Preemption

  • January 18, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Rochelle Bobroff, Directing Attorney, Herbert Semmel Federal Rights Project, National Senior Citizens Law Center

    Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question whether Medicaid beneficiaries have the same right to obtain federal court preemption of state laws in conflict with federal Medicaid requirements, as big businesses have to challenge state consumer protection laws that allegedly conflict with federal statutes. All courts of appeals that have considered this question have held that there was no basis for treating a preemption claim protecting low-income people's interests differently from a preemption claim on behalf of business interests. The Solicitor General recommended that certiorari be denied. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted cert in three consolidated cases, which are styled Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, California Pharmacists Assn, and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. I am among counsel representing the Independent Living Center.

    Medicaid beneficiaries were unable to get their prescription medications filled when the state of California passed a law slashing reimbursement rates, first by 10 percent and then by 5 percent, in an effort to save the state money. The reimbursement rates were below retailers' costs, and therefore some pharmacies were unwilling to provide the medications to low-income individuals with disabilities. Even though beneficiaries had Medicaid coverage for their prescriptions, many were still unable to get the medications they needed, due to the low reimbursement rates. The beneficiaries filed suit claiming that the state law was preempted by the federal Medicaid statute. The Ninth Circuit held that indeed the state law conflicted with federal law, and therefore an injunction properly halted enforcement of the state law. The federal government has denied the state's proposed plan amendment to implement the rate cut.

  • December 7, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Jennifer Chang Newell, a staff attorney for the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project. Chang Newell recently participated in an ACS panel discussion on Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, available here.
    Oral arguments in the first legal challenge to the recent wave of state and local anti-immigrant laws to reach the Supreme Court will be held this Wednesday. The case, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, involves a challenge to an Arizona state law that sanctions and penalizes businesses whom the state determines has employed workers not lawfully authorized to work in the United States. The challenged law imposes a potential business "death penalty" for employers found to have hired unauthorized workers and requires all Arizona employers to participate in an electronic employment verification system, e-Verify, that is voluntary under federal law. The case was brought by a coalition that includes the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Civil Liberties Union, and other civil rights and business groups. The coalition asserts that the Arizona law conflicts with federal immigration law and violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Acting Solicitor General of the United States, which submitted a key amicus curiae brief in support of the coalition's position, will also be arguing.

    The Backdrop: An Epidemic of State and Local Anti-Immigrant Laws Across the Country

    The challenge to the Arizona employer sanctions law provides the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to weigh in on the trend in recent years of states and localities fashioning their own local immigration laws. Over the past three years, hostility toward immigrants coupled with apparent frustration with the lack of federal immigration reform have inspired states and cities to propose and enact laws that attempt to make life difficult for "illegal aliens" by imposing a patchwork of local penalties. Hundreds of local anti-immigrant measures have been introduced across the country, including the other well-known Arizona anti-immigrant law, SB 1070 (currently the subject of a pending Ninth Circuit appeal). In addition to creating divergent employer sanctions schemes and mandating participation in the voluntary federal e-Verify program, these local immigration efforts have included prohibitions and penalties for the renting of apartments to allegedly unauthorized immigrants and even criminal laws that would prosecute immigrants or family members, friends, employers, and others who allegedly associate with undocumented immigrants.

    Where enacted, these laws have created a climate of hostility and racial profiling against immigrants, increased fear in immigrant communities, and caused immigrant families to flee to more welcoming communities. The harsh penalties in these laws have made employers and landlords wary of dealing with anyone who may look or sound foreign. In response to these many harms, the ACLU and other groups have gone to court to challenge these laws in numerous locations across the United States. Most notably, in September the Third Circuit struck down Hazleton, Pennsylvania's anti-immigrant employment and housing law, diverging with the Ninth Circuit's ruling below on the Arizona employer sanctions law in Whiting; a certiorari petition may be filed in the Hazleton case as well.

    The Issues before the Court in Whiting

  • December 3, 2010

    The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments Wednesday in a case challenging an Arizona law that regulates the hiring of undocumented immigrants. The case raises the question: Should states be in the business of regulating immigration?

    ACS held a preview discussion about the case, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, during which panelists, while representing differing interests and points of view, came together on the view that a patchwork of state and local immigration laws is not the best U.S. policy.

    Business groups, including the name party, the Chamber of Commerce, are opposing the law alongside immigrants' rights and anti-discrimination organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, in an uncommon coalition that may prompt the justices to "come together in this case in a way that their instincts might not normally bring them together," said Sri Srinivasan, a partner at O'Melveny & Myers (pictured left).

    Even David Rittgers, a legal policy analyst at the CATO Institute who believes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly decided the case as a matter of law, said he disagrees with the Arizona law as a matter of policy. He dispelled myths that "immigrants equal violent crime" and cited statistics that immigrant workers strengthen, not weaken, the U.S. economy.

