Pamela Karlan

  • July 10, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    While liberals continue to ponderously ponder how to refute the right’s method of constitutional interpretation called originalism, the right continues to advance a simplistic and destructive story that the Constitution is all about severely limiting the federal government’s reach. 

    For far too long liberals have obsessed over methods of constitutional interpretation, leaving rightists to advance the constitutional storyline, which says the nation’s governing document only promotes individualism, limited government, and of course Christianity.

    As law professor and historian William E. Forbath recently noted in an op-ed for The New York Times liberals have far too often shrugged their shoulders at this narrative, claiming that “rights and wrongs of economic life” are not addressed by the Constitution, but instead through politics.

    “That’s a major failing,” Forbath (pictured) writes, “because there is a venerable rival to constitutional laissez-faire: a rich distributive tradition of constitutional law and politics, rooted in the framers’ generation. None other than James Madison was among its prominent expounders – in his draft of the Virginia Constitution, he included rights to free education and public land.”

    In a more expansive piece for the book, The Constitution in 2020, Forbath explores the “historical heft” of a century-long effort “to make good on the constitutional justice of livelihoods and social and economic rights ….”

    For example, Abraham Lincoln and other founders of the Republican Party argued that equal rights also included “a fair distribution of initial endowments,” and FDR in his State of the Union proposing a Second Bill of Rights, said the government “owes to everyone an avenue to possess himself of a portion of [the nation’s wealth] sufficient for his needs, through his own work.”

    Moreover, Forbath noted, African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement strived to “craft a broader social rights agenda,” including the right to a decent income. During the Civil Rights movement, the federal courts took note of the efforts in “undoing the exclusion of black women from welfare rolls,” he continued.

    The Supreme Court in its 1970 Goldberg v. Kelly opinion, said, “From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty.”

  • June 29, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Reading from the bench during the announcement of the Supreme Court’s decision on the Obama administration’s landmark health care reform law, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg declared, “In the end, the Affordable Care Act survives largely unscathed.”

    Yes, the Obama administration’s signature legislative achievement and the strongest effort in many decades to repair the nation’s tattered social safety did survive Supreme Court scrutiny.

    But as noted here yesterday, it did so barely, and not in the manner that many constitutional law experts and the high court’s four moderate to left-of-center justices had thought it would. And the opinion also included a shrill dissent that envisions a vastly ineffective federal government. As former U.S. Solicitor General Walter Dellinger said during yesterday’s ACS press briefing if the dissent had carried the day it would have marked and “extraordinary revolution” in constitutional law jurisprudence.

    Although the federal government argued that the law’s integral measure, the minimum coverage provision, was constitutional on two major fronts, it was largely thought that it would be upheld as a valid regulation of commerce. The activity of the health care market represents nearly 18 percent of the nation’s economy.  

    But that did not happen. And some constitutional law scholars say that fact should not be ignored.

    Chief Justice John Roberts’ majority opinion provides some language suggesting the high court was not radically re-reading precedent on the commerce clause. But a careful reading of his opinion reveals that the libertarian argument for a vastly cramped interpretation of the commerce power carried the day.

    As The New York Times’ Adam Liptak put it, “Five justices accepted the argument that had been at the heart of the challenge brought by the 26 states and other plaintiffs: that the federal government is not permitted to force individuals not engaged in commercial activities to buy services they do not want. That was a stunning victory for a theory pressed by a small band of conservatives and libertarian lawyers. Most members of the legal academy view the theory as misguided, if not frivolous.”

    Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her concurring opinion also took the chief justice to task for a “rigid reading” of the commerce clause that “makes scant sense and is stunningly retrogressive.”

  • September 15, 2011
    BookTalk
    Keeping Faith with the Constitution
    By: 
    Goodwin Liu, Pamela S. Karlan & Christopher H. Schroeder

    This post, first published September 15, 2010, is part of the ACSblog Constitution Week Symposium. The author, Pamela Karlan, a law professor at Stanford Law School and co-director of the law school’s Supreme Court Clinic. The book she coauthored with Goodwin Liu and Christopher H. Schroeder, Keeping Faith with the Constitution, provides the framework for a new ACS webinar series, “What the Constitution Means and How to Interpret It.”


    Keeping Faith with the Constitution wades into a long-running debate about how we should interpret our Constitution. This debate is an important part of public policy discussions on everything from judicial nominations to health care reform. For a long time, conservatives have framed this debate by portraying themselves as strict adherents to the text and original understanding of the Constitution, while claiming that liberals and progressives ignore the text and decide cases based on their own values or policy preferences.

