



AMERICAN
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SOCIETY FOR
LAW AND POLICY

Program Guide

2016

Are All Voters Created Equal?

The 2016 presidential election is fast-approaching and the need to examine the vitality of our democratic system of governance is critical now, more than ever. This will be the first presidential election since the Supreme Court invalidated part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) in *Shelby County v. Holder*, and the upcoming 15th anniversary of *Bush v. Gore* serves as a stark reminder that a small number of votes can change election outcomes.

Given the timeliness of this issue, ACS encourages chapters to host events this year that illuminate issues impacting our right to vote. Among other things, events can explore equal and open access to the ballot, redistricting, Electoral College reform, and campaign finance reform. This brief guide, along with the accompanying Speakers List, is designed to assist both lawyer and student chapters in planning voting rights programs for this year. We encourage chapters to consult previous program guides on voting rights for additional programming ideas.¹

I. Equal and Open Access to the Ballot

In December of 2000, the Supreme Court decided *Bush v. Gore*, halting the vote recount in the contested presidential election in Florida and effectively deciding the election for George W. Bush. In the following months and years, the American public learned that an untold number of votes went uncounted due to hanging chads, butterfly ballots, and wrongful voter roll purges. As *Bush v. Gore* reminds us, the wrongful disenfranchisement of a relative few can change the results of an election. Yet, studies have shown that laws recently passed in many states imposing voter ID requirements, cutting back on early voting and out-of-precinct voting, and questionably purging voter rolls will do just that.² Prior to the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in *Shelby County*, many of these laws were blocked by the VRA's preclearance provision (Section 5), which required jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting to obtain federal approval before implementing changes to their voting laws. But the *Shelby County* decision, which found that the preclearance protections of the VRA were unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's powers, opened the floodgates for laws that discriminate and disenfranchise.

¹ See *Fall 2012 Program Guide: Voting Rights*, ACS LAW (2012), http://www.acslaw.org/Fall_2012_Program_Guide; *Fall 2010 Voting Rights Program Guide and Speakers List*, ACS LAW (2010), http://www.acslaw.org/Fall_2010_Program_Guide_VotingRights; *Spring 2008 Program Guide: Political Participation*, ACS LAW (2008), http://www.acslaw.org/Spring_2008_Program_Guide; *Fall 2006: Voting Rights and Democracy*, ACS LAW (2006), http://www.acslaw.org/Fall_2006_Program_Guide.

² See, e.g., Bill Hobby et al., *The Texas Voter ID Law and the 2014 Election: A Study of Texas's 23rd Congressional District*, HOBBY CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y & BAKER INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y (Aug. 2015), available at <https://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/e0029eb8/Politics-VoterID-Jones-080615.pdf>.

A powerful example of the recent voting rights restrictions comes from Alabama, the birthplace of the VRA. In 2011, Alabama passed a law requiring the presentation of photo identification at the polls, and in October 2015, Alabama decided to permanently close 31 DMV offices where voters could go to get the IDs the law required. Alabama is not alone in such efforts. Indeed, since the 2010 election, 21 states have enacted new laws that restrict access to registration and voting. In 15 of those states, 2016 will be the first presidential election for which those restrictions will be in place.³

Absent the preclearance provisions of the VRA, voters are left with nothing but litigation to protect their right to vote, and there have been several attempts to challenge these new restrictions in the courts. For example, in *Veasey v. Abbott*, the plaintiffs are challenging a new voter ID law in Texas on the grounds that it imposes an unconstitutional burden on the voting rights of minority and low-income voters. In August of this year, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas law had a discriminatory effect in violation of Section 2 of the VRA⁴ and remanded the case to the district court on the question of discriminatory purpose. In *League of Women Voters of North Carolina, et al. v. North Carolina*, a case challenging North Carolina's law prohibiting out-of-precinct voting, same-day registration, and reducing early voting by 7 days, the Supreme Court recently denied immediate review but stayed the Fourth Circuit's decision granting a preliminary injunction. Trial in the case concluded this past summer and the district court judge has yet to issue an opinion.

