Privacy rights

  • June 4, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Jill Adams, Executive Director, Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice, University of California, Berkeley School of Law

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium honoring the 50th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut.

    When it comes to our most intimate experiences and decisions, the right to privacy should arm the many, not just shield the few who can afford to pay for it.  We’ve learned in the years since Griswold v. Connecticut that privacy is not a panacea for the fulfillment of all people’s sexual and reproductive rights.  The right to privacy has not granted secure and reliable respect for decisions we make in our bedrooms and about our bodies.  This is especially disappointing in a country that places such a legal and cultural premium on matters of autonomy and individualism – particularly in the private sphere.

    Cast in the mold of Griswold’s privacy-based right to use contraception, the right to choose abortion declared in Roe v. Wade similarly presents an important avenue but imperfect vehicle for everyone’s guaranteed arrival at reproductive self-determination.  Courts have allowed the proliferation of countless contractions, exemptions, and restrictions on the rights to abortion and contraception, siphoning power out of the hands of individuals wishing to exercise their reproductive rights and into the hands of states, corporations, and institutions wishing to constrain or control them.

     
    Is privacy really a “right” if you can’t afford to exercise it?
     
    The abstract right to use reproductive health services  free from governmental interference rings hollow without the necessary, enabling conditions to ensure access to such services and the ability to make decisions about them free from coercion by person, system, or circumstance.  For low-income people, and other marginalized populations, the right to privacy may merely be a right on paper if it is not a right they can actually afford to exercise.
  • June 3, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Anthony S. Winer, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium honoring the 50th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut.

    Griswold v. Connecticut is justly celebrated for discerning the constitutional right to privacy, and thus constitutional protection for reproductive freedom.  It not only protected access to contraceptives, but also provided the foundation for the later cases constitutionally protecting access to abortion.  Moreover, Griswold helped instill constitutional respect for the broader concerns of “marriage, procreation, and family relationships,” and ultimately for the even broader concern of “personal dignity and autonomy.”

    However, where the privacy and personal autonomy of LGBT people are concerned, the legacy of Griswold is more nuanced.  Doctrinal developments following Griswold constrained gay rights in some respects, and in some respects fortified them.  And the way in which the Supreme Court has been treating LGBT rights recently may presage salutary changes to come.

    The most negative aspect of the Griswold legacy for LGBT people is that it did nothing to forestall the disaster of Bowers v. Hardwick.  This was the 1986 case in which the Supreme Court held that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law did not protect sexual relations between two men (nor presumably between two women).  When Bowers was decided, Griswold was already 21 years old, and Roe v. Wade had already passed its thirteenth anniversary.  Cases applying the right to privacy were not in short supply, but the Court majority could not bring itself to allow lesbians and gay men to share in the newly discerned freedoms.  There was no principled reason for Bowers to come out differently from the contraception or abortion cases.  Bowers seemed to create a “special case,” perhaps founded on homophobia, excluding lesbian and gay rights from the zone of privacy that protected others.

  • June 2, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Emily J. Martin, Vice President and General Counsel, National Women’s Law Center

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium honoring the 50th anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut.

    Fifty years ago this week, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not permit a state to prohibit the use of contraceptives within marriage or the provision of contraceptives to married people.  Finding a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,” the majority concluded that the contraception bans unconstitutionally intruded on marriage, which the Court described as “a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”  Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the constitutional right to use birth control to unmarried couples.

    By guaranteeing legal access to birth control, the Griswold decision opened the door for dramatic changes for women and for our society.  As the Supreme Court has since observed, “The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”  In fact, research has shown that availability of reliable birth control has been a key driver of the increases in U.S. women’s education, labor force participation, average earnings, and the narrowing in the wage gap between women and men achieved over recent decades.

    Given the profound importance of the availability of contraception to women’s health and women’s opportunities, it is notable that the Griswold majority nowhere mentioned the word “woman” or “women.”  Neither did the word “gender” or “sex” make an appearance.  And while the opinion for the Court relied on the First Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment in finding a constitutional right to be let alone and a right of intimate association that included the right to use contraception, the majority made no reference to the equality guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment in striking down Connecticut’s birth control ban.

  • May 7, 2015

    by Devon Ombres

    Today, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its unanimous opinion in American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, giving privacy advocates a victory they have long been seeking in holding that Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act does not authorize the bulk collection of telephone metadata.  Because the Second Circuit found that bulk telephone metadata collection is not permitted by the statute, the court did not reach the constitutional question of whether it would comport with the Fourth Amendment.  Additionally, despite vacating and remanding the lower court’s judgment, the Second Circuit did not enjoin the government from continuing the collection of metadata under Section 215, reasoning that the statute is set to expire on June 1, 2015 and there is significant legislative activity on the horizon that could impact the legal issues in play.

    As an initial matter, Judge Gerald Lynch’s opinion held that the ACLU and its affiliates were not precluded from bringing an action seeking an injunction against the government’s collection program.  Although the government argued that no private cause of action was permitted, the court held that the government’s reliance on “bits and shards of inapplicable statutes, inconclusive legislative history, and inferences from silence in an effort to find an implied revocation of the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] authorization of challenges to government action” was not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against the preclusion of judicial review.

    As to the program’s validity under Section 215, the court reviewed whether the statute authorized the creation of a “historical repository of information” where the “sheer volume of information sought is staggering.”  The court did not accept the government’s argument that data collection under Section 215 is analogous to the permissiveness provided to prosecution requests for grand jury subpoenas, which cannot be denied unless a court determines “that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject matter of the investigation.”  The court distinguished those subpoenas as bound by the facts of a particular investigation and a finite timeframe, while the Section 215 metadata collection program had no limitations on subject matter, individuals, or time, and there was no requirement of relevance to any particular set of facts.

  • April 9, 2015

    by Nanya Springer

    On “mommy blogs” across the Internet, pregnant women lament that perfect strangers feel entitled to pat their bellies, offer unsolicited diet and parenting advice, and ask intrusive questions about their personal health.  For most women, such invasions are at most a temporary social annoyance.  But it should come as no surprise that in this culture of entitlement to pregnant women’s bodies, legislation that effectively strips pregnant women of their privacy and autonomy is widespread and, in many instances, has resulted in incarceration and forced intervention by the state.

    The ceaseless barrage of measures restricting the liberty of pregnant women takes many forms.  First, there are laws that place medically unnecessary (and sometimes irrational) mandates on abortion procedures: waiting periods, crisis pregnancy center counseling, ultrasounds, physician scripts, ambulatory surgical center requirements, hospital admitting privileges, hospital transfer agreements, procedure-specific bans, parental consent laws, restrictions on private insurance coverage, and the list goes on.

    In Texas – a state where judges are elected – a bill is being considered that would publicize the names of judges who give minors permission to obtain an abortion.  The Ohio House last week passed a bill that would ban abortion once a fetal heartbeat is detected – possibly before a woman even knows she is pregnant – and provide for doctors who violate the ban to be imprisoned.  A new Arizona law requires doctors to tell patients, contrary to medical evidence, that drug-induced abortions can be reversed.  And on Tuesday, Kansas became the first state to ban dilation and evacuation as an abortion method.

    Such restrictions and state-sanctioned intrusions into the doctor-patient relationship are alarming, but they are not the end of the story.  At least 38 states have enacted “fetal homicide” laws, the majority of which apply to even the earliest stages of gestation.  These laws, which were originally sold to the public as tools to prosecute abusive boyfriends and others who may harm pregnant women, are increasingly being used to prosecute pregnant women themselves.