming consensus among scholars across the ideological spectrum - reflected in a law professors' brief filed by CAC in McDonald - is that Slaughter-House obliterated the text and history of the Clause through a profoundly incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.

    Unfortunately, the Privileges or Immunities Clause received a chilly reception from the Court on Tuesday, especially from those Justices who most profess to take the Constitution's text and history seriously. Justice Scalia belittled the Clause, accusing Alan Gura, McDonald's attorney, of "bucking for some place on some law school faculty" by advancing an argument that was "the darling of the professoriate." Scalia, supposedly the Court's chief originalist, wouldn't even consider the merits of the argument. Chief Justice Roberts, too, refused to follow the Constitution's text and history where it leads. He explicitly worried that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow for broad protections of substantive liberty; he preferred to rely on the Due Process Clause, since that text is about process, and does not easily lend itself to protecting substantive fundamental rights. While Roberts and Scalia were content to rely on substantive due process to protect gun rights, they seemed to want to reserve the opportunity to bash the doctrine in future cases involving rights they don't recognize. Other Justices were less overtly hostile, but none seemed willing to revive the Clause.

    In light of its reception at the Court, was Gura too bold?

  • February 22, 2010

    Activists hope to once again make Nebraska the battleground over whether the Supreme Court should reaffirm its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, recognizing a woman's right to an abortion. Just introduced in Nebraska's unicameral legislature is a bill acknowledged by advocates on both sides of the issue to be unconstitutional under the Court's present jurisprudence.

    From the Omaha World-Herald: [links added]

    The state has played a role on the national stage before, with a 1997 law banning the controversial late-term procedure known medically as intact dilation and extraction, or D&X.

    The U.S. Supreme Court in 2000 overturned that Nebraska law, upholding its previous abortion decisions and dealing a setback to abortion opponents, who call the procedure "partial-birth" abortion.

    Those opponents gained hope seven years later, when the justices on a more conservative Supreme Court upheld a federal ban on the D&X procedure.

    Now abortion opponents are looking for opportunities to push the court even further in restricting abortion.

    The law would ban abortions after 20 weeks, disregarding the question of viability, which occurs around the 24th week of pregnancy and was relied upon as a boundary for state regulation in the Supreme Court's 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision. In Casey, today's swing-vote Justice Anthony Kennedy co-wrote the majority opinion, joined by the liberal wing of the court. The Center for Reproductive Rights' Janet Crepps told the World Herald that this is reason for comfort to the pro-choice community, although Justice Kennedy joined the conservative wing of the Court in its two most recent decisions regarding reproductive rights.

  • January 28, 2010
    On January 28, 1916 President Woodrow Wilson nominated Louis D. Brandeis, a Boston lawyer and coauthor of a Harvard law Review article advancing the right to privacy, to the U.S. Supreme Court. In a brief piece for the ABA Journal, George Hodak notes that it took the Senate until June to confirm the nomination, making Brandeis the high court's first Jewish member.

    Hodak writes:

    Although he was widely revered for his commitment to public service, which earned him the title ‘the people's lawyer,' Brandeis had his share of critics, particularly within business circles. Resistance from those quarters coupled with a somewhat veiled anti-Semitism, made for a prolonged and contentious confirmation process.

    In the fall, ACS hosted a national event exploring Brandeis's trailblazing legal career, especially in the area of privacy law. The event featured Melvin I. Urofsky, author of the biography, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life. Video of the event is here. Following the event, Urofsky talked with ACSblog about his book and said Brandeis, who served as an associated justice on the high court for 23 years, is "on almost everyone's list of the top three justices in our history." Brandeis, Urofsky continued, helped to advance an especially resilient notion of privacy rights. See Urofsky's interview here

    [image via hawaiilibertychronicles.com]

  • January 20, 2010
    Guest Post

    Gregory T. Nojeim, Senior Counsel and Director of the Project on Freedom, Security & Technology at the Center for Democracy & Technology 

    The Washington Post reported yesterday that the FBI abused its authority to issue National Security Letters (NSLs) and that this abuse permitted it to illegally obtain more than 2,000 telephone call records from 2002-2006. This disclosure, made while Congress contemplates Patriot Act legislation that could rein in use of NSLs, should prompt a re-examination of the approaches taken in the pending bills.

    A national security letter is a simple form document issued by the FBI and other agencies of the government to obtain telephone call records, email to/from information, and other records about communications, as well as financial, credit, and other records, without any prior judicial authorization. NSLs are served on the business entities that hold the records and the businesses that receive NSLs must comply or challenge them in court, and with limited exceptions, are barred from disclosing to anyone that they have received or complied with the demand for records.

    The Patriot Act removed most of the legal restraints on issuing NSLs, including the requirement that the NSL seek information that pertains to a spy, a terrorist or another agent of a foreign power, and the requirement that agents articulate a factual basis for seeking records with an NSL. But it left in place the very minimal requirement that the NSL be issued only to seek information relevant to an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Rather than comply with this minimal requirement, FBI officials issued "exigent letters" to obtain information that should have been sought with NSLs even when no investigation had been opened, and in some cases, even though the information was not sought in an emergency situation. "Exigent letters" were a creation of the FBI and have no basis in law.

    After this and other abuses were disclosed in a DOJ Inspector General report issued in March 2007, the FBI put in place administrative changes it said were designed to prevent a recurrence. Those changes included internal review by lead attorneys in FBI field offices of NSL requests. However, The Washington Post article reveals that officials who sanctioned the illegal exigent records included senior officials of the FBI - managers as high as Assistant Director of the FBI. It is not likely that an attorney in an FBI field office will be able to stop illegal activity sanctioned by his boss's boss. That the abuses went this high up the chain of command at the FBI had not been previously revealed.