In light of the recent onslaught of new voting restrictions and the cost-prohibitive and time-consuming nature of litigation, the efficacy of the VRA is now in question. Numerous amendments to the VRA have been proposed in Congress since 2013. One such proposal, the Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, was introduced this past summer in both the House and the Senate and seeks to reinstate the preclearance requirements that were lost in *Shelby County*.⁵

What are the best avenues for protecting voting rights in the post-*Shelby County* era and how can advocates push back on the latest round of restrictive state measures? What are the costs and benefits of litigation as a check on voting restrictions and how is litigation better or worse than the preclearance system? If a restored VRA is what's needed, what are the best arguments to demonstrate that such legislation is within congressional authority? And since the federal Constitution doesn't explicitly protect the right to vote, should we be looking to state constitutions and state courts to do so?

For more information, see "Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America," a book by Ari Berman; "[Voting Laws Roundup 2015](#)," a roundup by the Brennan Center for Justice; "[The Value of a Vote: Reassessing Political Equality](#)," an ACS 2013 Convention panel; "[Voting Rights in the Post-*Shelby County* Era](#)," an ACS 2014 Convention panel; "[The Voting Rights Playbook: Why Courts Matter Post-*Shelby County v. Holder*](#)," a report by the Center for American Progress; "[To Protect the Right to Vote, Look to State Courts and State Constitutions](#)," an ACS

³ *Voting Laws Roundup 2015*, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 3, 2015), <https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2015#Restrictive>.

⁴ Section 2 of the VRA provides a private right of action to challenge racially discriminatory voting practices in any jurisdiction. Section 5, by contrast, applied only to certain jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting, and required preclearance of new election laws in those jurisdictions by the Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

⁵ Voting Rights Advancement Act, H.R. 2867, 114th Cong. (2015); Voting Rights Advancement Act, S.1659, 114th Cong. (2015) (identical bill).

Issue Brief by Joshua A. Douglas; “[Symposium: The Voting Rights Act at 50](#),” a collection of ACSblog posts; “[Fact Sheet: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015](#)” by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law.

II. Redistricting

In addition to passing new laws that restrict equal and open access to the ballot, state legislatures continue to manipulate the pool of voters who vote in our elections through the redistricting process. While the Supreme Court has articulated some limits to a state’s power to redraw its electoral districts, such as the “one person, one vote” rule announced in *Reynolds v. Sims* and the ban on racial gerrymandering it found in *Shaw v. Reno*, it has left these terms, and others, open to broad interpretation. Indeed, it has never actually defined the phrase “one person, one vote” and has never set justiciable standards to determine when partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution. Thus, to achieve political goals, state legislatures continue to push the limits on redistricting, and their efforts continue to result in litigation.

This Term, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to give some guidance to the states when it decides *Evenwel v. Abbott*. Since the Court’s 1964 *Reynolds* decision, which asserted that the “weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives,” it has been widely acknowledged that electoral districts must have roughly equal populations. However, the Court has never defined exactly what population must be equal. The plaintiffs in *Evenwel* are challenging Texas’s redistricting plan as an unconstitutional dilution of their votes under *Reynolds* because Texas uses total population as its basis for redistricting, instead of voting age population. This distinction matters because using voting age population, as plaintiffs would have it, results in the interests of children, some immigrants (including those who are eligible for naturalization), and others who are ineligible to vote being excluded from representation. A ruling requiring states to use voting population could also vastly redistribute representation from highly populated urban areas to sparsely populated rural areas. In *Evenwel*, the Court must either choose which population states should use in redistricting, or rule that states can decide which population to use.

