popular constitutionalism

  • August 2, 2012
    BookTalk
    For Liberty and Equality
    The Life and Times of the Declaration of Independence
    By: 
    Alexander Tsesis

    By Alexander Tsesis, a professor at Loyola University, Chicago, School of Law


    Constitutional scholars often treat the Declaration of Independence as a relic of a bygone era. My recent book, For Liberty and Equality: The Life and Times of the Declaration of Independence (Oxford University Press 2012), shows how out of step that thinking is with social movements. Some of the most progressive groups in this country’s history based their demands for change, justice, and equality on the grand statements of the nation’s manifesto. Unlike constitutional scholars, manhood suffragists, abolitionists, woman suffragists, labor organizers, and a host of other progressives turned to the Declaration to condemn the hypocrisies of the Constitution.

    From the earliest days of the Republic, anti-slavery activists decried the incompatibility of adopting the universal sounding language of the Declaration of Independence while providing constitutional protections for the institution of slavery. In 1783, New Jersey Quaker leader David Cooper underscored the contradictions between Revolutionary principles of equality and the institution of slavery in two, side-by-side columns. He quoted from the Declaration in the left-hand column and in the right-hand column condemned those signatories of the document who were slaveholders, speaking of the blessings of liberty while securing it only for white men. Even that characterization of American democracy was too generous given the endemic racism that spilled over far beyond the boundaries of slave plantations.

    The manhood suffrage movement of the early nineteenth century turned to the Declaration’s principles of equality to vindicate the right of propertiless white men to vote. Laborers complained that in a country committed to liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness an aristocratic democracy had been erected on the backs of the workingman. Writing about political equality in 1800, Thomas Paine’s biographer, James Cheetham, interpreted the Declaration of Independence’s words that “all men are created equal” to include “the political equality of man.” From this followed the principle that “the right of suffrage cannot . . . belong to a part without belonging to the whole.”

  • December 1, 2010

    As ACSblog has documented, recent events in Iowa have put the spotlight on judicial elections and their relationship to the big constitutional controversies of the day. Some prominent politicians, including Newt Gingrich and Mike Huckabee, have celebrated the unseating of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices who voted in favor of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Others have blasted this development as a threat to constitutionalism and the rule of law.

    While this debate rages on, an article forthcoming in the Columbia Law Review suggests a new lens through which to think about what happened in Iowa. In "Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism," David Pozen argues that judicial elections can be understood as instruments of "popular constitutionalism" -- venues in which ordinary citizens confront, debate, and register their beliefs on state and national constitutional questions. "By subjecting their judges to periodic elections," Pozen notes, "more than three quarters of the states give citizens a powerful tool with which to check the judges' interpretive outputs, as well as a recurring focal point with which to stimulate and structure constitutional deliberation."

    Pozen explains that there is a legitimate case to be made that using judicial elections as tools of popular constitutionalism can promote democratic values by enhancing the public's engagement with the courts and the court's responsiveness to the public, thus tightening the link between voters and judges.

    But, Pozen says that these elections can, in a variety of ways, undermine the very democratic values they are meant to serve. "At the same time that it provides an important new framework and vocabulary with which to defend elective judiciaries," Pozen concludes, "popular constitutionalism also points the way toward an original critique. For in the service of aligning judges more closely with ‘the people,' judicial elections do more than threaten collateral damage to values such as legality and equality: They threaten to undermine the democratic aspirations of popular constitutionalism itself."