Guest Post

  • March 25, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Peter Jan Honigsberg, professor of law at the University of San Francisco and Director of the Witness to Guantanamo project and author of Our Nation Unhinged, the Human Consequences of the War on Terror

    Damien Corsetti was an interrogator at the Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan in 2002, where, according to The New York Times, he was known as the “King of Torture.”  In 2006, he was prosecuted for alleged abusive treatment he committed while an interrogator, but was acquitted.  Nevertheless, he told our Witness to Guantanamo project that he had mistreated his prisoners.

    When he began working in summer 2002, Corsetti believed in what he was doing.  He thought they were all guilty and, like most Americans, he was angry.  He explained how he had obtained information regarding several alleged plots through his interrogations in time for the U.S. to intervene and prevent the incidents from occurring.  He saved American lives.

    In the months that followed, however, he and other interrogators began to have doubts about their work. They asked a Judge Advocate General, or JAG lawyer, for advice.  The JAG attorney assured them that their actions were legal because the Bush administration had decided not to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. After hearing the JAG assessment, Corsetti felt obligated to follow orders.

    Corsetti told us how he would hood prisoners, tighten the cord at the neck, and then pour water over the hood.  The process wasn’t quite the same as “waterboarding,” but the detainees did experience the sensation of drowning or suffocating.

    He forced prisoners into extremely uncomfortable and awkward “stress positions” for hours.  He noted how the military later renamed the term “stress positions” to “safety positions,” explaining that the safety positions were for the safety of the interrogators and the military personnel on the base, not the detainees.

  • March 22, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Eric J. Segall, Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Professor Segall is author of Supreme Myths: Why the Supreme Court is not a Court and its Justices are not Judges. This post is part of an ACSblog symposium on Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor.

    Progressives and liberals in favor of same sex marriage need to be careful what they wish for when the Court decides the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Proposition 8 cases later this term. It would be easy to argue that the Court should overturn DOMA and invalidate Proposition 8 on the grounds that governmental classifications based on sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny, and neither California nor the federal government can satisfy that standard. The problem with the Court imposing a national rule, however, may be a serious backlash against the decision resulting in long term pain for everyone on the left. The lessons of Roe v. Wade might be instructive.

    In the years preceding Roe, there was a popular momentum flowing through the states to make the right to choose a bit easier but legislative efforts to secure the right were blocked by the efforts of a strong and well-funded Catholic minority. There is a similar momentum now (albeit only recently) on the issue of same-sex marriage. The Court’s decision in Roe, however, not only slowed the momentum but created a significant backlash though not in the traditional way most people think. In ground breaking work, Professors Reva Siegel and Linda Greenhouse have suggested that, when it comes to the right to choose, women truly are better off today than they would have been without Roe, and that the case for backlash after Roe is overstated. They may be right when it comes to the right to choose, but they did not purport to ask another related but equally important question. Although the backlash on abortion specifically may be overstated, the use of the Court’s decision in Roe by right wing groups on issues other than abortion has been a major problem for the left. The rise of the New Right in the 1970’s led by Jerry Falwell and Phyllis Schaffly, the emergence of brash, young,  and conservative anti-choice republicans  and judges in the 1980’s, and the difficulty of confirming liberal judges in the Senate, can in significant part be traced to the criticism of the Court’s decision in Roe. As Cass Sunstein has argued, the rise of the Moral Majority was certainly assisted by opposition to Roe. Meanwhile, as far as the long-term effectiveness of Roe is concerned, not only does the case currently hang by the thread of Justice Kennedy’s robes, but in many states between the two coasts poor women still have an enormously difficult time securing safe, affordable abortions. This is not to say that the Court erred in Roe, but it is a fair question whether the backlash to the decision across a broad range of important issues was worth the somewhat limited abortion rights gained by the decision.

  • March 22, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Victoria Ni, Senior Attorney, Public Justice. This piece is cross-posted at Public Justice’s blog.

    The U.S. Supreme Court has issued its first-ever decision interpreting the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act.

    On March 19, the high court ruled 9-0 that courts should disregard written promises by plaintiffs who are trying to represent a class in state court that the class will seek damages less than $5 million -- the amount that can trigger federal court jurisdiction over a case.

