In the groundbreaking case of Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers must inform suspects of their right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, to have an attorney present during questioning, and to have an attorney appointed if they cannot afford one. The Miranda opinion also noted that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."

In the subsequent case of Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed a cognate question: What happens when a police officer reads a suspect a Miranda warning, but still asks questions after the suspect invokes the right to counsel? In Edwards, the Court held that statements made in response to such questioning are inadmissible at trial.

This fall, the Supreme Court will revisit the Miranda-Edwards line of case in Maryland v. Shatzer. Mr. Shatzer, the respondent in this case, was serving a prison sentence on an unrelated crime when a detective first interviewed him. When the detective read Mr. Shatzer his Miranda rights, Mr. Shatzer responded that he wanted an attorney present while the detective asked him questions. The detective wrote in his report, "When I attempted to again initiate the interview, he told me that he would not talk about this case without having an attorney present." The detective then terminated the interview and closed the case. Two years and seven months later, though, a different detective conducted a follow-up investigation. That detective read Mr. Shatzer his Miranda rights and then -- without allowing Mr. Shatzer any access to an attorney -- interrogated him. Mr. Shatzer then confessed that he had committed a crime.

At trial, Mr. Shatzer argued that his confession was inadmissible, because the second detective obtained it in violation of Edwards. But in Edwards, only a day had elapsed between the suspect's invocation of the right to counsel and the second interrogation. In contrast, two years and seven months had elapsed between Mr. Shatzer's invocation of the right to counsel and the second interrogation. Moreover, while the suspect in Edwards was in continuous police custody between the first and second interrogation, Mr. Shatzer was not. Mr. Shatzer, though, was in prison for that entire period.

Mr. Shatzer's Supreme Court case presents two important questions about the application of Edwards. First, is Edwards a bright-line rule that applies regardless of the amount of time that elapses between a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel and any subsequent interrogation? Second, is Edwards a bright-line rule that applies regardless of whether the suspect has been in continuous police custody between the invocation of the right to counsel and any subsequent interrogation?

In its Supreme Court brief, Maryland argues that rather than treat Edwards as a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court should construe as rebuttable the Edwards presumption of coercion:

Excluding a statement made under circumstances where there has been a break in custody and a significant passage of time, followed by an effective Miranda advisement and the suspect's voluntary election to talk with police without counsel present, would expand Edwards beyond its intended purpose. Where, as here, there is no reasonable likelihood of badgering, the Edwards presumption of coercion should terminate.

Not surprisingly, Mr. Shatzer disagrees. In his Supreme Court brief, he argues that a bright-line Edwards rule is easy for police officers, lawyers, and judges to apply. In contrast, permitting reinterrogation after some indeterminate break in time or custody will require police officers, lawyers, and judges to make difficult, case-by-case, fact-specific inquiries that will ultimately lead to arbitrary results:

The bright-line rule of Edwards benefits the courts in that it conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness, and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward terms.

Trial judges called upon to ensure compliance with the requirements of Miranda and Edwards are best served by a bright-line rule. Prior to the decision in Edwards, courts engaged in a case-by-case analysis of whether a waiver of the right to counsel by a person who had previously invoked it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

[Maryland's] approach would require a return to the case-by-case analysis which undermines the benefit of a rule allowing police officers, prosecutors and trial judges to readily determine the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation.

Interestingly, at the end of its Supreme Court brief, Maryland argues -- for the first time -- that the Court should consider overruling Edwards:

Shatzer's interrogation was consistent with Edwards, but if the Court disagrees and concludes that Edwards cannot be read to allow this interrogation, that illogical and untenable result should be rejected and Edwards should be overruled.

The Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Maryland v. Shatzer on Oct. 5, 2009.