Daniel Farber

  • July 24, 2017
    Guest Post

    by Daniel Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law & Co-Faculty Director, Center For Law, Energy & The Environment, University of California, Berkeley

    *This is part of ACSblog's Symposium on Regulatory Rollback

    While public attention has been focused on health care legislation, immigration and the Russia scandal, a lot has been happening under the radar in Washington. In numerous government agencies, Trump appointees are working to reverse years of effort by the Obama Administration.

    The EPA is headed by Scott Pruitt, who made his name as Oklahoma Attorney General with a series of lawsuits against the agency. The LA Times calls him “Trump’s most dangerous and adroit hatchetman.” The NY Times reported that Pruitt “has moved to undo, delay or otherwise block more than 30 environmental rules, a regulatory rollback larger in scope than any other over so short a time in the agency’s 47-year history....” The title of the NY Times story was revealing: “Counseled by Industry, Not Staff, E.P.A. Chief is Off to a Blazing Start.” One of his great triumphs was successfully lobbying President Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change.

  • September 14, 2016
    Dear Speaker Ryan and Leader Pelosi:
     
    We, as professors who specialize in constitutional law, write to urge you and your colleagues not to approve the fast-tracked resolution to impeach John Koskinen, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service.
     
    When it comes to impeachment, the Constitution leaves many open and difficult questions. Whether the alleged conduct of John Koskinen is impeachable is not one of them. There is simply no credible case for impeachment.
     
    The Constitution is designed to reserve the impeachment and removal from office for conduct that inflicts the most serious harms on society and that critically compromises the ability of an officer to govern. The Constitution limits the availability of impeachment in two ways. First, the Constitution provides a very limited definition of the scope of impeachment. Second, the Constitution erects significant procedural protections against impeachment and removal from office.
     
    I. The Constitution defines the scope of the impeachment power narrowly.
    An officer is subject to impeachment and removal from office only on the grounds of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” It is true that the phrase “other high crimes and misdemeanors” is open-ended. It is nonetheless clear that the phrase charts a narrow scope. The text explicitly links the phrase – by employing the term “other” – to definite terms treason and bribery. The familiar canon of construction, ejusdem generis, tells us that it is proper to understand the open-ended term as limited to conduct that involves the attributes common to the definite terms. Treason and bribery each involves an immediate and elemental threat to our constitutional system; an officer who commits either of these offenses is indisputably unfit for office. Thus, the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” refers not to any misconduct but to misconduct that harms the nation as seriously as treason or bribery and that renders an officer as indisputably unfit to serve as an officer who commits treason or bribery.