Privileges or Immunities Clause

  • June 13, 2012
    Guest Post

    By David H. Gans, Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights & Citizenship Program, Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC). This analysis is cross-posted at the Text & History Blog.


    Twenty years ago this month, a bitterly divided Supreme Court handed down Planned Parenthood v. Casey, one of the most important opinions delivered by the Court on the meaning of the Constitution’s protection of liberty and equality for all Americans.  In a landmark joint opinion, authored by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David Souter, a narrow five-Justice majority reaffirmed what they called the “essential holding of Roe,” beating back a twenty-year assault on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and the notion that the Constitution protects substantive fundamental rights not enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution.  In the process, the Justices rooted protection of a woman’s right to reproductive choice, not in a generalized right of privacy as Roe had, but in a woman’s right to bodily integrity, to personal liberty, and to equal citizenship.  (For more discussion, see CAC’s Crossroads Chapter on Reproductive Freedom).  As a senior in college at the time, I had the incredibly good fortune of working on the legal team representing Planned Parenthood at the Supreme Court – alongside brilliant and courageous attorneys Kitty Kolbert and Linda Wharton – and to this day my work on Casey is still one of the proudest moments of my career in the law. 

    Casey’s understanding of constitutional protection for personal liberty and equality drew on the Court’s precedents going back 70 years and the doctrine of stare decisis.  The joint opinion forcefully demonstrated that keeping faith with the Court’s precedents required reaffirming constitutional protection for a woman’s right to reproductive choice, while the dissenters argued that these  precedents had to be jettisoned.  Two decades later, thanks to the work of Jack Balkin, Reva Siegel, Dawn Johnsen and others, there is more basic foundation of support for Casey’s understanding of fundamental constitutional principles: the Constitution’s text and history.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, both Casey’s analysis of the protection of substantive fundamental rights and of gender equality has deep roots in our Constitution’s text and history.  Supporters of Roe and Casey should embrace these sources – just as much as precedent – in defending a woman’s right to reproductive freedom against attacks by conservatives.   

  • March 5, 2010
    Guest Post

    By David H. Gans, Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights, and Citizenship Program at the Constitutional Accountability Center. He is the lead author of the report, The Gem of the Constitution: the Text and History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and co-author of CAC's brief in McDonald. This article is cross-posted at CAC's blog, Text & History.

    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which raises the question whether the Second Amendment's guarantee of a right to bear arms applies to states and local governments. Going into argument, incorporation of the Second Amendment right seemed a given - after all, states already have to obey virtually every right in the Bill of Rights. The critical question was whether the Court would breathe new life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and honor the part of the Fourteenth Amendment's text that clearly protects substantive fundamental rights from state infringement.

    The Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to be the centerpiece of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was written out of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases. The decision has been regarded as one of the worst in the Court's history, and roundly condemned by the Amendment's framers in the 1870s, Justice Harlan in the early 20th century, and Justice Black in the 1940s. The overwhelming consensus among scholars across the ideological spectrum - reflected in a law professors' brief filed by CAC in McDonald - is that Slaughter-House obliterated the text and history of the Clause through a profoundly incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.

    Unfortunately, the Privileges or Immunities Clause received a chilly reception from the Court on Tuesday, especially from those Justices who most profess to take the Constitution's text and history seriously. Justice Scalia belittled the Clause, accusing Alan Gura, McDonald's attorney, of "bucking for some place on some law school faculty" by advancing an argument that was "the darling of the professoriate." Scalia, supposedly the Court's chief originalist, wouldn't even consider the merits of the argument. Chief Justice Roberts, too, refused to follow the Constitution's text and history where it leads. He explicitly worried that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow for broad protections of substantive liberty; he preferred to rely on the Due Process Clause, since that text is about process, and does not easily lend itself to protecting substantive fundamental rights. While Roberts and Scalia were content to rely on substantive due process to protect gun rights, they seemed to want to reserve the opportunity to bash the doctrine in future cases involving rights they don't recognize. Other Justices were less overtly hostile, but none seemed willing to revive the Clause.

    In light of its reception at the Court, was Gura too bold?

  • February 24, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Lawrence Rosenthal, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Professor Rosenthal filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in McDonald v. City of Chicago in support of Chicago.

    In its 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, a closely divided Supreme Court, applying what the majority characterized as "the original understanding of the Second Amendment," invalidated D.C.'s prohibition on the possession of handguns. Relying on eighteenth-century sources, the Court defined the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear arms" as "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," and held that a prohibition on handguns was unconstitutional. The Court cautioned, however, that the Second Amendment is only a limitation on the powers of Congress, and reserved decision on the question whether it also applied to state and local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that its nineteenth-century decisions had refused to apply the Second Amendment to state and local laws, but added that these cases "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases."

    The Court will now confront the applicability of the Second Amendment to state and local laws in McDonald v. City of Chicago. At issue is the constitutionality of Chicago's handgun ban. Chicago and its amici rely on the approach to incorporation of the first eight amendments within the Fourteenth that the Court has taken for nearly a century - asking whether a particular right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Under this approach, many of the rights in the first eight amendments have been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause - but not all.

  • February 19, 2010

    The widely anticipated Second Amendment case pending before the Supreme Court is creating strange bedfellows, reports Jess Bravin in The Wall Street Journal. Bravin writes that, "as gun-rights groups battle each other over how to argue the case, ... some left- and right-leaning legal theorists unite over how to interpret the Constitution."

    As noted at ACS's Supreme Court Preview for the Court's current term, some progressive advocates support incorporation of the Second Amendment to the states in McDonald v. Chicago. They see McDonald as an opportunity to revive the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, which was neutered by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases. Since then, incorporting rights to bar infringement by state action has been a burden carried by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which speaks merely to deprivations of rights, as opposed to the broader language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

    As to the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court left the question of incorporation for another day in the 2008 D.C. v. Heller decision, which -- for the first time -- recognized the right to bear arms as an individual right, rather than a right bestowed upon members of a militia collectively. And that day will be before the Court soon in McDonald.  

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