Executive power

  • January 3, 2014
    Guest Post
    by Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Professor of Law and ACS Co-Faculty Advisor at the University of Chicago, and former ACS Board Chair
     
    * This post originally appeared on The Huffington Post and is the third part of an ongoing series. The first part can be read here; the second part can be read here; the fourth part can be read here; the fifth part can be read here.
     
    In my last post, I explored the pros and cons of the NSA's bulk telephony meta-data program. As I reported, after considering all the competing interests and perspectives, the Review Group concluded that, in light of the availability of other means by which the government could achieve its legitimate objectives, there was "no sufficient justification to allow the government itself to collect and store bulk telephony meta-data." The Review Group therefore recommended that the meta-data program, as currently constituted, "should be terminated as soon as reasonably practicable."
     
    At the same time, though, the Review Group found that access to telephony meta-data can be useful to the government in its effort to identify terrorists operating inside the United States. The challenge was to figure out how best to preserve the legitimate value of the program while at the same time reducing its risks to personal privacy and individual freedom.
     
    To strike a better balance, the Review Group recommends several important changes in the program as it currently exists.
     
    First, and perhaps most important, the Review Group recommends that the government should not be permitted to store the telephony meta-data. The Review Group reasoned that taking the meta-data out of the hands of government would substantially reduce the potential for government abuse. The Review Group therefore recommends that the telephony meta-data should be held by private entities. That is, the meta-data should be held either by the various telephone service providers themselves or, upon a showing that that solution would make effective use of the meta-data impossible, by a private organization created specifically for that purpose. This approach would both prevent the government from having direct access to the database and ensure that an independent set of eyes could monitor the government's access to the information.
     
  • December 23, 2013
     
    Last week’s release of a 300-plus page report by the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies was only the latest bump on a long road of challenging news in recent weeks for the National Security Agency (NSA).
     
    The esteemed panel of intelligence and legal experts – including Geoffrey R. Stone, former ACS Board Member and Co-Faculty Advisor to the ACS Student Chapter at the University of Chicago Law School – suggested “significant new limits” on intelligence activities as well as general principles to guide future reform.
     
    All in all, 46 recommendations were offered, among them the private, non-governmental retention of all personal communications data, accessible only through individualized court orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC); the first-ever appointment of a “public interest advocate” to argue on behalf of civil liberties and privacy concerns before the FISC, which currently has no adversarial process; the ceasing of “back door” access points in hardware or software; and the incorporation of privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens.
     
    Also of note was the enumeration of guiding principles. For example, the panel endorsed a dual understanding of “security” – national security, on the one hand, and Fourth Amendment personal security on the other. The report also said the idea of “balancing” these two interests has “an important element of truth” but is “inadequate and misleading”:
     
    [S]ome safeguards are not subject to balancing at all. In a free society, public officials should never engage in surveillance in order to punish their political enemies; to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress legitimate criticism and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit or burden members of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, and gender.
     
    The panel also endorsed a “broad principle for the future: as a general rule and without senior policy review, the government should not be permitted to collect and store mass, undigested, non-public personal information about US persons for the purpose of enabling future queries and data-mining for foreign intelligence purposes.”
     
  • December 16, 2013

    by Nicholas Alexiou

    In a potentially significant ruling, Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has found that the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk collection of phone metadata program likely violates the Fourth Amendment.

    In Klayman et al. v. Obama et al., Plaintiffs Larry Klayman (founder of the conservative Judicial Watch and Freedom Watch) and Charles Strange (father of a Michael Strange, a slain Cryptologist Technician with Navy SEAL Team VI, who has been a vocal opponent of President Obama) allege, in part, that the NSA collection program violates the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. They sought a preliminary injunction that would prohibit the NSA from collecting the plaintiff’s call records under the existing collection program, require the destruction of all records already collected, and prohibit the “querying” of any metadata already collected.

