In the past week, two important Voting Rights Act decisions have come under fire from conservative commentators. The Voting Rights Act can be expected to stir strong emotions, and strong emotions can be expected to distort reality. But the nature of the recent critique is fun-house-mirror material.

The first decision, Hayden v. Pataki, involved a dissent by Judge Sotomayor, of renewed importance upon her nomination to the Supreme Court. The second decision is the new administration's first objection to VRA preclearance for a statewide legal change, and a notable change in approach after years of controversy in the DOJ's Voting Section.

One of the central figures in that controversy, Hans von Spakovsky, has spoken out on both decisions, with characteristic vigor. First, he castigated Judge Sotomayor for her Hayden dissent, claiming that she "appears to have allowed her views on race to supersede the clear requirement of the law." He asserts that she was, in "duplicitous" fashion, "actually proposing that the courts alter the statute . . . ." Strong words. Which turn reality completely on its head.

Hayden, which I've reviewed before, debated whether the Voting Rights Act (VRA) specially exempted felony disenfranchisement laws from the general rule that electoral provisions are subject to challenge when they have a differential impact on account of race. The decision addressed neither the merits of the VRA claim nor the policy of disenfranchisement. And despite the soundbites, none of Judge Sotomayor's 242 dissenting words suggest that she "would let prisoners vote."

Instead, the dispute concerned interpretation of the VRA's scope. Like all statutory interpretation, that work begins - and usually ends - with the statutory text.

The Voting Rights Act's text refers to all voting qualifications, without exception. Felony disenfranchisement laws disqualify voters. So under the "clear requirement of the law," the next question should have been whether plaintiffs' evidence proved that the laws in question, under the totality of the circumstances, abridged the right to vote on account of race.

The Hayden court never got close to the right question. It instead decided, over several strong dissents, that the statute's text did not mean what it said. According to the court, the VRA covers all voting qualifications ... except one.

Mr. von Spakovsky has it exactly backward: Judge Sotomayor protested the court's decision, unwarranted by any constitutional necessity, to rewrite the text based on irrelevant snippets of legislative history. Her words: "I do not believe that Congress wishes us to disregard the plain language of any statute or to invent exceptions to the statutes it has created." Whether you agree or disagree with her legal conclusion, it is absurd to believe that she is the one contravening clear law for policy purposes. Mr. von Spakovsky doth protest too much, methinks.

Mr. von Spakovsky's topsy-turvy approach to the VRA also drives his second recent critique, concerning section 5 of the Act. In enforcing that provision, the Department of Justice (DOJ) must object to changes in covered states' voting practices, unless the state proves that the proposed change leaves legitimate minority voters no worse off than the status quo.

Mr. von Spakovsky's tenure at Justice featured some controversial enforcement decisions. For example, the Department precleared a restrictive Georgia identification law one day after career staff recommended an objection because the available evidence did not ameliorate concern regarding the law's potential impact on minorities.

This past week, faced with a new Georgia restriction, DOJ demonstrated a different -and commendable - focus on the facts. Georgia's new policy blocks registration of voters flagged by flawed attempts to match voter data to driver's license or Social Security records. The matching process yields thousands of errors, forcing citizens to struggle to correct the state's mistakes. Less-flawed alternatives are available. And - most important for section 5 - Georgia's system disproportionately affects minorities.

Given the available evidence, the Justice Department found that Georgia failed to prove that the new policy did not violate the Voting Rights Act. As required by law, it objected to the change. Mr. von Spakovsky, in turn, objected to the objection: "I just think it is an outrageously stupid decision." The action, he said, "shows how arbitrarily the Voting Rights Act is applied, based on nothing more than the administration in power."

To the extent Mr. von Spakovsky's last observation is accurate, it does not speak well of his DOJ tenure. The new objection might create political turbulence, given the brouhaha over matching programs last fall. Yet it is hardly arbitrary. It is how we should hope that law enforcement - no less than courts - would act. It is the responsible decision, carefully applying a legitimate statute to the presented evidence. It ensures that political views do not supersede the clear requirement of the law. On that standard, at least, it seems we can all agree.