Supreme Court

  • July 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Justin Pidot, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law

    In its last decision of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA, ruling that EPA must consider costs before deciding to regulate toxic air pollutants from power plants.  Lisa Heinzerling has identified the many questions that remain open in the wake of the Court’s decision.  And Dan Farber and Ann Carlson also provide insightful commentary on the meaning of the decision. As all three suggest, the lasting practical effect of the Court’s decision on mercury and other toxic emissions from power plants remains to be seen.

    Without retreading ground that has been well-covered already, I want to offer two observations.  First, I want to offer some (very cautious) optimism that the legal rule provided by the Michigan v. EPA decision has little effect.  Read broadly, the decision could require agencies in many contexts to consider costs before regulating.  I’m not convinced, however, that the decision necessarily tells us anything about when agencies must consider costs. 

    The Court offers several reasons that EPA unreasonably interpreted its authority to regulate power plants without accounting for the billions of dollars of costs such regulation might impose: 

    First, the Court explains that the toxic air pollution provisions of § 112 of the Clean Air Act differentiate between power plants and other stationary sources.  For sources other than power plants, the Act essentially allows EPA to consider, at most, health and environmental effects.  In contrast, the Act requires EPA to regulate power plants only if “necessary and appropriate.”  This contrast, the Court offers, must mean something.

    Second, the Court opines that appropriate regulation generally requires an agency to think about both the benefits of regulation and its cots.  This suggests, that could be read to presumptively require agencies to consider costs in making regulatory decisions. 

  • June 30, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Sam Kleiner, a fellow at the Yale Law Information Society Project 

    With his landmark opinion in Obergefell v Hodges, Justice Anthony Kennedy cemented his legacy as a gay rights icon. “He will be remembered for these decisions perhaps more than any other,” said Camilla Taylor, counsel and director of Lambda Legal’s marriage project. What makes this all the more remarkable, is that Justice Kennedy wasn’t supposed to be a justice at all. He was Reagan’s more conciliatory choice, the one who was “popular with colleagues of all political persuasions,” after the failed nomination of the far more right-wing Robert Bork.

    The effort against Bork has been immortalized in Senator Edward Kennedy’s speech on “Robert Bork’s America.” "To Bork" has entered the American lexicon as a hyperbolic attack on a good person.

    The reality, however, is that Bork was outside the legal mainstream. Whereas Senator Kennedy led an effort to skewer Bork, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee led a far more substantive critique of Bork’s extremism that proved pivotal in the fight over the nomination. That senator was Joseph Biden.

    Bork was nominated with impeccable credentials- a professor at Yale Law School and a Judge on the D.C. Circuit court of appeals. The Senate had traditionally questioned the qualifications of a nominee but an inquiry into their judicial philosophy had not been done in a full-throated manner. Bork, however, had built his academic career disparaging an array of civil rights cases and Biden thought it was necessary to dig in on what exactly this nominee’s views of the Constitution were and what he would do on the Court.

    While others wanted Biden to go after Bork’s personal life, he took the higher road. “When confronted with a request to subpoena Judge Bork’s video rental records in a search for possible pornography, Mr. Biden refused,” noted Jeff Rosen (then a Biden intern).

    Instead, Biden went into an in-depth hearing on Bork’s understanding of the Constitution. Biden, as Rosen noted, focused the “questioning on Judge Bork’s substantive views about the right to privacy." In 1965, the Court in Griswold had ruled that a law banning the use of contraceptives by a married couple was unconstitutional as a violation of the “right to marital privacy.” Professor Bork had built his career criticizing decisions like Griswold and Biden used the hearings as a way to highlight just how extreme Bork was.

    In the hearings, Biden, at some length, prodded Bork on his argument against Griswold. Bork gave “weak-kneed statements from a man known for verbal muscle,” as one historian notes.  Biden’s objective was not to disprove Bork’s views explicitly but he was able to discredit him in the court of public opinion. The strategy worked.

    The concern raised about Bork was that he had always been opposed to the development of new liberties and was unlikely to be a defender of liberty on the Court. “As one imagines the kinds of great new issues that might come before the court in the years ahead, there surely are reasons to fear that on these great issues, Judge Bork will not be there when it counts,” testified Bork’s Yale Law colleague Paul Gewirtz at a Biden-led hearing.

  • June 30, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Robert N. Weiner, partner, Arnold & Porter LLP

    *This post originally appeared on casetext.com.

    The first lawsuit seeking to strike down the Affordable Care Act (ACA) came just seven minutes after the President signed the bill on March 23, 2010. The assaults continued even after the Supreme Court upheld the law as constitutional. For all but those first seven minutes, the ACA has weathered nonstop legal attack, as its opponents sought to enlist judges to undo their political defeats in Congress.

    To that end, an American Enterprise Institute Conference in late 2010 foraged through the 900 pages of the ACA in search of some plausible flaw to eviscerate the statute “as a matter of political hygiene.” All the quest turned up was an awkward phrase in what the Court in King called the “ultimate ancillary provision: a sub-sub-sub section of the Tax Code.” This previously undiscovered provision supposedly barred subsidies that help low-income families afford insurance if their States opted to have the Federal Government establish insurance Exchanges rather than doing it themselves. Congress, in other words, deliberately embedded a self-destruct mechanism deep in the statute.