    Judge Leon has found that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the NSA’s program, regardless of whether the program was in accordance with the rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and that the plaintiffs have shown both “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim, and that they will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief.” Therefore, Judge Leon granted, in part, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction; but recognizing the “significant national security interests at stake . . . and the novelty of the constitution issues” the injunction is stayed pending an appeal. Finding sufficient evidence to grant the preliminary injunction on Fourth Amendment grounds, Judge Leon did not address either the First or Fifth Amendment arguments.

    In analyzing the Fourth Amendment question, Judge Leon notes that the scope and technological sophistication of the NSA program far surpasses any other governmental surveillance program previously examined by the judiciary. In 1979, the Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. United States that an individual had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers they dialed on their phone, for they were voluntarily submitting them to the telephone company. Therefore, a pen register installed by the police without a warrant was not barred by the Fourth Amendment as it did not constitute a “search.”

  • December 2, 2013
    BookTalk
    Emergency Presidential Power
    From the Drafting of the Constitution to the War on Terror
    By: 
    Chris Edelson

    by Chris Edelson, Assistant Professor of Government, American University School of Public Affairs

    In March 2009, about a month after President George W. Bush and Dick Cheney left office, Scott Horton declared that “[w]e may not have realized it, but in the period from late 2001-January 19, 2009, this country was a dictatorship.  That was thanks to secret memos crafted deep inside the Justice Department that effectively trashed the Constitution.”  Some of the most infamous of these memos were drafted by John Yoo, an Office of Legal Counsel attorney from 2001-2003.  Yoo and others – most notably, Cheney’s counsel, David Addington – advanced the unitary executive theory, a theory of presidential power Cheney had personally favored for decades.

    The unitary executive theory, as implemented by the Bush administration, was claimed to justify effectively unchecked presidential power over the use of military force, the detention and interrogation of prisoners, extraordinary rendition and intelligence gathering.  According to the unitary executive theory, since the Constitution assigns the president all of “the executive power”, he can set aside laws that attempt to limit his power over national security.  This is an enormous power: critics charge that it effectively places the president above the law.  Advocates of broad presidential power argue it is necessary to defend the nation against the threat posed by terrorism.

  • November 15, 2013
    Guest Post
    by Hillary B. Farber, Associate Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law, and author of a forthcoming article on the domestic deployment of drones in Vol.64 of the Syracuse Law Review
     
    Editor’s Note: On Tuesday, November 19, ACS is hosting a panel discussion on constitutional protections of privacy in a time of rapid technological innovation and increasing surveillance, featuring Dahlia Lithwick of Slate, Chris Calabrese of the ACLU, Stephen Vladeck of American University Washington College of Law and others.  We hope that you will join us for this important and timely conversation.  If you are interested in attending, please RSVP here.

    By the end of this decade it is estimated that 30,000 drones will occupy national airspace.  In 2012, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act, which ordered the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to promulgate regulations for the integration of drones into the national airspace. Law enforcement agencies around the country have purchased drones and are testing the new technology. As of May 2013, four Department of Justice (DOJ) divisions had acquired drones: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); and, the U.S. Marshals Service.  On June 19, FBI Director Robert Mueller told Congress that the FBI has deployed drones for surveillance on domestic soil and is developing guidelines for their future law enforcement use. 

    As compared with manned airplanes and helicopters, unmanned aerial surveillance bears unique risks to society's expectation of privacy. Drones, properly called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are practically invisible at altitudes where a manned aircraft could be seen with the naked eye. Smaller UAVs operate almost silently, making them significantly harder to detect. Moreover, UAVs can be equipped with sensory enhancing technologies such as thermal imaging devices, facial recognition software, Wi-Fi sniffers, GPS systems, license plate readers and cameras that can provide high resolution images from significant altitudes.  This type of aerial surveillance presents the potential for intrusion of privacy far more pervasive than the flyover of a plane or helicopter.  Drone surveillance has the potential to enable users to gather unprecedented amounts of information about people and retain it well into the future.