All in all, 46 recommendations were offered, among them the private, non-governmental retention of all personal communications data, accessible only through individualized court orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC); the first-ever appointment of a “public interest advocate” to argue on behalf of civil liberties and privacy concerns before the FISC, which currently has no adversarial process; the ceasing of “back door” access points in hardware or software; and the incorporation of privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens.
Also of note was the enumeration of guiding principles. For example, the panel endorsed a dual understanding of “security” – national security, on the one hand, and Fourth Amendment personal security on the other. The report also said the idea of “balancing” these two interests has “an important element of truth” but is “inadequate and misleading”:
[S]ome safeguards are not subject to balancing at all. In a free society, public officials should never engage in surveillance in order to punish their political enemies; to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress legitimate criticism and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit or burden members of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, and gender.
The panel also endorsed a “broad principle for the future: as a general rule and without senior policy review, the government should not be permitted to collect and store mass, undigested, non-public personal information about US persons for the purpose of enabling future queries and data-mining for foreign intelligence purposes.”
by Erin Kesler, Communications Specialist at the Center for Progressive Reform
Climate change and pollution affects everyone. Global warming-induced hurricanes pummel our coasts and droughts ravage our farmland. Our neighbors, friends, and children develop asthma and heart attacks because of air pollution and our favorite parks and hunting grounds are withering away.
The science is conclusive and polls reflect the concern of many Americans about global warming and its related pollution. So what can account for the lack of government action on the issue? The answer has a lot to do with our broken campaign finance system and the ability of individuals committed to denying the existence of climate change to dump huge amounts of money (much of it secret) into elections and in the political process.
During the 2012 election, outside spending groups, many of them newly created in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, reported spending more than $1.28 billion to influence voters and politicians. Of the amount disclosed, just 132 individuals who contributed over $1 million each were responsible for the bulk of Super PAC spending. Significant amounts were dumped into the campaign coffers of members of Congress by regulated industries that have taken an active role in opposing any new efforts by the President to move forward on greenhouse gas regulations.
In addition, veins of secret money whistled their way through the campaign to the tune of over $300 million. Financial juggernauts of vague origin “donated” even more money to still more groups organized under the section of the tax code reserved for nonprofits and trade associations and continue to spend and influence policy debates and elections throughout the country, with a particular focus against environmental protection and anti-pollution measures.
As the end of 2013 quickly approaches, Senate leaders are working to move as many judicial nominations as possible before recess. However, some Senators continue to obstruct progress at every opportunity, slowing the pace of confirmations.
Brian Davis was confirmed to the Middle District of Florida on December 20, and is the only nominee to be confirmed since our last update. There has been speculation about a possible deal that will allow some nominees to be confirmed, or allow all nominees to be held over into the New Year, thereby avoiding the nominees being sent back to the White House. If sent back, they will need to be re-nominated by President Obama in January.
It seems most likely that nominees currently pending on the Senate floor, including Robert Wilkins for the D.C. Circuit, will not receive votes until the Senate returns in January.
Obstruction continues at the Judiciary Committee level, too. On Wednesday, December 18 five nominees were scheduled for a committee hearing. Minority members of the Committee invoked the two-hour rule, causing the hearing to be delayed until Thursday. Also on Thursday, December 19, the Committee was poised to vote on 15 nominees. Prior to the Committee meeting Senator Leahy (D-Vt.) issued a statement stressing the importance of reporting these nominees out of Committee before recess. Senator Grassley (R-Iowa), however, requested that the nominees be held over, as is often the case when nominees appear before the Committee for the first time for a vote. Senator Leahy acquiesced, but noted that all of these nominees had been scheduled for votes more than once before, but the Committee had not had quorum to vote.
The pending case of Harris v. Quinn may turn out to be a case that proves the axiom “Be careful what you wish for.” Harris has the potential to knock out one of the pillars under the carefully balanced labor law system in the United States. If it does so, the long term impact is uncertain.
Under long-established private sector law, largely adopted in many public sector labor law regimes as well, unions are selected by a majority of the employees and then required to represent all employees in the bargaining unit regardless of membership. Except in right to work states, employees thus represented can then be required to pay the cost of representation, although not the cost of any political or other activity engaged in by the union. The Supreme Court found this balanced system passed muster under the First Amendment in both the private sector and the public sector.
The system of exclusive representation serves the interest of labor peace, avoiding competing unions jockeying to outdo one another in obtaining benefits and continual negotiations by employers with a variety of unions each representing their own members. While this system requires some employees to accept and fund representation that they do not prefer, so does our political system in which representatives are also chosen by majority vote.
In our political system, we can campaign for our preferred representatives for the next election and try to influence our existing representatives. So too can employees try to convince a majority of their fellow employees to remove the union or choose a different union through a statutory election process. They can also try to influence the union by lobbying the union’s officials or campaigning for different leadership in government-mandated internal elections. If they choose to be union members they can vote for the union’s officers or run for union office themselves. Government employees can even communicate to their government employer their views in direct opposition to the union’s collective bargaining positions.
I was in a labor union and have been on strike; I happily paid my dues to Local 2325 of the UAW because I thought my brothers and sisters greatly benefitted from collective bargaining. But that is just my opinion, and no group of workers must be represented by a union unless a majority agrees, and no individual worker need join a union at all. But those who decline to become a member of a union that a majority of their fellow workers chose often must pay an agency fee, to reimburse the union for benefits which accrue to all.
That’s essentially the issue in Harris v. Quinn, which Kent Greenfield has already aptly described as a potential sleeper on the Supreme Court’s docket: Are workers’ First Amendment rights impaired, not by being forced to join a union (which they are not) but by being forced to pay for collective bargaining (which they are)? The Court could use the case to limit the ability of government workers to unionize, to eliminate any required payment of agency fees by non-members benefitting from the contract, or undermine the principle, embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, of exclusive representation by a single union. All of these would be unfortunate, and would require repudiation of a line of Supreme Court decisions dating to the unanimous Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), which found no problem in a federal law allowing negotiation of contracts requiring all covered workers to pay union dues, rejecting dissenting workers’ claims that mandatory payment of dues compelled "ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights."
Harris involves home health care aides provided by the state of Illinois to certain ill people through Medicaid. The case is maddening in a number of ways. The plaintiffs—represented by, among others, former Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal—insist that the workers at issue cannot be considered government employees, even though they get paychecks and health benefits from the state, must meet qualifications set by state regulations, and perform duties as required by those regulations and by individual social service supervisors. Although the aides are “hired” and “fired” by the individual patients they serve, that is only so because the state in its generosity has delegated that authority. The patients, who pay nothing both because of the rules of the program and because they are indigent, are not in any ordinary sense “employers.”