Transparency

  • December 17, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Meredith Fuchs. Ms. Fuchs is the General Counsel of the National Security Archive, a private, non-governmental research institution located at George Washington University. A recent discussion on NPR's "Morning Edition" with Ms. Fuchs about the Obama Administration's transparency policies is available here.
    Last week Peter Orzag, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), issued a long awaited Open Government Directive (OGD). The OGD came nearly eleven months after it was requested by President Obama in his January 21, 2009, Presidential Memorandum on Transparency. The OGD was accompanied by a list of commitments by Cabinet Departments to make data more accessible from major federal departments. At least a couple of these already have been viewed as not being anything new or not being anything too substantial.

    The Open Government Directive sets an ambitious schedule (my summary) for agencies to identify high-value data sets, create open government web pages, and issue Open Government Plans. The Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and other agencies issued news releases about their initial efforts pursuant to the Directive. The OGD also directs a policy review to see whether laws and policies impede transparency and the use of modern technology for openness and citizen engagement. The goal of all this effort is to accomplish President Obama's promise of "creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government."

    On the one hand, the OGD is clearly ambitious. By asking agencies to identify and proactively make records publicly available without waiting for a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the Directive is trying to change the paradigm for government openness.

    On the other hand, unlike the FOIA, there is no enforcement mechanism. The FOIA, of course, permits citizens to freely bring legal actions to wrest records from government agencies. In fact, the FOIA even includes a fee-shifting provision to encourage private enforcement. The OGD, however, does not have either citizen recourse or official government enforcement built in. There is no private right of action, and there are no consequences for failure by agencies. We have seen in the past, such as when President Bush ordered agencies to prepare FOIA improvement plans, that some agencies will take it seriously and develop good plans for improvement. But, several agencies issued FOIA improvement plans that showed little grasp of their own problems and lacked any ambition to improve their FOIA programs.

    In this regard, it will be critical for public interest organizations and members of the public to read and comment on the Open Government Plans. Many agencies are likely to launch public engagement initiatives aimed at soliciting public comment. Where these processes are taken seriously, there may be a chance to have a real impact on what comes out of agencies. In particular, agencies are required to identify high-value data sets for online publication. The definition of what is of high value is quite vague, but it seems like it should be information that the public either really wants or helps the public gain insight into the agencies' activities.

  • July 31, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Sudha Setty, Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Professor Setty is the author of a recently released ACS Issue Brief, "National Security Without Secret Laws: How Other Nations Balance National Security Interests and Transparency of Law."

    A fundamental tenet of the rule of law is that a state has no secret laws. Yet in the post-September 11, 2001 era, the Bush administration maintained secret legal policies governing parts of the "war on terror" that implicated human rights and civil liberties issues. Some of these then-secret legal policies-such as the 2002 and 2003 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda sanctioning torture during the interrogation of suspected terrorists-staked out positions at odds with legislation, treaties and court decisions. Both the substance of these memoranda and the secrecy surrounding them were rightly criticized by many scholars and activists-notably including Dawn Johnsen, President Obama's nominee to head up the Office of Legal Counsel.

    But is disclosure and transparency really feasible when we're talking about counterterrorism, or do we undermine our national security programs in an effort to adhere to the rule of law? The Bush administration defended its extreme lack of disclosure by claiming that various legal policies, including the OLC memoranda, would, if disclosed, assist the cause of those plotting terrorist acts against the United States. In my recently released Issue Brief, I reject this particular defense of secrecy based, in part, on the fact that other nations facing serious national security issues-I consider India, Israel and the United Kingdom-do not resort to the creation of bodies of secret law to provide legal comfort for their counterterrorism operations.

    The substance of India's antiterrorism policies is often harsher than what has been (thus far) established in the United States-for example, antiterrorism laws allow for lengthy preventive detention and the denial of substantial access to counsel before trial. However, the process by which Indian antiterrorism legal policy is developed is relatively transparent. Repeatedly, the question of how to frame a long-term legislative response to terrorism has been referred to the Indian Law Commission, a nonpartisan commission of respected lawyers and jurists who respond to government requests for legal recommendations. The Law Commission circulates its reports and recommendations to the public and distributes reports to government officials for review, comments and, ultimately, debate in Parliament.

  • July 24, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Nate Cardozo, Open Government Legal Fellow, Electronic Frontier Foundation

    This week, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed suit to compel the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency and other members of the intelligence community to turn over documents detailing their concerns about their own misdeeds. We sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a law that allows anyone to request information about the federal government's activities. President Obama has called the FOIA "the most prominent expression of a profound national commitment to ensuring an open Government."

    The documents we're seeking involve reports to the little-known Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), which was created within the Executive Office of the President in the aftermath of Watergate. Until last year, the board was the primary body within the executive branch providing accountability for the intelligence community. Every intelligence agency was required by executive order to send the IOB quarterly reports of "any intelligence activities of their organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." The IOB reviewed and summarized this information for the President, and forwarded reports of misconduct that it believed violated the law to the Attorney General for prosecution. With few exceptions, reports to the IOB have not been made public.

    In February, 2008, President Bush issued a controversial executive order undercutting the IOB's oversight role, shifting much of the board's responsibility to the newly created Director of National Intelligence (DNI). While the IOB still receives reports of the intelligence community's questionable activity, it no longer has the authority to refer those reports to the Attorney General for prosecution. That job that now falls to the DNI. Intelligence agencies do not have to file reports with the IOB or the DNI quarterly, but rather when "appropriate."