Joseph Kimble

  • September 14, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Joseph Kimble, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, WMU-Cooley Law School

    *This post is part of ACSblog’s 2015 Constitution Day Symposium.

    In Reading Law, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner make this assertion about the interpretive theory called textualism, which they endorse and expound:

    [W]e must lay to rest at the outset the slander that [textualism] is a device calculated to produce socially or politically conservative outcomes. Textualism is not well designed to achieve ideological ends, relying as it does on the most objective criterion available: the accepted contextual meaning that the words had when the law was enacted. A textualist reading will sometimes produce “conservative” outcomes, sometimes “liberal” ones. [Reading Law, p. 16.]

    But that assertion is belied by the overwhelmingly conservative results that textualism does in fact produce, especially in the cases that matter most. Who can honestly doubt it?

    In a recent article, I’ve summarized six empirical studies. (See pp. 30–35 for details and attribution.) Four of the studies show a strong ideological bent in Justice Scalia’s opinions. Another concludes from an analysis of more than 600 Supreme Court cases that the textual canons of construction “are regularly used in an instrumental if not ideologically conscious manner.” The other study examines a 25-year set of the Court’s cases and concludes that a principal defense of originalism — its constraining effect on judges — “is overstated at best and illusory at worst.”

    In one of the studies, Professor Geoffrey Stone polled colleagues to identify the 20 most important Supreme Court cases since 2000. In every one, Justice Scalia voted for the conservative position. And Stone notes that originalism “in no way” explains that voting record.

    Besides the empirical studies, I cite 11 other sources that cast doubt on the neutrality and consistency of Justice Scalia’s textualism. (P. 35 note 96.)