ACSBlog

  • March 21, 2013
    BookTalk
    Unlearning Liberty
    Campus Censorship and the End of American Debate
    By: 
    Greg Lukianoff

    by Greg Lukianoff, an attorney and president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education

    I went to law school with a particular passion in mind: the First Amendment and freedom of speech. Starting at Stanford in 1997, I took virtually every class the law school offered on the First Amendment, completed six additional credits on the origins of the legal theory of “prior restraint” in Tudor England, and worked for the ACLU of Northern California. I was nonetheless unprepared for the kind of censorship I would see on college campuses, first as legal director and then as president of The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education(FIRE).

    My recent book, Unlearning Liberty: Campus Censorship and the End of American Debate, is my attempt to catalog a small fraction of the terrible cases I’ve seen over the last 11 years and to explain why college censorship matters both on and off campus.

    The cases of censorship I have seen over the years run from the absurd to the serious. I have covered these cases in great detail at The Huffington Post, where I’m a regular contributor, and have for the past two years dubbed some of the offenders the “worst colleges for freedom of speech.” On the high-end of the absurd cases are those involving cartoons, one case involving a quote from the beloved yet short-lived science-fiction series, Firefly, and a politically incorrect flyer that made a joke about the freshman 15, all of which I showcased in an article with the tongue-in-cheek name “Top 10 Pics Too Hot for Campus.”

    I open Unlearning Liberty talking about the currently ongoing legal saga that straddles the chasm between absurd and serious. The case involved a student, Hayden Barnes, who protested against his school, Valdosta State University in southern Georgia, for its decision to build two parking garages on campus. He went about protesting the parking garages by contacting the Board of Regents and writing a letter to the editor of the student newspaper.

  • March 21, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Kevin M. Cathcart, Executive Director, Lambda Legal. Cathcart’s piece is a part of Lambda Legal’s blog roundtable, “From Sex to Marriage: How We Got From Lawrence v. Texas to the Cases Against DOMA and Prop. 8.” The roundtable will include commentary from Paul M. Smith, an ACS Board Member, and the attorney who argued Lawrence before the Supreme Court. See ACSblog’s symposium on Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor.

    It might be hard for some to imagine, given the rapid pace of our progress, but as recently as 10 years ago, lesbian and gay Americans in many states were considered criminals in the eyes of the law—simply for having sex with someone of the same gender.

    And the discrimination went far beyond criminal law. Parents were denied custody of their children. Qualified workers were turned down from jobs. Prospective tenants were refused housing. All because of archaic and discriminatory laws that targeted and criminalized same-sex intimacy in 13 states.

    But in 2003, one Supreme Court decision changed everything. After decades of fighting against sodomy laws, Lambda Legal’s historic victory in Lawrence v. Texas opened a new path toward LGBT equality. For the first time, the Court established that lesbian and gay men share the same fundamental right to private intimacy with another adult that heterosexuals have.  

  • March 21, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Gabriel J. Chin, Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law

    This week, the Supreme Court heard argument in Arizona v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, a case at the intersection of two lines of cases which have been prominent on the Court’s docket in recent years. The case is an example of a challenge to Arizona’s apparently endless cornucopia of anti-immigrant legislation. It also tests measures which, according to some conservatives, are designed to preserve the integrity of the ballot box, but according to others are calculated to suppress the minority vote.

    The case involves Arizona’s Proposition 200, passed in 2004, which requires prospective Arizona voters to provide proof of United States citizenship before registration. But the federal National Voter Registration Act of 1993 directed the federal Election Assistance Commission to create a federal form for voter registration (current version here). That form requires applicants to provide a date of birth and other identifying information, and an oath that the applicant is a citizen, but does not require independent documentary proof of citizenship.  Federal law requires states to “accept and use” the federal form. The critical question is whether “accept and use” means that a properly completed form is sufficient for voter registration unless the state independently proves that it is fraudulent, or, rather, that the form is the beginning of an application process during which the state may freely add supplemental requirements and inquiries.

    A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which included retired Justice O’Connor, invalidated Prop. 200’s proof-of-citizenship requirement, over a dissent by Chief Judge Kozinski. En banc, the Ninth Circuit held 9-2 that the requirement was invalid, this time with Chief Judge Kozinski in the majority. Both the panel and the court en banc Circuit upheld a separate provision of Prop. 200, requiring registered voters to show identification at the polls.

