Speech and expression

  • June 27, 2011

    In one of the final opinions of the term, the Supreme Court today struck down a California ban on the sale of violent video games to minors, holding that it violated the First Amendment to “restrict the ideals to which children may be exposed,” NPR reports.

    Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the 7-2 majority opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, with Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer each writing their own dissents.

    First Amendment Center President Ken Paulson provides analysis of the case, noting that the opinion reaffirms that sexual content and violent content are viewed differently by the court, that entertainment is protected by the First Amendment, and that “states can’t target emerging media,” such as video games.

    “Overall, the Supreme Court’s ruling is a vibrant application of 219-year-old principles to cutting-edge technology and asserts that any new forms of communication or media to come will be protected by the First Amendment,” Paulson writes.

    For those who want to revisit the oral argument, litigator Richard M. Zuckerman has analysis for ACSblog, while Slate’s Dahlia Lithwick provided an entertaining take, summarized as, “Gamers: Meet the old people. Old people: Try to find the power-on button. Everyone else, search for James Madison's avatar and ask what he thinks of Grand Theft Auto.”

  • June 23, 2011

    At the closing plenary panel of the ACS 10th Anniversary National Convention, The New York Times Supreme Court correspondent Adam Liptak said an effort would be made to “try and make sense of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.” To that end, the panel at least offered an entertaining attempt at making sense of the Court’s track record on First Amendment issues.

    For instance, Liptak said the panel would try to figure out how the Roberts Court could uphold the free speech rights of “lunatic funeral protestors, aficionados of dog-fighting, corporations, but not people who try through benign means to persuade terrorists to give up their arms.”

    New York Law School professor Nadine Strossen, when asked to sum up the coherence of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence said that when you step back and look at the overall pattern of decisions through the six terms of the Roberts Court, it is really “much more negative for freedom of speech. In every single one of the terms that has concluded the free speech losses outnumbered the free speech gains, and the total record, the free speech losses outnumbered the wins by more than a 2 – 1 margin.”

    She noted that a full two-thirds of the free speech victories were in the area of campaign finance. The big losers for free speech claims, Strossen said were public workers, public employment unions, or students at public schools or universities.

    Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger said that even when the Roberts Court upholds free speech rights it does so in the narrowest way possible, and fails to explain to the country or the world why free speech is such a great principle. Bollinger then pointed to Justice Samuel Alito as a justice who frequently articulates strongly some of the harms of unfettered free speech, as he did in the funeral-picketing case and the case involving a regulation of videos depicting cruelty to animals. And Alito’s strong opinions call “for an answer by the majority and it’s just not there.”

    Floyd Abrams, partner at Cahill Gordon & Reindell LLP, said he found it “disturbing,” that passionate supporters of the First Amendment cannot acknowledge the “seriousness, the centrality of the First Amendment interests on the side that those conservative jurists thought were so important in the campaign finance cases. Abrams argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC on behalf of the interests of corporations in striking down campaign finance regulations.

    The other panelists included Judge Marsha S. Berzon, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Paul D. Clement, partner, Bancroft PLLC, and former U.S. Solicitor General, and Monica Youn, senior counsel, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice.

    Video of the entire discussion is available here or by clicking on image below.

  • April 28, 2011
    BookTalk
    Philosopher Kings?
    The Adjudication of Conflicting Human Rights and Social Values
    By: 
    George C. Christie

    By George C. Christie, James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law


    In Europe, speech involving matters that are not generally known, even if the speech concerns events that took place in an area open to public view, has been successfully challenged as an invasion of privacy if the defendant was unable to show that the speech in question concerned a matter of legitimate public interest or contributed “to a debate of general interest to society.” What speech meets these criteria is for the courts to determine. That the public may have a great interest in the subject matter involved in the challenged speech is not by itself enough. Whether courts actually have the capacity to decide on their own what is a matter of "legitimate" public interest is one of the major themes discussed in my new book Philosopher Kings?  The Adjudication of Conflicting Human Rights and Social Values."

    In the United States, the balance is tilted the other way since freedom of speech is the preferred value. Recent developments, however, contain a hint that a court-administered regime of what is acceptable speech has some support in the United States as well. In Snyder v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court, quite properly in my judgment, upheld the right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket near the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq. The signs they displayed to express their contempt for the military’s tolerance of homosexuality were certainly vulgar and offensive, but Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, declared that the issue involved was a matter of public concern and thus protected by the First Amendment.

    Many American observers, however, have preferred the approach taken in the dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, who expressed the view that, if the plaintiff could show that he suffered severe emotional distress because of the grossly tasteless signs displayed by the demonstrators, the plaintiff should be able to recover under the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, the approach taken by Chief Justice Roberts leaves open the possibility that vulgar hateful speech on matters that a court determines do not concern a matter of public concern is actionable. That suggests the possible adoption of something like the method used in Europe to decide conflicts between speech and privacy. Under the European approach, a court must balance the value of the challenged speech against the value of the other interests involved in the case before the court. These other interests can range from the desire of the plaintiff to preserve his anonymity to the judicially determined legitimacy of the public interest in the subject matter of the speech in question.

