Thurgood Marshall

  • December 20, 2012
    BookTalk
    Brandishing the First Amendment
    Commercial Expression in America
    By: 
    Tamara R. Piety

    by Professor Tamara R. Piety, Associate Dean of Faculty Development and Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law


     

    The Supreme Court has been very active on the First Amendment in the last few years. In 2010 it issued Citizens United, a controversial and unpopular decision which announced a robust vision of the role of corporate personhood. According to the New York Times, “[t]he First Amendment dominated” the 2011 term as well when the Court decided, among other cases, Brown v. Entertainment Merchantsa decision striking downa California statute which attempted to restrict the sale of violent videos to children, and Sorrell v. IMS Health, a decision striking down a Vermont statute which attempted to limit the sale of physician prescriber information for marketing purposes without the doctor’s permission on First Amendment grounds.  These cases, and others, taken together reflect a distinct trend, in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, toward greater protection for commercial speech. This trend is the subject my new book, Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial Expression in America (U.  of Michigan Press, 2012). In Brandishing the First Amendment I discuss the way in which increased First Amendment protection for commercial speech has provided the intellectual foundation for increased protection for corporate political speech, which has, in turn been then used to argue for greater protection for commercial speech, thereby turning the First Amendment into a sort of all-purpose weapon against a variety of governmental regulations.            

    This is a troubling development because it is difficult to meaningfully and effectively regulate commerce if you cannot regulate commercial speech. This new and robust commercial speech doctrine threatens to undermine a good deal of the basic regulatory regime legitimized since the New Deal.In Brandishing the First Amendment I look at the various theories that have been offered for why we might want to protect freedom of expression, using as a starting point the work of the late Yale law professor

    Thomas Emerson, in particular his book Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, and conclude that none of interests that freedom of expression is meant to protect are particularly advanced, if at all, by protecting commercial speech.  To the contrary, I argue there is good reason to suppose that offering robust protection to commercial speech may well undermine the very interests the protection for freedom of expression is thought to advance.

    In Brandishing the First Amendment I draw on work in marketing research, psychology, behavioral economics, and professional and academic work in marketing and public relations to explore marketing practices and how they work and how marketers,  driven by the imperatives of the market, may engage in promotional practices that are contrary to the public health and welfare. I also explore the attributes of corporate “personhood” as dictated by principles of corporate law and argue that an examination of all of these elements suggests that full First Amendment protection for commercial expression is likely to exacerbate many of the pressing social problems of our times, from changing consumption patterns to ameliorate global climate change to protecting the public from unsafe pharmaceutical drugs; from reining in unsafe promotional practices in the consumer credit market to regulating the sale of securities.  Those interested in the interaction of the First Amendment, commerce, commercialism, and corporate influence in modern life will want to read this book.

  • July 1, 2010
    Faced with what appears to be a centrist, pragmatic jurist in the nominee of Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court, conservatives on the Senate Judiciary Committee found a way to sneak race into the confirmation process, writes University of Maryland Law School professor Sherrilyn A. Ifill in an article for The Root.

    Since those senators - Jon Kyle, Jeff Sessions and John Cornyn - don't have the nominee they'd hoped for, "the kind of nominee they wish President Obama had nominated - one who was black and unabashedly liberal," they sought a means to dragging a divisive cultural debate into the forum by turning to Kagan's "association" with the Civil Rights icon Thurgood Marshall.

    In "Trashing Thurgood Marshall," Ifill notes, like a growing number of commentators, that the Republican's attacks on the legacy of a Civil Rights champion (Marshall pictured with Kagan in 1988) are "a new low," and a "sucker-punch" on the first day of the hearings, one that is spurring backlash.

    Ifill writes:

    Race, class and culture divisions are themes that some Republican senators turn to again and again at confirmation hearings. They do this by invoking the specter of out-of-touch elites, unqualified racial minorities, the dangers of international law and equal rights for gays and lesbians.

    And so it was attack by association. Kagan's work as Thurgood Marshall's law clerk after she graduated for Harvard Law seemed too good an opportunity for some Republicans on the committee to pass up. Invoking Justice Marshall as an activist gave the Republicans on the committee the chance to criticize the kind of nominee they wish President Obama had nominated - one who was black and unabashedly liberal. The fact that President Obama chose not to appoint such a nominee (precisely to deny Republicans the opportunity to paralyze the country with divisive and unproductive hearings) was of no importance. Elena Kagan was, in essence, raced by the committee members, who used Justice Marshall as a racial stand-in for President Obama and a proxy in the ongoing culture wars.

    Outside the Senate Judiciary hearing room, Justice Marshall is regarded as one of the greatest lawyers and most admired judges of the 20th century, so the way the Republicans talked about him -- as a dangerous judicial activist "outside the mainstream" -- was pure theater. Marshall was an unabashed liberal at a time when that word was simply a place on the ideological spectrum, not an indictment. Indeed Marshall's place on the legal spectrum is well within the mainstream of legal thought -- so much so that he was confirmed by a vote of 69-11 for a seat on the Court. In 1967.