Further complicating the redistricting process is the blatant partisan gerrymandering that occurs in nearly every state and that often leads to cherry-picked electorates and incongruous election results. For example, in 2012, House Democrats won the national popular vote by over 1.1 million, but only secured 46% of the seats.⁶ Earlier this year, the Supreme Court decided *Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission*, which held that voters can seek to tamp down on partisan gerrymandering by assigning the redistricting task to a body other than the state legislature. Now before the Court is *Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission*, which involves the same independent commission and will assess the constitutionality of the commission’s actions. The plaintiffs in *Harris* allege that the commission itself engaged in partisan gerrymandering in violation of the “one person, one vote” principle, while the commission argues that the districts were drawn in order to receive preclearance under the VRA, a justification the plaintiffs contend is no longer valid after the Court’s *Shelby County* decision made preclearance unnecessary. While the Supreme Court has said that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause and may be unconstitutional in certain circumstances, there are no clear standards and the Court has never

⁶ See Katrina vanden Heuvel, *We Need a Fairer System for Choosing House Members*, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/katrina-vanden-heuvel-we-need-a-fairer-system-for-choosing-house-members/2014/08/19/bf93c84c-271c-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.

struck down a redistricting plan because of partisan gerrymandering. *Harris* offers the Court an opportunity to clarify the law in this area.

How can we draw electoral districts to be truly representative? How does gerrymandering affect the strength of our democracy? What standards might the Supreme Court articulate in *Evenwel* and *Harris*, and what impact will those standards have on the future of redistricting? Are independent redistricting commissions preferable to legislative redistricting? Are there other redistricting reforms that would strengthen or weaken our democracy (or at least make districts more competitive and less politically polarized)?

For more information, see “[Drawing Lines: The Limits to a State’s Redistricting Powers](#),” an ACS 2015 Convention panel; “[A Stealth Attack on Voting Rights is Brewing](#),” an article by the Brennan Center’s Michael Li; “[Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Redistricting But Were Too Afraid to Ask](#),” a report by the ACLU; “[The New Look at ‘One Person, One Vote,’ Made Simple](#),” a SCOTUSblog post by Lyle Denniston.

III. Electoral College Reform

Citizens of the United States do not directly elect the President and Vice President. Rather, pursuant to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, citizens vote for electors to the Electoral College, and those electors are responsible for electing the President and Vice President. The Electoral College is composed of 538 electors, apportioned among the states in numbers equal to each state’s members of Congress, and a candidate must receive a majority (270) of the electors’ votes to win the presidency.

As we saw in the presidential election of 2000, the Electoral College system allows for the possibility that a candidate will win the popular vote but lose the presidency. Further, because each state is accorded the same number of electors as congressional representatives, votes from states with smaller populations weigh far more than votes from states with larger populations. For instance, when considering population size relative to the number of electoral votes, each individual vote in Wyoming counts almost four times as much as each individual vote in Texas.⁷ Moreover, the Electoral College system continues to result in a few swing states with large numbers of electors becoming the main focus of presidential campaigns, while voters in some states never encounter a presidential candidate.⁸

Some scholars argue that the Electoral College is necessary because the popular vote may not always be truly representative due to corruption and gerrymandering.⁹ Others suggest that reforming the Electoral College is necessary to reflect our democratic commitments.¹⁰ One proposed reform that would not require amending the Constitution is the National Popular Vote bill, which if enacted by a state would require that state’s electors to commit their votes to the winner of the nationwide popular vote. National Popular Vote legislation has been adopted by ten states and the District of

⁷ See *Problems with the Electoral College*, FAIRVOTE, <http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/national-popular-vote/the-electoral-college/problems-with-the-electoral-college/> (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).

⁸ See John Koza, *We Need a National Popular Vote*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 1, 2012), <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/10/01/we-need-a-national-popular-vote>.

⁹ See Stephen M. Sheppard, *A Case for the Electoral College and for Its Faithless Elector*, 2015 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2015); see also Norman R. Williams, *Why the National Popular Vote Compact is Unconstitutional*, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1523 (2012).

¹⁰ See, e.g., John B. Anderson, *The Electoral College Flunks the Test in an Age of Democracy*, 32-SPG HUM. RTS. 17 (2005).



Columbia, which together possess 165 electoral votes, but the legislation does not go into effect until it has been passed by enough states to constitute a majority of the votes in the Electoral College. Only then would the legislation have the desired effect of ensuring that the presidency goes to the candidate who wins the national popular vote.