    I disagree. In Europe,

  • March 2, 2011
    The over-the-top anti-gay group called the Westboro Baptist Church convinced a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court that its speech aimed at tarring gays, Jews, Catholics and American soldiers is protected by the First Amendment.

    In an 8-1 opinion issued this morning, the high court led by Chief Justice John Roberts found that the content of Westboro's speech "plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of ‘purely private concern.'"

    For decades Fred Phelps and his tiny Kansas-based church, made up largely of his relatives, have traveled the country initially targeting the funerals of persons who had died of AIDS with signs reading "God Hates Fags." Eventually after antiviral drugs helped, in this country, to lessen the number of AIDS-related deaths, Phelps and his family turned to protesting funerals of soldiers, and with two American wars, the opportunities to amplify their vitriol again increased. According to its website "godhatesfags.com," Phelps and his family picket funerals of soldiers as part of a campaign attacking America for allegedly being tolerant of gays. Beyond posting invective on its web site, the small group travels the country to hoist signs at soldiers' funerals reading "God Hates the USA," and "Semper fi fags." When Phelps and his family brought their act to a Maryland funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, his father, Albert lodged a lawsuit against the group and won a jury verdict of $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. The jury verdict was overturned by an appeals court, citing First Amendment protection for Phelps.

    Writing for the majority in Snyder v. Phelps, Roberts said the content of Westboro's messages "may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight - the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy - are matters of public import," and ultimately protected by the First Amendment. "Such speech," Roberts wrote, "cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt."

    Justice Samuel Alito was the only member to dissent. "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case," he wrote.

    Alito continued that Phelps' band has a freedom to "write and distribute books, articles, and other texts," and disseminate its commentary in other public ways, such as posting its commentary on its web site.

    "It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate," Alito said.

    Alito also questioned the majority's conclusion that the Phelps outfit was engaging in speech of public concern. He wrote that evidence showed that the group went "far beyond matters of public concern," and "specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United States military. Both Matthew and petitioner were private figures, and this attack was not speech on a matter of public concern."

    Tom Goldstein, founder of SCOTUSblog provides some initial reaction to the opinion, noting:

    The Court left undecided two important issues that it concluded were not squarely presented. First, recognized that the government may regulate the "time, place, and manner" of speech and that the State of Maryland (where this protest was held) subsequently enacted a statute governing the circumstances in which funeral protests may be held. The Court did not decide the constitutionality of that statute or other similar federal and state laws. The Court may have been motivated to grant review in the case and still affirm in order to issue an opinion that, unlike the arguable implications of the court of appeals' decision, did not call such statutes into question.

    Second, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had also brought suit on the basis of statements made by the defendants on a website. But it concluded that the issue had been waived by not preserving it in the petition for certiorari and only briefly mentioning it in the merits briefing. The Court was therefore able to limit its decision strictly to the context of funeral protests.

  • January 31, 2011
    Guest Post

    This post is part of an ACSblog symposium marking the one-year anniversary of the landmark decision Citizens United v. FEC. The author, Daniel JH Greenwood, is a professor at Hofstra University School of Law, where he researches corporate governance and the role of corporations in our economy and democracy. He co-authored an amicus brief in Citizens United on behalf of the American Independent Business Alliance.
    A year later, Citizens United still looks like the modern Lochner v. New York. This case may well come to symbolize the Court's contribution to our modern Gilded Age and its destruction of the foundations of prosperity and democracy.

    Lochner symbolizes the Old Court's turning the Civil War Amendments on their heads. The Fourteenth Amendment promised African-Americans, and indeed all Americans, the rights of citizenship, equal protection and due process of law. The Court, instead, ruled that American citizens had fought the Civil War in order to forfeit our right to use democratic government to protect ourselves against the arbitrary power of "malefactors of great wealth."

    The Gilded Age's concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few, symbolized and furthered by Lochner's rejection of basic American values, led straight to the Great Depression. Neither democracy nor market capitalism can long survive if entrenched economic power is permitted to set the rules of competition so that it always wins. When ordinary Americans lacked the power to demand wages high enough to buy the products and services they produced, the resulting shortage of demand nearly destroyed the system.

    Today, we are again in a crisis caused by a similarly radical upward shift of power and wealth. In sector after sector, economic incumbents have amassed enough power to be able to shift the rules in their own favor. We have raised CEO and banker pay, at the direct cost of ordinary employee wages, to the point where our major firms increasingly resemble the world's kleptocracies. The wonder is not that so many have collapsed, Enron-style, into complete corruption or, dot.com and housing-style, into utter incompetence and misallocation, but that so many manage to last so long, emulating the Soviet and Third World autocracies in their fantastically wealthy elites and long slow slides into collective failure.