  • November 9, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Elizabeth B. Wydra, Chief Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC). Wydra's analysis is cross-posted at CAC's Text & History blog.
    You know it's been a less-than-thrilling morning at the Supreme Court when the only time the courtroom audience really perked up was at a rather inexplicable joke by Justice Stephen Breyer about a "9,000-foot cow." (Something about how mountainous Switzerland could discriminate against other European countries' milk products by enacting the facially neutral law that it will only buy milk from cows that graze in meadows above 9,000 feet.) Perhaps that is inevitable in a case that involves preemption doctrine, state contract principles of unconscionability, and forced arbitration. But as complicated as the legal argument in AT&T v. Concepcion may have been in the Court today, it was perhaps just as impenetrable as what is at the core of the case: the lengthy, legalese-heavy, fine print that many of us never read in our cell phone contracts (or employment contracts, health insurance agreements, or other contracts that consumers are effectively forced to sign these days in order to obtain goods and services). And in many of those contracts-as in the contract the Concepcions signed with AT&T-the fine print will require that all disputes be resolved through arbitration, not through the court system, while banning class actions. Accordingly, the Court in Concepcion could decide whether individuals can band together to hold big corporations accountable for misconduct-including discrimination in the workplace and widespread consumer fraud in the marketplace-or whether corporations can get away with wrongdoing so long as they do it on an individually small scale, making individual claims too small to pursue.

    The Concepcions sued AT&T on behalf of themselves and all others who were charged $30.32 in sales tax for a supposedly free mobile phone. If successful, the class action could have yielded millions of dollars for all of AT&T's customers who were improperly charged. But because the arbitration agreement contained a provision banning class actions, the Concepcions were faced with fighting just for their own $30, an amount over which it's hardly worth the time and expense of pressing a legal claim against a corporate giant like AT&T. The company would essentially get away with allegedly fraudulent behavior because the fraud was, for each consumer, not worth fighting over when the expense of filing fees, lawyers, etc., are taken into account.

  • November 5, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Annie Decker, Visiting Assistant Professor, Benjamin H. Cardozo School of Law.
    On November 3, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America. This case ties another important knot in the string of cases addressing when state tort claims can survive federal preemption challenges.

    1. What Question for Preemption Doctrine Does Williamson Pose?

    The overarching - and unresolved - preemption question that emerged from the pack on Wednesday was whether and when an agency's decision to give manufacturers a choice between two or more options means that the agency intended to preserve manufacturers' freedom of choice to the extent that manufacturers had immunity from state tort claims challenging whatever choice the manufacturers ended up making. On the other hand, when does an agency's decision to establish minimum standards in the form of options not signal its intent to preempt subsequent state tort claims arguing that manufacturers made the unreasonable choice among those options?

    2. The Facts

    The potentially preemptive federal law here is a 1989 regulation that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration promulgated as a "minimum standard" pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Instead of setting a single standard, the NHTSA gave car manufacturers two options for installing seatbelts in certain specified positions: The first option was to install a lap-only belt, and the second was to install a full lap and shoulder belt assembly.

    Mazda chose to put only a lap belt in the minivan seat occupied by Thanh Williamson, who died of internal injuries after jackknifing over the belt during a head-on collision. Her husband and daughter - who were in the car in seats that had shoulder belts -survived and sued Mazda on her behalf. They asserted that Mazda should have installed the shoulder/lap belt combination, primarily alleging defective design but attaching associated claims, such as failure to warn.

    Martin Buchanan, a San Diego attorney, argued for the Petitioners, the Williamsons. William Jay argued on behalf of the U.S. Solicitor General as amicus curiae in support of the Williamsons. Gregory G. Garre, a partner at Latham & Watkins, argued for Mazda, the Respondent.

    3. What Type of Preemption Is Mazda Arguing Applies Here?

    Preemption doctrine is generally broken into two categories: express and implied. Mazda cannot argue that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act or its regulations expressly preempt the Williamsons' litigation. While the Act has an express preemption clause, it also contains a strong so-called savings clause that preserves state tort claims: "Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter," Congress mandated, "does not exempt a person from liability at common law."

    Seeking to go beyond the reach of that savings clause, Mazda therefore is relying on implied preemption doctrine to argue that the Williamsons' tort claim is barred. Among the various types of implied preemption, Mazda is relying on the strand known as "obstacle preemption." Obstacle preemption lets federal statutes and regulations trump state or local acts that obstruct the accomplishment of important federal objectives. This strand led Honda to victory in the Supreme Court decision most relevant here, Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, as discussed more below.

    4. Into the Oral Argument Weeds

    The broad question outlined above provoked the Justices to tussle with the several interrelated questions.