What purpose does the Electoral College serve in modern-day America? What problems does a National Popular Vote fix and what does it leave unresolved? Are there other potential reforms to the Electoral College that might be more effective or more feasible?

For more information, see History’s “[Ask History: What’s the Electoral College?](#),” FairVote’s [Reform Options for the Electoral College and the Election of the US President](#); the National Popular Vote, Inc.’s [website](#); and “[A Case for the Electoral College and for Its Faithless Elector](#),” a 2015 Wisconsin Law Review article by Stephen M. Sheppard.

IV. Campaign Finance Reform

Over the past 40 years, the Supreme Court has greatly limited the ways in which Congress and the states can reduce the influence of money in our elections. In its seminal 1976 decision in *Buckley v. Valeo*, the Court held that campaign contributions and expenditures implicate fundamental First Amendment expressive and associational rights, and thus campaign finance restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court went on to strike down limits on campaign spending and limits on donations to sources independent of candidates themselves (“independent expenditures”), but to uphold limits on individual contributions to candidates. The Court’s 2010 *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* decision, which struck down a ban on corporate independent expenditures, further opened the door to money in politics. And most recently, in its 2014 *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission* decision, the Court struck down aggregate contribution limits as unconstitutional.

As a result of these decisions, campaign spending has radically increased. In fact, the 2014 midterm election was the most expensive in history, costing nearly \$4 billion.¹¹ Not surprisingly, money is now a strong indicator of election results. Out of 467 congressional races in 2012, candidates who spent more on their campaigns were about *nine times* more likely to win.¹² The increasingly important role that money plays in our elections poses a grave risk to our democracy, as more attention is paid to big spenders, and less is paid to the average voter. The increase in money in politics also heightens both the threat and perception of corruption.

Public financing is one way to allow candidates to run competitive campaigns without becoming beholden to moneyed interests. The Fair Elections Now Act and its companion Government By the People Act of 2015 were introduced earlier this year and provide qualified congressional candidates

¹¹ See Russ Choma, *Final Tally: 2014’s Midterm Was Most Expensive, With Fewer Donors*, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Feb. 18, 2015), <http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/02/final-tally-2014s-midterm-was-most-expensive-with-fewer-donors/>; see also Rebecca Ballhaus, *At \$4 Billion, 2014 is Most Expensive Midterm Ever*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 2:10 PM), <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/10/23/at-4-billion-cost-2014-is-most-expensive-midterm-ever/>.

¹² See Jasper McChesney, *Infographic: How Money Won Congress*, REPRESENT.US (Mar. 6, 2014), <http://bulletin.represent.us/infographic-money-wins-congress> (asserting that candidates who spent more won 91% of time); see also Domenico Montanaro et al., *Money is Pretty Good Indicator of Who Will Win Elections*, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 11, 2014), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/money-pretty-good-predictor-will-win-elections/> (indicating that 94% of the House race spenders won and 82% of the biggest Senate race spenders won in 2014).



with opportunities for grants, fund matching, and television vouchers,¹³ helping to counteract the influence of big money in politics. Another approach advocated by some is to amend the Constitution to explicitly authorize campaign finance limits.¹⁴

Is the expenditure of money equivalent to speech under the First Amendment? Should it be? Regardless, what campaign finance limits, if any, might survive Supreme Court review under the current jurisprudence? What new legal theories can be advanced to justify campaign finance laws? In addition to public financing and a constitutional amendment, what other avenues are available to help reduce the influence of money in our democracy and what are their relative merits?

For more information, see [“Five Years Later, *Citizens United* Wreaks Havoc on Our Democracy,”](#) an ACSblog post by Fred Wertheimer; the ACS 2014 Convention panel [Beyond *Citizens United* and *McCutcheon*: What Next for Campaign Finance Regulation?](#); [“Taking Stock of *Citizens United*, Justice Ginsburg Notes Flood of Money in Judicial Campaigns,”](#) an ACSblog post by Nanya Springer; [“A Court Failing The Nation,”](#) an ACSblog post by Gene R. Nichol; [“*McCutcheon v. FEC* and *Roberts v. Breyer*: They’re Both Right and They’re Both Wrong,”](#) an ACS Issue Brief by Alan B. Morrison.