    It is common ground that the federal government has broad power over federal elections.  As the Brennan Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center wrote in a brief for me and other constitutional law scholars, under the Elections Clause (Article I, Section 4), Congress may regulate federal elections and supersede state electoral laws. The Framers recognized the national implications of state electoral improprieties, and granted the national government the power to protect itself.  Neither Arizona nor any of the justices questioned the century of precedents to this effect. Instead, the case seemed to turn on the intent of Congress.

  • March 20, 2013

    by Jeremy Leaming

    While the Obama administration has justifiably been knocked for its secretive and deadly use of Reaper and Predator drones to kill suspected terrorists overseas, the private and public use of drones here at home is in need of some serious discussion say groups and individuals concerned about eroding privacy rights.

    During a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing today a law professor and Amie Stepanovich of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (epic.org) urged lawmakers to revamp the nation’s privacy laws to ensure that public and private use of drones do not shred what privacy rights we have left.

    Ryan Calo, assistant professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law, told the committee that citizens have good reason to be concerned about the increasing use of drones for an array of purposes. During his testimony, Calo reiterated the need for the nation to update laws to protect privacy – technology is fast outpacing laws protecting privacy.

    “Drones have a lot of people worried about privacy – and for good reason,” Calo told the Senate committee. “Drones drive down the cost of aerial surveillance to worrisome levels. Unlike fixed cameras, drones need not rely on public infrastructure or private partnerships. And they can be equipped not only with video cameras and microphones, but also the capability to sense heat patterns, chemical signatures, or the presence of a concealed firearm.

    “American privacy law,” he continued, “meanwhile, places few limits on aerial surveillance. We enjoy next to no reasonable expectation of privacy in public, or from a public vantage like the nation’s airways. The Supreme Court has made it clear through a series of decisions in the nineteen-eighties that there is no search for Fourth Amendment purposes if an airplane or helicopter permits officers to peer into your backyard. I see no reason why these precedents would not extend readily to drones.” See Calo’s written testimony here.    

    The drones discussed at today’s hearing are not like the types employed overseas in ongoing counterterrorism operations.  (A subcommittee led by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) will explore the drone war and its intersection with constitutional rights in April.) The drones are much, much smaller and have been used for police surveillance and by public safety agencies to assess damages from storms, study hurricanes, tornados and flooding for example. Many of those drones weigh mere pounds and are operated in a limited fashion. Michael Toscano, president & CEO of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), told the committee that the industry does not support “weaponization” of civil drones. (He also informed the lawmakers that the industry does not refer to the technology as drones, they may be pilotless, but they are operated by humans from nearby control centers. (Sen. Leahy said he and others on the committee would refer to drones as drones regardless of what the industry dubs them.)

     

  • March 20, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Anthony S. Winer, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota. This post is part of an ACSblog symposium on Hollingsworth v. Perry and U.S. v. Windsor.

    As most readers realize, the Supreme Court asked all parties in both of the upcoming marriage cases to brief and argue issues of standing. The possibility that either or both of the cases could be dismissed on the basis of a lack of Article III standing should therefore be taken seriously. 

    In particular, regarding the Prop 8 case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, I have given some thought to a 2011 opinion of the California Supreme Court that specifically addressed the standing of the Prop 8 proponents.   The Prop 8 proponents emphasize this California opinion in defending their standing before the U.S. Supreme Court. However, in this posting I assert that the U.S. Supreme Court should not give any substantial weight to the California Supreme Court’s opinion.

    To start with, I’ll say that dismissal for lack of standing in either or both of the cases could have at least a modestly positive result for same-sex marriage rights. A lack of standing in either case would be attributed to the litigants petitioning the Court in opposition to same-sex marriage.  Failure of standing would thus go against the opponents of same-sex marriage. Contrarily, any such dismissal is most likely to favor, at least to some extent, the litigants who are advancing same sex-marriage. For those of us supporting same-sex marriage rights, that would most likely be a positive development. 

    By the same token, however, any such dismissal would also probably result in a relatively narrow ruling with relatively limited effects. That is, in the Prop 8 case, dismissal for the proponents’ lack of standing could result in the reinstatement of the District Court’s determination that Prop 8 is unconstitutional. But such a result would not necessarily affect the constitutionality of similar propositions adopted in other states.