Pratheepan Gulasekaram

  • April 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law.  Professor Gulasekaram teaches Constitutional Law and Immigration.  He is currently working on a book with Prof. Karthick Ramakrishnan (political science, U.C. Riverside) on the political and legal dynamics of immigration federalism.


    Pro-immigrant advocates – and I count myself among them – will be anxiously listening to oral argument in U.S. v. Arizona, searching for clues as to whether the Court will uphold the preliminary injunction against Arizona’s now-notorious SB 1070.  Riding the momentum of district court and appellate court victories, and with the clear weight of precedent and academic opinion on its side, the federal government’s legal case appears sound.  For many progressives and immigrant advocates who have been wearily following the recent rise of state and local regulations the case appears to offer the promise of a final resolution to the question whether subfederal jurisdictions can engage in immigration enforcement.

    Except, it likely will not provide this anticipated resolution.  While a victory for the federal government could establish powerful Supreme Court precedent against subfederal participation, there are at least four reasons why Arizona will not end the contentious national debate and policy battle over state and local involvement in immigration regulation.  First, because Justice Kagan has recused herself, there exists a distinct possibility that the case could result in a split 4-4 vote, producing no majority opinion.  Second, the district court never enjoined the provision of SB 1070 that announced the state’s intention to make “attrition through enforcement” the policy of the state.  Third, the political and legislative dynamics producing this recent proliferation of state and local laws suggest that restrictionist policy activists will not be deterred by the Court’s decision.  And, finally, regardless of the result in the case, subfederal jurisdictions can, and in some cases must, participate in enforcement programs condoned by federal law.  I briefly elaborate on each of these points below.

  • December 12, 2011

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The Supreme Court announced this morning it will wade into yet another high-profile constitutional concern, taking for review Arizona’s controversial anti-immigrant law.

    SCOTUSblog's Lyle Denniston, noting the Court has already agreed to consider the constitutionality of the Obama administration’s signature domestic law, the Affordable Care Act, and redistricting in Texas, the justices have now taken on “the searing constitutional – and political – controversy over state power to strictly limit the way undocumented immigrants live their lives in the U.S.”

    Denniston notes, Ariz. Gov. Jan Brewer (pictured) is arguing that her state’s law, S.B. 1070, is a “major test of the sovereignty of the states to make their own social policies under traditional ‘police power’ principles.’” The Obama administration, which has also challenged parts of Alabama’s stringent anti-immigrant law, argues that the Arizona law undermines the federal government’s role in setting immigration policy. (Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," ….)

    Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit blocked several provisions of S.B. 1070, including one that “allows police to arrest without a warrant any person for whom the officer has ‘probable cause to believe’ that the individual has committed any crime, anywhere, that would make that individual subject to being deported,” Denniston writes. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit blocked provisions that require state police to attempt to determine a suspect’s immigration status upon arresting them, that make it a crime to not carry immigration documentation and a misdemeanor for undocumented workers to seek and apply for work.

    Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in the case, Arizona v. United States, apparently because she was involved in the handling of the case when she was U.S. Solicitor General. If, as The Huffington Post’s Mike Sacks notes, the justices split 4-4, the Ninth Circuit opinion would stand.

    Karen Tumlin, an attorney with the National Immigration Law Center, applauded the high court for taking the case.

    “This case boils down to a question of whether Arizona can mandate that its officers interrogate individuals about their immigration status and attempt to enforce civil immigration law,” Tumlin told ABC News.

  • July 30, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor Gulasekaram teaches Constitutional Law, Immigration, and Citizenship.
    As most are aware by now, a federal district court preliminarily enjoined key parts of Arizona's controversial anti-illegal immigrant law, SB 1070, ruling for the federal government in its suit against the State of Arizona. The law's opponents heralded the decision as a carefully crafted one that deals a blow to anti-immigrant forces. Here, I will briefly explain that while I believe the decision stands on firm constitutional ground, and immigrants and immigrant-advocates are justified in celebrating this preliminary outcome, it is not a complete victory.

    As an initial matter, I think Judge Bolton's opinion is constitutionally sound. It does not rest on new-fangled legal theories or the acceptance of previously unrecognized suspect classes under the constitution. Instead, the decision analyzes the Arizona law under well-worn principles of federalism. It relies on decades-old Supreme Court precedent like Hines v. Davidowitz and DeCanas v. Bica, both cases addressing state lawmaking directed at non-citizens, with the former striking down an alien registration requirement similar in spirit to parts of the Arizona law. Applying this federalism framework to SB 1070, the court correctly predicted that Arizona's law is highly likely to impermissibly affect citizens and legal residents of the United States even if they are not its target, require the redirection of some federal resources, and create penalties and liabilities for undocumented persons that are not contemplated by federal law.

    In addition, from the perspective of someone who teaches this area of law, I fully endorse the court's conclusion that the section of SB 1070 allowing police officers to conduct a warrant-less arrest of a person, when the officer has probable cause to believe that person has committed an offense that makes that him or her removable, is well-beyond the bailiwick of local law enforcement. Such a provision might make sense if determinations of legal status and deportability were a simple matter. However, as Judge Bolton accurately noted, determinations of removability require the careful analysis of several complex and interrelated portions of the immigration code, and are dedicated by federal law to the expertise of immigration judges and federal appellate courts. If such determinations were as lucid as the Arizona law would suggest, immigration professors could save several classes each semester attempting to decipher imprecise terms such as "crimes of moral turpitude" and "aggravated felonies," along with the various exceptions and waiver possibilities that accompany those designations.