Reproductive freedom

  • April 11, 2017
    Guest Post

    *This piece is part of the ACSblog symposium: "The Future of the U.S. Constitution

    by Pamela S. Karlan, ACS Board Member and Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Co-Director of the Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford Law School

    “Always it is by bridges that we live,” the poet Philip Larkin wrote. One of the problems with the way we have tried to build a more just constitutional law is our failure to draw lessons across constitutional subfields – to build constitutional bridges.

    Several years ago, I published an article in the Indiana Law Journal called “Taking Politics Religiously: How Free Exercise and Establishment Clause Cases Illuminate the Law of Democracy.” It is an example of what I mean by building constitutional bridges: I used themes developed in the religion clause cases – like the “radical” idea that “[f]ree people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain nor to direct,” that the Constitution should combat the creation of an outsider class and that it should prevent capture and exploitation of the machinery of government – to suggest how we ought to think about political party regulation, redistricting and campaign finance.

    Now, I want to begin a conversation about two areas of law that might seem rather disconnected from one another: voting rights and reproductive justice. I often joke about that connection: politics, like reproduction, combines lofty goals, deep passions about identity and instincts for self-preservation, increasing reliance on technology and often a need – as the Supreme Court put it in a redistricting case – to “pull” and “haul” rather indelicately at the very end. And of course, it often involves somebody getting screwed.

  • April 10, 2017
    Guest Post

    *This piece is part of the ACSblog symposium: "The Future of the U.S. Constitution"

    by Reva Siegel, ACS Board Member and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale Law School

    An aroused public can shape judicial appointments, and shape law.

    Only a few constitutional cases provoke sustained public engagement. But in those few cases where the public is fiercely engaged, judges often respond. Justice Kennedy expressly acknowledged public deliberation about same-sex marriage in Windsor and Obergefell. Justice Scalia, who denounced the living Constitution, wrote an originalist opinion in Heller responding to the claims of living Americans opposed to gun control.

    Mobilization can influence not only the outcome of cases, but even their reasoning. Opponents of health care spread fear of death panels and government-mandated consumption of broccoli, and, in the process, transformed constitutional arguments against the law from “off the wall” to “on the wall.” In Sebelius, the Justices addressed Congress’s power to enact the health care law in opinions that repeatedly discussed vegetables and the importance of protecting individual liberties.

    *   *   *

    Looking back over a half century of abortion conflict, we can see this dynamic in action and imagine new forms it might take.

    For decades, supporters of the abortion right sought protection for women’s health, liberty and equality, while opponents sought protection for unborn life. The Court balanced these claims in Roe’s trimester framework and in Casey’s undue burden standard.

  • March 21, 2017
    Guest Post

    by Hillary Schneller, Staff Attorney, Center for Reproductive Rights

    This week marks the 45th anniversary of a key decision protecting our constitutional right to reproductive freedom—and it is not Roe v. Wade. Often flying under the jurisprudential radar is Eisenstadt v. Baird, decided on March 22, 1972, in which the Supreme Court held that the Constitution protects the right of unmarried individuals to use contraception. There, the Court pronounced simply: if this right of personal liberty “means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”

    This anniversary happens to coincide with the confirmation hearings of Judge Neil Gorsuch, who has heard cases bearing on access to contraception during his time on the bench, but has never heard a case about abortion access. While Judge Gorsuch’s lack of a record on abortion has confounded those who seek a window on how he would decide reproductive rights cases, there is much to be gleaned from his views about access to contraception. Senators should ask Judge Gorsuch where he stands on the right to contraception, a right that he has not acknowledged even while writing opinions that would allow employers—if not the government itself—to deny individuals access to birth control.

    It may be unsurprising that Judge Gorsuch has never addressed the constitutional right to contraception. While abortion is well-known to be a constitutional right, contraception lacks equivalent popular recognition. Eisenstadt is in fact the second case in a trio in which the Court defined the fundamental right to contraception. Those three cases—Griswold v. Connecticut; Eisenstadt v. Baird; and Carey v. Population Services International—identify a sphere of personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is shielded from government interference. The Court has carried that point through its decisions about reproductive freedom, personal decision-making and family relationships.

  • March 6, 2017
    BookTalk
    Sex and the Constitution
    Sex, Religion, and Law from America's Origins to the Twenty-First Century
    By: 
    Geoffrey Stone
    by Geoffrey Stone, ACS Board of Advisors Member and Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Law School
     
    My new book, Sex and the Constitution, will officially be released on March 21, but is now available for pre-order on Amazon at a discount. I have worked on this book, on-and-off, for roughly a decade. My goal was to explore the history of sex, religion, law and constitutional law from the ancient world to the 21st century. It was probably a crazy goal, which is no doubt at least partly why it took so long to complete. Now that it is complete, though, I have to admit that I am quite pleased with the result, and the early reviews have been glowing, including from such folks as Lawrence Tribe, Linda Greenhouse, Cass Sunstein, Erwin Chemerinsky, David Cole and George Chauncey.
     
    I have been invited to write this ACS BookTalk in order to inform readers about the work and, hopefully, to entice your curiosity. Rather than writing something “new” for this purpose, I decided that the best way to accomplish the goal is simply to set forth below the opening paragraphs of the Prologue. Hopefully, that will give you a sense of what this work is all about.
     
    We are in the midst of a constitutional revolution. It is a revolution that tests the most fundamental values of the American people and that has shaken constitutional law to its roots. It has bitterly divided citizens, politicians and judges. It is a battle that has dominated politics, inflamed religious passions and challenged Americans to rethink and reexamine their positions on issues they once thought settled. It is a story that has never before been told in its full sweep. And, best of all, it is about sex.
     
  • February 23, 2017
    Guest Post

    by Louise Melling, Deputy Legal Director and Director of the Center for Liberty at the ACLU

    Religious freedom protects the right to our beliefs.  But does it protect the right of institutions to discriminate? The ACLU, staunch defender of religious liberty, says no. The answer for United States Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch appears to be yes. It is the province and duty of the Senate to press Judge Gorsuch on his stance during the confirmation hearings, as this question promises to be central to significant cases likely to come before Court in the near future.

    The opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that Judge Gorsuch joined and authored addressing Religious Freedom Restoration Act challenges to the contraceptive coverage rule of the Affordable Care Act raise troubling questions about his understanding of religious liberty, principles of equality, and their intersection.  Three points are worth noting.

    First, and most significant, in the Hobby Lobby case, the Tenth Circuit, ruling en banc, gave short shrift, and even embraced the harms, to women that would result were the rule enjoined as to Hobby Lobby.  The court acknowledged that women denied coverage (in that case to four methods of contraception) would suffer an economic burden, but went on to say, “Accommodations for religion frequently operate by lifting a burden from the accommodated party and placing it elsewhere.”   In other words, the court, with Judge Gorsuch joining, accepted that employees should bear the cost of their employer’s religion.

    That’s a position the Supreme Court declined to embrace in its Hobby Lobby decision. The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit and ruled for the arts and crafts giant, but its ruling, unlike that of the Tenth Circuit, rested on the premise that the government could extend the accommodation it provided to religiously affiliated nonprofit entities to for-profit companies. Critically, that accommodation was designed to ensure that employees would continue to receive seamless coverage of contraception from the insurer. In the Court’s opinion, the effect then on “the women employed by Hobby Lobby … involved in these cases would be precisely zero.” The same cannot be said under the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning, which Judge Gorsuch joined.