    The narrow decision in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles means that plaintiffs in a proposed class action will not be able to agree in writing to a damage cap in order to stay in state court. But it does nothing to clarify the debate over how courts should figure out how much money really is at stake in a lawsuit, which determines in part whether the defendant may move the case to federal court. This matters deeply to some defendants because federal courts are perceived to be more friendly to business interests.

    We joined Public Citizen on an amici brief in the case to argue against a broad approach by the Court that could have undermined legitimate litigation choices by plaintiffs to protect the interests of the class.

    So even though the plaintiffs lost, the good news is that the Court did not take a broad approach and refused even to acknowledge the defendant's repeated attempts to characterize the plaintiff's stipulation as an underhanded effort to evade federal jurisdiction. The decision did not open the door to second-guessing of the myriad strategic decisions that go into filing a lawsuit; it simply focused on whether the stipulation was binding on the proposed class, finding it was not.

  • March 21, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Kevin M. Cathcart, Executive Director, Lambda Legal. Cathcart’s piece is a part of Lambda Legal’s blog roundtable, “From Sex to Marriage: How We Got From Lawrence v. Texas to the Cases Against DOMA and Prop. 8.” The roundtable will include commentary from Paul M. Smith, an ACS Board Member, and the attorney who argued Lawrence before the Supreme Court. See ACSblog’s symposium on Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor.

    It might be hard for some to imagine, given the rapid pace of our progress, but as recently as 10 years ago, lesbian and gay Americans in many states were considered criminals in the eyes of the law—simply for having sex with someone of the same gender.

    And the discrimination went far beyond criminal law. Parents were denied custody of their children. Qualified workers were turned down from jobs. Prospective tenants were refused housing. All because of archaic and discriminatory laws that targeted and criminalized same-sex intimacy in 13 states.

    But in 2003, one Supreme Court decision changed everything. After decades of fighting against sodomy laws, Lambda Legal’s historic victory in Lawrence v. Texas opened a new path toward LGBT equality. For the first time, the Court established that lesbian and gay men share the same fundamental right to private intimacy with another adult that heterosexuals have.  

  • March 21, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Gabriel J. Chin, Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law

    This week, the Supreme Court heard argument in Arizona v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, a case at the intersection of two lines of cases which have been prominent on the Court’s docket in recent years. The case is an example of a challenge to Arizona’s apparently endless cornucopia of anti-immigrant legislation. It also tests measures which, according to some conservatives, are designed to preserve the integrity of the ballot box, but according to others are calculated to suppress the minority vote.

    The case involves Arizona’s Proposition 200, passed in 2004, which requires prospective Arizona voters to provide proof of United States citizenship before registration. But the federal National Voter Registration Act of 1993 directed the federal Election Assistance Commission to create a federal form for voter registration (current version here). That form requires applicants to provide a date of birth and other identifying information, and an oath that the applicant is a citizen, but does not require independent documentary proof of citizenship.  Federal law requires states to “accept and use” the federal form. The critical question is whether “accept and use” means that a properly completed form is sufficient for voter registration unless the state independently proves that it is fraudulent, or, rather, that the form is the beginning of an application process during which the state may freely add supplemental requirements and inquiries.

    A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which included retired Justice O’Connor, invalidated Prop. 200’s proof-of-citizenship requirement, over a dissent by Chief Judge Kozinski. En banc, the Ninth Circuit held 9-2 that the requirement was invalid, this time with Chief Judge Kozinski in the majority. Both the panel and the court en banc Circuit upheld a separate provision of Prop. 200, requiring registered voters to show identification at the polls.

    It is common ground that the federal government has broad power over federal elections.  As the Brennan Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center wrote in a brief for me and other constitutional law scholars, under the Elections Clause (Article I, Section 4), Congress may regulate federal elections and supersede state electoral laws. The Framers recognized the national implications of state electoral improprieties, and granted the national government the power to protect itself.  Neither Arizona nor any of the justices questioned the century of precedents to this effect. Instead, the case seemed to turn on the intent of Congress.