Lawfare

  • May 29, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Sam Kleiner, a law student at Yale Law School and member of the ACS Yale Law School Chapter.

    In his widely-noted speech at the Oxford Union, Harold Koh (pictured) invited us to imagine a different response to September 11. It's easy to think that the path taken by the Bush administration was driven by a pre-destined sense of necessity, and Koh's invocation of a President Gore (a timely counter-factual with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's musings on that election and the Supreme Court’s involvement), offers an alternative/hypothetical response in the time-tested law enforcement approach.

    At Lawfare, Ben Wittes defends the Bush administration’s record as oriented on a law enforcement approach. Koh argued that the Obama administration's approach "combined a Law of War approach with Law Enforcement and other approaches to bring all available tools to bear against Al Qaeda" and Wittes countered that this description fit the Bush administration's approach. 

    Contrary to Wittes’ attempt to frame the Bush administration as focused on law enforcement, President Bush specifically rejected this approach and attacked candidate John Kerry for suggesting this path forward. In 2004, when Kerry emphasized his background as a prosecutor and urged that terrorism be considered through a law enforcement lens until it became a "nuisance," Bush attacked him vehemently. Kerry argued for an approach that was, "less of a military operation and far more of an intelligence-gathering law enforcement operation." Bush responded: "I disagree -- strongly disagree. … After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. With those attacks, the terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States of America, and war is what they got." Wittes boasts of a more restrained argument from the Bush administration and he cites a 2006 speech by John Bellinger and a Bush administration brief filed in Boumediene (after losing hugely in RasulHamdi and Hamdan), of a more restrained vision of the war on terrorism. Bush did move away from the GWOT framing in his second term largely because he had been thwarted by the courts and Congress. What Koh invites us to ponder -  and Wittes fails to comprehend - is that you could have had a response to 9/11 that started with a deeply powerful law and order framework rather than heading down the rabbit hole by making outlandish claims of unilateral executive power that threatened constitutional order. By 2006, it was too little too late.