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¹³ Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1538, 114th Cong. (2015); Government By the People Act of 2015, H.R. 20, 114th Cong. (2015).

¹⁴ See *The Solution*, FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, <http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/the-solution/> (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).



2016 Program Guide Speakers List

Name	Title	Organization	Focus	Location
Nancy Abudu	Legal Director	ACLU of Florida	Redistricting, Voting Rights	FL
Debo Adegbile	Partner	WilmerHale	Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Dmitry Bam	Associate Professor of Law	University of Maine School of Law	Election Law, Judicial Elections	ME
Jocelyn F. Benson	Dean	Wayne State University Law School	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	MI
James Blacksher	Attorney at Law		Redistricting, Voting Rights	AL
John Bonifaz	Co-Founder and President	Free Speech for People	Campaign Finance	MA
Lisa Bornstein	Legal Director and Senior Legal Adviser	Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights	Voting Rights	DC
Rachel Paine Caufield	Associate Professor of Political Science	Drake University	Judicial Elections	IA
Guy-Uriel Charles	Charles S. Rhyne Professor of Law, Senior Associate Dean for Faculty & Research	Duke Law School	Campaign Finance, Redistricting, Voting Rights	NC
Jeff Clements	Co-Founder and Chair of the Board	Free Speech for People	Campaign Finance	MA
Katherine Culliton-González	Senior Attorney and Director of Voter Protection	Advancement Project	Redistricting, Voting Rights	DC
Gilda Daniels	Associate Professor of Law	University of Baltimore School of Law	Redistricting, Voting Rights	MD
Chandler Davidson	Research Professor and Tsanoff Chair of Public Affairs Emeritus	Rice University	Voting Rights	TX
Armand Derfner	Constitutional Law Scholar-In Residence	Charleston School of Law	Redistricting, Voting Rights	SC
Judith Browne Dianis	Co-Director	Advancement Project	Voting Rights	DC
Joshua A. Douglas	Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law	University of Kentucky	Election Law, Voting Rights	KY
Anita Earls	Executive Director	Southern Coalition for Social Justice	Redistricting, Voting Rights	NC



Atiba R. Ellis	Professor of Law	West Virginia University College of Law	Election Law, Voting Rights	WV
Christopher Elmendorf	Professor of Law	University of California -Davis School of Law	Election Law, Voting Rights	CA
Ron Fein	Legal Director	Free Speech for People	Campaign Finance	MA
Kathay Feng	Executive Director & National Redistricting Director	California Common Cause	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Redistricting	CA
Julie Fernandes	Senior Policy Analyst	Open Society Foundations	Election Law, Voting Rights	DC
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer	Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow	Indiana University, Maurer School of Law	Voting Rights	IN
Jose Garza	Attorney at Law	Law Office of Jose Garza	Redistricting, Voting Rights	TX
Heather Gerken	J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law	Yale Law School	Election Law	CT
Michael Gilbert	Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law	University of Virginia School of Law	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Judicial Elections	VA
Rebecca Green	Professor of the Practice of Law and Co-Director of the Election Law Program	William & Mary School of Law	Election Law	VA
Rick Hasen	Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science	University of California at Irvine	Campaign Finance, Election Law	CA
Kevin J. Hamilton	Partner	Perkins Coie	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	WA
Ryan P. Haygood	President and CEO	New Jersey Institute for Social Justice	Voting Rights	NJ
J. Gerald Hebert	Executive Director and Director of Litigation	Campaign Legal Center	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	DC
Dale Ho	Director	Voting Rights Project, ACLU	Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Sherrilyn Ifill	President and Director-Counsel	NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund	Judicial Elections, Voting Rights	NY
Samuel Issacharoff	Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law	New York University School of Law	Voting Rights	NY



