U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit

  • April 11, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    When Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith asked the Department of Justice for a three-page single-spaced memo defending its support for the long-established principle of judicial review, Attorney General Eric Holder did what was asked and responded.

    He refrained from pointing out, as Jeffrey Toobin did, that Smith’s behavior during the hearing on a challenge to the Affordable Care Act was a “disgrace,” or as Orin Kerr did, that it was “highly inappropriate” for Smith to ask the DOJ to defend political comments by President Obama about the Supreme Court’s review of the health care law totally outside of the scope of the record in the case.

    But in his dreams [and in The American Prospect], constitutional law professor Garrett Epps envisions a different kind of letter Holder might have sent, in which he refuses to respond on the basis that the Fifth Circuit has absolutely no jurisdiction in this case over the President of the United States:

    Dear Judge Smith,

    … This letter is a truthful response to this court's order and the issues of jurisdiction and judicial ethics it raised. Because it is truthful, it will never be filed with any court. Nonetheless, I will take this imaginary opportunity to state that the proper response to your order is a regretful refusal to comply on the grounds that it was made in excess of your jurisdiction, that it raises serious issues about your fitness to serve the United States in a position of honor and trust, and that it tends to bring discredit on the federal judiciary.

    Epps goes on to explain that the very same decision that established judicial review, Marbury v. Madison, also established that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and any attempt to go outside that jurisdiction deprives them of their power.

    While presidents are political actors who have criticized the courts since Thomas Jefferson, judges are expected not to act as naked partisans, he explains.

    He continues:

  • February 24, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Emily Martin, vice president and general counsel at the National Women’s Law Center. This commentary is cross-posted at NWLC's blog. 


    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, a challenge to the affirmative action plan used by the University of Texas at Austin. Currently, the university allocates over 80 percent of its slots to students who graduate in the top ten percent of their public high school. For the final 20 percent, the university considers many factors, including grades, a personal essay, character, special talents, socio-economic circumstances, and race. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held last year in upholding the constitutionality of the plan, UT-Austin carefully crafted its plan to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, which held that consideration of race in public university admissions could properly forward the compelling interest in diversity in education.

    One of the great promises of public education, at every level, is its potential to create a student body drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives, enhancing the educational experience of all students. As the Supreme Court recognized in Grutter, “Numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”

    Racial diversity within schools breaks down stereotypes that feed and perpetuate inequality. This is particularly important for women because many of the most poisonous racial stereotypes are also gender stereotypes — for example, that black women are promiscuous, that Asian women are subservient, or that Latina women are domestics. Membership within a diverse student body challenges gender stereotypes that harm women (and men) of color: when a student’s classrooms are full of numerous exceptions to every stereotypical rule, the rules lose their power to define people for that student. Moreover, racial diversity may also help break down gender stereotypes more broadly. Studies indicate that diverse schools encourage students to reject stereotypes in general, and to view individuals as individuals, rather than as representatives of particular group characteristics.

  • April 28, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Emily Hecht-McGowan, Director of Public Policy, Family Equality Council


    In a stunning reversal of both the district and appellate court rulings in Adar v Smith, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit sitting en banc found that the refusal of the Louisiana state registrar to issue an amended birth certificate to a child adopted by a gay couple did not violate the Full Faith and Credit clause of the U.S. Constitution.

    Parents Oren Adar and Mickey Smith’s (no relation to the state registrar also named Smith) child was born in Louisiana and adopted jointly by the two men in New York. Although Louisiana state law requires the registrar to issue a new birth certificate upon receipt of a valid adoption decree, the registrar refused to do so in this case on the ground that Louisiana state law prohibits adoption by unmarried couples. Adar and Smith sued under both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  The federal district court agreed with plaintiffs’ Full Faith and Credit argument, and ordered the registrar to issue a new birth certificate identifying both men as the child’s parents. A panel of the 5th Circuit affirmed. Louisiana then sought en banc review by the full 5th Circuit, and in a divided decision with a vigorous dissent written by Judge Weiner, the en banc Court reversed and ordered that Adar and Smith’s complaint be dismissed. 

    With respect to plaintiffs’ Full Faith and Credit claim, the Court noted that the state “is bound by the New York adoption decree, such that the parental relationship of Adar and Smith with Infant J cannot be re-litigated in Louisiana.”  The Court nevertheless concluded that Louisiana’s failure to issue a new birth certificate reflecting that adoption did not deny recognition of the New York adoption.  Although the Court emphasized that the adoption’s validity could not be contested in a Louisiana court, same-sex couples who jointly adopt children born in Louisiana will find these statements of very little comfort in light of the practical effects of this decision.  Specifically, by permitting the state registrar to refuse to issue a new birth certificate on the ground that the adoption decree entered by N.Y. would not have been permissible under Louisiana law, the Court has essentially given permission for any entity other than a court to refuse recognition of any out-of-state adoption decree for any purpose.  There is no legitimate state interest in refusing to issue a birth certificate that accurately reflects the established legal relationship between a child and the child’s parents. The clear objective here is to attempt to delegitimize an adoption by a gay couple and to stigmatize an innocent child.