Eric J. Segall

  • February 29, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Eric J. Segall, Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law. Follow Professor Segall on Twitter @espinsegall.

    On Wednesday, the Supreme Court will hear arguments in an historic abortion case involving two Texas laws that, if upheld, will make it much more difficult for poor women in Texas to obtain abortions. The death of Justice Scalia has little effect on the outcome of this case. There are likely three conservative votes to uphold the laws (Roberts, Alito, and Thomas) and four liberal votes to invalidate the laws (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan). If Justice Kennedy votes with the liberals, the laws will be struck down 5-3 (instead of 5-4 had Scalia remained on the bench). If he votes to uphold the laws, the decision of the lower court sustaining both laws will be affirmed by a 4-4 vote (though the case would not have national implications).

    One of the Texas laws requires clinics that perform abortions to have the physical plans of ambulatory surgical centers while the other requires doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic. Before these laws went into effect, there were over 40 clinics in Texas where women could secure a safe abortion. If these laws are upheld, the number will be less than 10. Women in West Texas will have to drive over 150 miles to obtain an abortion should the Supreme Court affirm the lower court.

    The legal standard currently in effect for abortion laws is whether they pose an “undue burden” on the right to an abortion. There can be little dispute that these laws do exactly that (in fact that is their very purpose). As the Texas Solicitor General announced shortly after the laws were passed:

    These laws were not enacted solely to advance the State’s interest in maternal health. They were also enacted to advance the State’s interest in promoting and protecting fetal life. A law that is enacted to advance the State’s interest in the life of the unborn need not be medically necessary to survive constitutional challenge.

    Although Texas does argue that both laws further women’s health by making abortion clinics safer and by ensuring doctors have access to a hospital should something go wrong, both rationales are patently absurd. As Judge Posner held in a case striking down the same admitting privileges law in Wisconsin, and as many other folks have pointed out, abortion is a much safer medical procedure than many other outpatient procedures, including colonoscopies and liposuction, yet nether Wisconsin nor Texas requires doctors to have admitting privileges at local hospitals when performing those services.

  • January 21, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Eric J. Segall, the Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law

    Texas’ lawsuit against the Obama administration over its proposed new immigration regulations adds one more important public policy issue to the Court’s term which already has abortion, affirmative action, voting rights, and freedom of speech and religion on its agenda. This battle over immigration policy, however, does not belong in federal court because Texas should not be allowed to turn what is essentially a political controversy between Republicans and Democrats over immigration reform into a federal case.

    The Supreme Court has long required every plaintiff in federal court, including individuals, corporations, and the states, to suffer a personal injury caused by the defendant that can be redressed by the Court. This requirement of injury, known as standing, is a constitutional prerequisite to jurisdiction that cannot be waived by the parties or the Court. The Justices have repeatedly said that standing is necessary to maintain the appropriate separation of powers between unelected, life tenured federal judges and the elected branches of government.

    President Obama’s new immigration regulations, collectively known as DAPA, seek to change the immigration status of approximately four million undocumented aliens who are parents of children who are either legal citizens or legal resident aliens. Texas argues that only Congress has the power to alter the legal status of those immigrants.

    Texas may disagree strongly and sincerely with the President’s policy and/or think such a policy is illegal, but it may only challenge that policy in federal court if it has suffered an injury sufficient to satisfy the Court’s standing doctrine. The primary injury Texas has alleged in this lawsuit is that it will incur increased expenses because, once the regulations go into effect, Texas will feel obliged to provide driver’s licenses at reduced costs to some people with altered immigration status under DAPA. Yet, nothing in DAPA implicates the manner in which Texas provides driver’s licenses to its citizens. The proposed regulations leave all issues relating to Texas driver’s licenses, including their costs, up to Texas.

    Texas also argues that, even though it has the final decision on whether to grant driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries, the need to change or reconsider its current policies gives it sufficient injury to support its lawsuit. Texas also argues that it will incur additional expenses in a host of different ways including “healthcare, law-enforcement, and education costs,” if DAPA goes into effect.

    Texas’ argument fails to support standing because it would allow any state to sue the federal government every time either Congress or the president increases or decreases the number of legal immigrants in this country.  Whenever the federal government changes immigration requirements, both the states’ expenses (in terms of its services) and revenues (through taxes now collected from more legal residents) “may” go up or down. But changes in Texas’ public policy because of those shifts remain completely up to the State of Texas.

    If the states could sue the federal government every time either Congress or the president passes legislation that alters how Texas manages its own public policy due to the number of people lawfully in the state, virtually all federal policy (beyond immigration law) will be transferred from elected officials to federal judges. The very purpose of the standing doctrine is to prevent that transfer of power.

