• April 19, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Charles Duan, Director, Patent Reform Project, Public Knowledge

    Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, which will be argued in the Supreme Court on April 25, is fundamentally a case about how technical language is to be understood by those not intimately familiar with that language, namely judges and juries. Of course, in the matter of specialized patent jargon, the question presented in Cuozzo could very well be Exhibit A. That question is: whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office properly applies the broadest reasonable interpretation standard when construing claims during inter partes review. I don’t expect that sentence to be fully comprehensible even to the educated readers of this blog, so let’s break it down to reasonable terms.

    A patent gives a person exclusive rights over an invention, allowing the patent owner to stop others from making, using, selling, or doing other things with the invention. But for the patent to have that function, it must define what things are within the scope of the invention and what things are not. That definition of the scope of the invention (and thus the scope of the exclusive rights) is done in a part of the patent called the “claims.” Each claim is structured as a sentence identifying all the features that must be present for the patent to be infringed. Here’s an example from Cuozzo’s patent:

    10. A speed limit indicator comprising:
    a global positioning system receiver;
    a display controller connected to said global positioning system receiver, wherein said
    display controller adjusts a colored display in response to signals from said global positioning system receiver to continuously update the delineation of which speed readings are in violation of the speed limit at a vehicle's present location; and
    a speedometer integrally attached to said colored display.

    As you can see, this claim is full of terms whose meanings are not immediately apparent. What exactly is a “display controller?” What is supposed to happen when the “display controller adjusts a color display?” And what does it mean for the speedometer to be “integrally attached” to the color display?

  • April 19, 2016

    by Jim Thompson

    The Editorial Board of the Waco Tribune-Herald writes about a recent event hosted by the Baylor Law ACS student chapter, concluding “If Senate Republicans are indeed entitled to block Obama’s quite reasonable pick for the court . . . then the Republican Party should indeed pay the political price for inaction, given politics is the standard they have chosen to employ in governing.”

    Neil Siegel, co-faculty advisor to the Duke Law ACS Student Chapter, writes in The Hill that obstructionist senators “are harming the court without a justification that passes the laugh test.”

    Dahlia Lithwick at Slate provides commentary on yesterday’s oral arguments in United States v. Texas, stating, “Most of Monday’s arguments suggest a court ready to break tidily 4-4 along party lines.”

  • April 18, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Jennifer Hunter, Associate General Counsel, and Elena Medina, Assistant General Counsel, Service Employees International Union

    A recent decision by a trial court in Wisconsin striking down the state’s so-called “Right to Work” law highlights one reason why those laws are unfair to union members: It requires them to pay out of their own pockets for their union’s representation of other people who choose not to pay anything.

    What the decision leaves unstated is the bigger reason why the laws, more aptly called “Right to Work for Less,” are bad for working people in general. The real reason why corporations and wealthy special interests push for these laws in states across the country is not concern for the rights of individual workers. Rather, it is to weaken the ability of ordinary people to join together in unions to build a country in which everyone can make enough to sustain their families.

    In his decision last week, Dane County Circuit Court Judge William Foust struck down Wisconsin’s Act 1, which precludes unions from charging the workers they represent their fair share of the costs of that representation. As the judge pointed out, unions have a duty under federal law to fairly represent all of the workers in the bargaining units that elect them, including by bargaining a contract that benefits all of them and providing union members and non-members alike with representation if they are harmed by a violation of the contract. Judge Foust found that Wisconsin violates the Takings Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution by creating a free-rider situation in which unions are legally required to provide that representation to workers who pay nothing.

    The Honorable Diane Wood of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals observed in another case on the same issue that this inherent conflict is akin to a “rule providing that, as a condition of receiving a business license in a city, a company selling gasoline had to give it away to any customer who did not want to pay.”

  • April 18, 2016

    By Nanya Springer

    Acting on a complaint filed through its web site, the Voting Rights Institute has asked the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate a claim of voter suppression in Alabama. Willie Williams, a Daphne, Ala., resident, says the city reduced polling locations from five to two in heavily black neighborhoods, reports Elizabeth Lauten at Alabama Today.

    In Newsweek, ACS Board member Paul Smith argues the law should respect the religious beliefs of business owners “without disregarding the core interests of employees who have different beliefs.”

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned Vergara v. California late last week, reinstating tenure and other job protections for public school teachers and handing labor unions a major victory, report Howard BlumeJoy Resmovits and Sonali Kohli at the Los Angeles Times.

  • April 15, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law, Penn State Lawauthor of Beyond Deportation: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases (NYU Press 2015).                         

    On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced two deferred action programs. One extends a program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or “DACA.”  The other creates a new policy known as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Legal Residents, or “DAPA.” Despite the fact that deferred action is a longstanding tool in immigration with a rich source of law and history, the state of Texas and 25 other states filed a lawsuit against the Administration to challenge the legality of these programs. The case, United States v. Texas, is the subject of an oral argument at the U.S. Supreme Court on April 18, 2016. The Court will hear arguments on four questions of law. Legal questions over the authority to exercise discretion and whether the plaintiffs have “standing” to bring this challenge have been analyzed extensively by scholars. This article discusses one of those issues – whether the updated DACA and new DAPA directives were legally required to undergo “notice and comment rulemaking” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

    The plaintiff-states have argued that rulemaking is required under the APA. For certain rules, section 553 of the APA requires agencies to engage in formal rulemaking, where the government publishes a notice of the proposed rule and the parties then provide input primarily through the submission of written comments within a specified time period. Recognizing that the government would be unable to function efficiently if all rules required this lengthy and elaborate procedure, section 553 exempts "general statements of policy" from the notice and comment rulemaking requirement. The Supreme Court has held that "general statements of policy" include agencies' announcements as to how they plan to exercise discretionary powers going forward.

    In the memorandum announcing DAPA, the Secretary of Homeland Security explicitly instructed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officers to assess the facts of each individual case and to exercise discretion even in cases where all the threshold criteria – some of which are themselves discretionary – have been met. The challengers argue that this is a pretext and that in practice USCIS officials will be pressured into approving DAPA requests mechanically. To prove this, Texas has relied on the low rate of denials among recipients of an earlier program, DACA 2012.

    This rationale is flawed. First, the DAPA program has discretion built into it as confirmed by the program’s actual requirement that the individual “present no other factors, in the exercise of discretion, that makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate.” Second, DACA requestors are a highly self-selected group. Moreover, the DAPA program has not even begun, so there is no evidence to show that employees are not using discretion, assuming of course the test even rests on the discretion exercised by boots on the ground as opposed to the Secretary of DHS, a point reasonably questioned by scholars. There is no basis for assuming that the DAPA approval rates will mimic those for DACA.