Anthony Johnstone	Associate Professor of Law	University of Montana School of Law	Campaign Finance, Judicial Elections, Voting Rights	MT
Michael S. Kang	Professor of Law	Emory Law School	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Judicial Elections	GA
Pamela Karlan	Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law	Stanford Law School	Election Law, Voting Rights	CA
Ellen Katz	Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law	University of Michigan Law School	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	MI
John Koza	Chairman	National Popular Vote	Electoral College	CA
Adam Lioz	Counsel and Senior Advisor, Policy & Outreach	Demos	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Voting Rights	DC
William P. Marshall	William Rand Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Law	University of North Carolina School of Law	Campaign Finance, Election Law	NC
Eugene Mazo	Visiting Assistant Professor of Law	Wake Forest University School of Law	Voting Rights, Election Law	NC
Laughlin McDonald	Senior Counsel and Director Emeritus	ACLU Voting Rights Project	Redistricting, Voting Rights	GA
Michael McDonald	Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science	University of Florida	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	FL
Terry Ao Minnis	Director of Census and Voting Programs	Asian Americans Advancing Justice	Voting Rights	DC
Janai Nelson	Associate Director-Counsel	NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Nina Perales	Vice President of Litigation	Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund	Redistricting, Voting Rights	TX
Nathaniel Persily	James B. McClatchy Professor of Law	Stanford Law School	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	CA
Richard H. Pildes	Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law	New York University School of Law	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Michael Pitts	Professor of Law and Dean's Fellow	Indiana University McKinney School of Law	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	IN



Robert C. Post	Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law	Yale Law School	Campaign Finance	CT
William Quigley	Professor of Law and Director of the Loyola Law Clinic & the Gillis Long Poverty Law Center	Loyola University New Orleans College of Law	Voting Rights	LA
Jamin B. Raskin	Professor of Law and Director of the Law and Government Program	American University College of Law	Campaign Finance, Redistricting, Voting Rights	DC
D. Theodore Rave	Assistant Professor of Law	University of Houston Law Center	Election Law	TX
Rob Richie	Executive Director	FairVote	Electoral College, Redistricting, Voting Rights	DC
Thomas A. Saenz	President and General Counsel	Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund	Redistricting, Voting Rights	CA
Steven D. Schwinn	Associate Professor of Law	John Marshall Law School	Campaign Finance, Redistricting, Voting Rights	IL
Christopher B. Seaman	Associate Professor of Law	Washington and Lee University School of Law	Election Law, Voting Rights	VA
Kate Shaw	Assistant Professor of Law	Cardozo School of Law	Campaign Finance, Election Law	NY
Theodore Shaw	Julius Chambers Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Civil Rights	University of North Carolina School of Law	Voting Rights	NC
Ganesh Sitaraman	Assistant Professor of Law	Vanderbilt Law School	Campaign Finance	TN
Paul Smith	Partner, Chair of the Appellate and Supreme Court Practice, and Co-Chair of the Media and First Amendment, and Election Law and Redistricting Practices	Jenner & Block	Redistricting, Voting Rights	DC
Terry Smith	Distinguished Research Professor of Law	DePaul University College of Law	Redistricting, Voting Rights	IL
Douglas M. Spencer	Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy and Roger S. Baldwin Scholar	University of Connecticut School of Law and Dept. of Public Policy	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Voting Rights	CT



Daniel Tokaji	Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of Constitutional Law and Senior Fellow, Election Law	Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law	Campaign Finance, Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	OH
Franita Tolson	Betty T. Ferguson Professor of Voting Rights	Florida State University College of Law	Election Law, Redistricting, Voting Rights	FL
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy	Associate Professor of Law	Stetson University College of Law	Campaign Finance, Election Law	FL
Arturo Vargas	Executive Director	National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO)	Voting Rights, Redistricting	CA
Tova Andrea Wang	Director of Democracy Programs; Senior Democracy Fellow	Communication Workers of America; Demos	Voting Rights, Election Law	DC
Wendy Weiser	Director, Democracy Program	Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law	Campaign Finance, Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Fred Wertheimer	Founder and President	Democracy 21	Campaign Finance	DC
Erika Wood	Professor of Law	New York Law School	Redistricting, Voting Rights	NY
Robert Yablon	Assistant Professor of Law	University of Wisconsin Law School	Campaign Finance, Voting Rights	WI