    Before jumping to the four-word phrase at issue, it is not only useful but necessary to examine its context ‒ the history, purpose, and structure of the ACA, as the Court did in King. Congress enacted the ACA to reduce the number of people without health insurance. The law barred insurers from refusing to cover consumers because of their preexisting illnesses, but counterbalanced that prohibition with a requirement that virtually everyone maintain insurance coverage. To make that requirement affordable, the ACA directed each state to establish a marketplace, called an Exchange, that would function like Travelocity, affording individual consumers the knowledge and leverage to negotiate insurance contracts as favorable as those offered to purchasers of large group policies. To ensure that these Exchanges functioned everywhere, the Act instructed the Secretary of HHS to step in and establish “such Exchange” if the State did not do so itself. As a further step to make insurance affordable, the ACA also lowered the net cost by providing tax subsidies, based on income, for those purchasing policies on an Exchange.

  • June 29, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Lisa Heinzerling, the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

    In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's decision to regulate power plants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Section 112 is the provision regulating toxic air pollutants, such as mercury. The question before the Court was whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act to allow EPA to decline to consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court held that it was not reasonable to interpret the Act in this way. Thus, from the Court's decision, we know that EPA must consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. There are, however, important questions that remain:

    1. We do not yet know what happens to EPA's rule while EPA does the analytical work the Court has required of it. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The case will go back to the D.C. Circuit for it to figure out how to address the Supreme Court's ruling. Certainly the case will eventually have to return to EPA; the D.C. Circuit itself will not attempt to undertake the consideration of costs the Supreme Court has ordered. But what happens between the time the case goes back to EPA and the time EPA makes a decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling? That depends on the D.C. Circuit. The court will need to decide whether to remand or to vacate and remand; that is, whether to simply send the matter back to EPA while leaving the rule in place, or undo the rule in the interim. The D.C. Circuit has lately remanded quite a few agency rules, especially environmental rules, without vacating them. Given the amount of discretion left to the agency by the Supreme Court's decision (see below), and the fact that EPA has previously stated that the rule is justified even in light of its costs, I believe there is a strong case for remand without vacatur.

    2. We do not yet know how EPA will or should take costs into account in revisiting the issue of whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court left this matter to EPA, with the qualification that the agency's treatment of costs must be, "[a]s always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation." The Court emphasized that it was not holding that the agency must conduct "a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value." Beyond that, the Court gave little hint of the kind of analysis it would approve. At times, it seemed to be looking for a judgment about whether costs were disproportionate to benefits; at other points, it seemed to highlight cost-effectiveness analysis. These are different inquiries, and it will now be up to EPA – at least in the first instance – to decide which of several cost-sensitive frameworks to use. My sense from the Court's opinion is that as long as EPA considers costs in some fashion, whether through formal cost-benefit analysis or something far more qualitative, it will be sufficient.

    3. We do not yet know which benefits EPA may consider for purposes of the additional analysis the Court has required. Although EPA conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis of the rule for purposes of White House regulatory review, and that analysis included billions of dollars in "ancillary" benefits due to reductions in air pollutants not covered by the air toxics program, the Court did not decide whether these ancillary benefits may be included in the analysis yet to come. That is, the Court said, "a point we need not address." Several justices seemed skeptical of these benefits at oral argument, and there is some (small but discernible) textual basis for excluding them. A number of commentators have argued that EPA must be able to consider such benefits because they are included in standard economic practice and because an OMB circular on cost-benefit analysis, dating from the George W. Bush administration, admits them in the cost-benefit framework. I don't think economic practice and an OMB circular will decide this question, but I do think it would be quite aggressive for a court to tell EPA which regulatory benefits count.

  • June 26, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the School of Law, Distinguished Professor of Law, Raymond Pryke Professor of First Amendment Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law

    The Supreme Court’s decision upholding a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians surprised no one, but that makes the victory for liberty and equality no less important. Two years ago, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Windsor, declared unconstitutional a key provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The Court held that there was no legitimate purpose served by the federal government refusing to recognize same sex marriages.

    Virtually every lower court, except for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, interpreted Windsor as providing a basis for invalidating laws prohibiting same sex marriage. As a result, as the Supreme Court considered the issue, marriage equality existed in 37 states and the District of Columbia. The issue before the Court was less about whether to extend marriage equality and more about whether the Court would take it away from all of the states where it existed by virtue of Court decisions.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision reflects that there is no legitimate government purpose served by denying gays and lesbians of the right to marry. A history of discrimination never is enough to justify current discrimination. The argument based on procreation was silly.  Gay and lesbian couples will procreate – by adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination – whether they can marry or not. Their children should be able to benefit from marriage, the same as children of heterosexual couples.

    The Court’s decision will be regarded as a historic landmark for advancing equality and liberty. It is the Court playing exactly the role that it should in society:  protecting those who have been traditionally discriminated against and extending to them a right long regarded as fundamental.