    Texas relies on the Court’s 5-4 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA where the justices allowed Massachusetts to challenge decisions made by the EPA relating to global warming which allegedly harmed the coastline in that state. But, in that case Massachusetts asserted that its own sovereign property was being damaged by allegedly illegal federal policies. In this case, Texas remains sovereign over all of its internal policies and all of its property.

  • June 25, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Eric J. Segall, Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law

    In a debate with Professor Jonathan Adler, one of the architects of the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy in King v. Burwell, in the Pennsylvania Law Review, I began as follows: “Many issues, both constitutional and statutory, that reach the United States Supreme Court raise difficult and complex interpretive and normative questions. . . . The King case, however, is different.”

    It was different, I argued, because Congress explained exactly what would happen if states refused to create their own health insurance exchanges (which 36 states refused to do). In that circumstance, under Section 1321 of the Act, the federal government was required to establish “such exchange,” as the ones established by the states. As the Court today said: “By using the phrase ‘such Exchange,’ [Section 1321] instructs the Secretary to establish and operate the same Exchange that the State was directed to establish.” That kind of exchange quite obviously was authorized by the law to offer federal subsidies, and that is exactly what today’s opinion held.

    If there were any doubts at all about the strength of the legal arguments made by the government and its supporters, Justice Roberts put them to rest by not relying on the Chevron rule of deference that says all reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language should be upheld, but rather by siding with the government as a pure matter of law. Deference was not required, according to the Chief, because this was one of those “extraordinary cases” where Congress is unlikely to have intended that courts defer to agency decisions. This part of the opinion may well prove problematic in the future when courts evaluate agency decisions but today demonstrates that at least six justices of the United States Supreme Court were willing to say that Congress rather clearly and obviously expected federal subsidies to be available on federal as well as state exchanges.

    In addition to the pure legal analysis, the majority opinion also said that “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.”

    This language, while unnecessary to the holding in the case, may be a strong signal from the justices that it will not undo through legal means the Affordable Care Act. There are, after all, a number of challenges to the ACA still pending in the lower courts, including a baseless Origination Clause challenge to the entire law. Maybe, hopefully, the justices are indicating that the fate of the ACA rests in the political arena, not in partisan challenges dressed up as legal cases. At the end of the day, that may be the best news of all.

  • September 2, 2014

    by Caroline Cox

    Eric J. Segall, who spoke at the ACS Supreme Court Review in June, profiles in Salon Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and his rulings on high-profile cases that are likely to be decided by the Supreme Court.

    In The New York Times, Adam Liptak reports that Supreme Court justices are increasingly putting data from amicus briefs into their opinions.

    Robert J. Samuelson argues in The Washington Post that more workers are at the mercy of the market and questions whether this trend will continue.  

    Vanita Gupta argues at CNN that drug laws are too harsh and out of step with public opinion.

    The question of how much oversight the federal government can have over state voter ID laws is up for debate in Texas, reports Laurel Brubaker Calkins for Bloomberg

  • June 26, 2014

    by Jeremy Leaming

    ACS will conduct its annual Supreme Court review tomorrow covering most of the high-profile cases that have come down this term and looking ahead to Monday when more opinions are expected. We are still waiting for opinions in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, regarding the contraception policy of the Affordable Care Act, and Harris v. Quinn, a case involving a First Amendment challenge to union representation of state home care workers.

    The high court today issued opinions in NLRB v. Noel Canning, involving the president’s recess appointments power, and McCullen v.Coakley, centering on a First Amendment challenge to a Massachusetts law creating buffer zones around abortion clinics.

    SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, who will moderate tomorrow’s ACS Supreme Court Review, said of Noel Canning during live-tweeting at SCOTUSblog this morning:

    Here is the upshot of the decision. The President can make a recess appointment without Senate confirmation when the Senate says it is in recess. But either the House or the Senate can take the Senate out of recess and force it to hold a "pro forma session" that will block any recess appointment. So while the President's recess appointment power is broad in theory, if either house of Congress is in the hands of the other party, it can be blocked.

    Eric J. Segall, the Kathy and Lawrence Ashe Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law, also a panelist for tomorrow’s high court review, told ACSblog, “When is a recess not a recess? When it’s less than 10 days. Justices issue a mixed ruling in NLRB v. Noel Canning.”

    Chief Counsel for the Constitutional Accountability Center Elizabeth Wydra in press statement said, “While the Supreme Court voted unanimously to strike down the particular exercise of the Recess Appointments Clause power in the Noel Canning case, more important, the Court – by a sharply divided 5-4 vote – rejected the sweeping arguments made by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its allies.” (Wydra is also scheduled to participate in tomorrow’s ACS Supreme Court Review.)

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled early last year that President Obama’s appointments to the National Labor Relations Board in early 2012 during “pro forma sessions,” where Congress took deliberate steps to shorten the period for the president to make recess appointments. The president took the action noting that the 5-member NLRB could not function with three languishing vacancies.