    But Marshall's legacy stands up to the Republicans' personal attacks, Ifill continues. His legacy includes a long list of principled stances, fights and heroic struggles that built a better nation, albeit one with much progress to be made. Marshall eloquently argued the unconstitutionality of the death penalty, and gave us the resounding statement in favor of privacy rights - "if the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels as the thought of giving the government the power to control men's minds."

    Ifill's entire article is available here.

  • June 30, 2010
    A group of Republican Senate Judiciary Committee members, as noted in this blog post, attacked the work of Thurgood Marshall, the former Supreme Court justice and towering civil rights leader during the opening day of the Elena Kagan Supreme Court confirmation hearings. The senators' broadsides of Marshall continue to draw sharp rebuttals.

    As noted by The New York Times, "Justice Thurgood Marshall, who as a lawyer argued the Brown case [Brown v. Board Education, which invalidated segregation in schools], has emerged as a dominant figure in the hearings. Ms. Kagan clerked for him, and Republicans, led by Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, have attacked Justice Marshall as a liberal ‘activist' and expressed concerns about Ms. Kagan's association with him."

    In a column for The Washington Post, Stephanie J. Jones knocks Sens. Kyl, Jeff Sessions and John Cornyn for their over-the-top and wildly unfair remarks.

    Jones, the former executive director of the National Urban League Policy Institute and a former chief Senate Judiciary Committee counsel, writes:

    Let me put it plainly, senators: Far from being the out-of-the mainstream caricature you seek to create, Thurgood Marshall deserves your unyielding gratitude and respect. Among other things, he saved this nation from a second civil war.

    ...

    Marshall stood up for the rights of millions of ordinary Americans who, were it not for him, would have continued to be second-class citizens, unable to vote, attend state universities or share public accommodations by virtue of the color of their skin. This would have been a very different nation - had it even survived.

  • March 11, 2010
    BookTalk
    Property Outlaws
    How Squatters, Pirates and Protesters Improve the Law of Ownership
    By: 
    Sonia Katyal & Eduardo M. Peñalver

    By Sonia Katyal, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School

    Fifty years ago, on Monday, February 1, 1960, Ezell Blair, Jr., Franklin McCain, Joe McNeil, and David Richmond, all freshmen at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical University, walked into the cafeteria at the Woolworth's Store in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina. They sat down at the counter and quietly waited for service. They received none. Blair, McCain, McNeil, and Richmond were black, and Woolworth's, although not required to do so by law, followed the local "custom" of refusing to allow its black patrons to eat at its lunch counter. Though they received no service, the four men sat quietly and without incident. When the store closed at 5:30, they left. The next morning, the four young men returned, along with sixteen other students from North Carolina A&T. By Thursday morning, the ranks of the sit-in participants had swelled to over sixty. Within a month, similar sit-in protests were occurring at department stores throughout the South. The fight for civil rights would never be the same.

    What had been, as one contemporary put it, a civil rights movement dominated by lawyers working quietly in courtrooms had become a mass phenomenon. The student-led sit-ins thrust the civil rights question to the forefront of the 1960 presidential elections, and there is a direct line between the students' activism and the passage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That landmark law, which prohibits racial discrimination in most privately-owned businesses, radically transformed rights of private ownership in the United States and has become one of our most successful civil rights statutes.

    It's easy, in hindsight, to downplay the controversy that surrounded the students' tactics, but, at the time, the Greensboro protesters were maligned from all sides as threatening sacred rights of private property and the rule of law in pursuit of what many commentators considered to be a trivial interest in access to lunch counter service. Such criticism did not come just from conservatives and segregationists. According to one account, when Thurgood Marshall heard about the sit-ins, he proclaimed that "he was not going to represent a bunch of crazy colored students who violated the sacred property rights of white folks by going into their stores or lunch counters and refusing to leave when ordered to do so."

    Whether the Greensboro students knew it or not, in violating property rights as they did, they tapped into a long tradition within the history of Anglo-American property law. For as long as there has been private ownership, it seems, there have been groups who have sought to challenge the prerogatives of ownership in search of a more just social order. Sometimes these movements have succeeded. More often, they have not. But the pervasive influence of these property outlaw tactics on the development of American property doctrine cannot be denied. In Property Outlaws, we explore the sit-in episode (along with scores of other examples of property lawbreaking) to try to extract broader lessons about the interaction between disobedience and ownership.

  • July 13, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Walter J. Kendall III, Professor, The John Marshall Law School

    Watching the early initial statements from the Senators, especially the reaction of Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) to the character trait of empathy, reminded me of several statements of Justice Thurgood Marshall.

    • "[I]t is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live." U.S. v. Kras, 409 US 434.
    • In another opinion, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 US 450, he characterized the factual findings of the majority as "callous indifference to the realities of life for the poor."
    • In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, the majority characterized some questioning by the police as "conversation." Justice Marshall argued it was better characterized as an "interrogation."

    In other words "empathy" understood as the ability to stand in another person's shoes, as the saying goes, is not fairly considered bias towards one party or the other, as Sen. Sessions sees it; rather it is the ability to, or at least the effort to, understand the factual reality, the lived experience of both parties, before the Court. It is an effort to understand the social political-economic problem the Court is being asked to address.