    That characterization is, of course, a caricature. In our book, we approach the topic through a different set of questions: How have judges, elected officials and citizens actually gone about the process of constitutional interpretation? What explains the enduring character of our Constitution in light of the profound economic, social and political changes that our nation has gone through? And how does this 220-year-old document retain its legitimacy, authority and relevance over time? Simply put, our thesis is that the Constitution has endured because judges, elected officials and citizens throughout our history have engaged in an ongoing process of interpretation. That interpretation reflects fidelity to our written Constitution. To be faithful to the Constitution is to interpret its words and to apply its principles in ways that sustain their vitality over time. Fidelity to the Constitution requires us to ask not how its text and principles would have been applied in 1789 or 1868, but rather how they should be applied today in light of the conditions and concerns of our society.

  • June 22, 2011

    Several of the nation’s top constitutional experts engaged in a robust discussion on what the U.S. Constitution means and how to interpret it, during the opening plenary discussion at the American Constitution Society’s Tenth Anniversary National Convention.

    ACS Board Chair Geoffrey R. Stone, a law professor at the University of Chicago, kicked off the discussion by offering a new way of framing constitutional interpretation, as articulated in a recent article in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas he coauthored with University of North Carolina law professor William Marshall, entitled “The Framers’ Constitution.”

    In the article, Stone and Marshall lay out their vision for interpreting the Constitution as the Framers intended, recognizing that the Framers were “visionaries” and not “timid men” who would have viewed originalists’ vision that “any particular moment’s understanding of the meaning of the Constitution’s open-ended provisions should be locked into place” as wrongheaded.

    “As men of the Enlightenment, [the Framers] believed that just as reason, observation and experience would enable us to gain greater understanding over time into questions of biology, physics, economics and human nature, so, too, would they enable us to learn more over time about the content and meaning of the broad principles they had enshrined in our Constitution,” Stone explained in his remarks.

  • May 19, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law


    Does Goodwin Liu’s stalled nomination to the federal bench signal the end of judicial nominations for academics? Law professors have never been the darlings of the Senate Judiciary Committee – or even of presidents considering appointments to the federal courts. What’s happening with Goodwin Liu may yet further reduce the likelihood of law professors receiving nominations in the future.

    Law professors aren’t natural choices for federal judgeships to begin with. Nominations for the lower federal courts often come from the senators in the state in which the vacancy arises, and law professors don’t tend to be politically connected players close with elected officials. As a general matter, we don’t make much money, contribute much to campaigns, or raise much for candidates. So when senators recommend nominees to the president, they are more likely to be partners at big firms than professors from big schools. (The Supreme Court is an obvious exception; over the past century, the Court was filled with law professors, from Frankfurter and Douglas to Scalia and Kagan.)

    Even if a law professor scores a nomination, today’s highly polarized confirmation process, coupled with new technologies, make confirmation very difficult. Any law professor that writes on a politically contentious issue like abortion, affirmative action, or same-sex marriage will have those writings used against him. This isn’t unique to law professors; any writings of any nominee will be scrutinized. A sitting judge, however, can explain away controversial opinions by saying they don’t reflect her personal views but were required by precedent. Law professors don’t have that easy out – as Liu’s case shows. Republicans have refused to allow Liu to win confirmation because of his writings in favor of affirmative action and against torture.

    Of course, not all law professors will face the same difficulty. Elena Kagan was confirmed despite being a former law professor. Kagan, however, had written only a handful of scholarly articles and most of them argued for broad free speech rights – a position that both Republicans and Democrats could accept. When staffers went out to search her articles for statements they could use against her, the only “gotcha” they found was her criticism of judicial nominees who refuse to discuss their views. 

    It’s no longer just the nominee’s writings that matter. Before Kagan was named, ACS Board member Pamela Karlan, of Stanford Law School, was one name bandied about as a potential nominee. But it was easy to go on YouTube and find videos of Karlan, who speaks at numerous events, making sarcastic, biting remarks on nearly every hot-button issue of the day. Though those who see her in person know that her most outrageous statements are meant to be humorous -- Karlan gets more laughs than any other law professor I know -- they are easy fodder for opponents.

    The message for law professors from these examples is clear: if you want to become a judge one day, don’t write too much, write on non-controversial topics, and watch what you say at speaking events. The world is watching.