Oral Argument

  • April 26, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Omar Jadwat, Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project


    I was at Wednesday’s Supreme Court argument in Arizona v. United States, observing with particular interest because I am counsel in the separate civil rights coalition challenge to S.B. 1070 (and challenges to the five copycat state laws that were enacted in 2011). I’d urge those who are following this case to pay attention to the following issues, which based on the accounts I’ve seen so far, appear to be underreported :

    First, while much of the argument revolved around Section 2(B), the “show me your papers” provision of S.B. 1070, the discussion seemed to imagine a law quite different from the one the state legislature actually passed. S.B. 1070 itself directs state and local police to detain individuals for investigation and determination of their immigration status, but during the argument, several exchanges construed the section as merely serving to notify the federal government of an individual who was otherwise properly detained. Prognostication around the argument fails to factor in this significant retreat from the plain language of the statute.

    Second, this has always been a case about discrimination, harassment and racial profiling. It is true that there is no separate legal claim based on the Equal Protection Clause in the federal government’s case (although there is one in the civil rights coalition’s case). But it is equally true that from its inception, S.B. 1070 has been synonymous with racial profiling, and for good reason – as law enforcement officials from around the country have repeatedly confirmed, and as our clients’ experiences demonstrate.

  • April 26, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Gabriel J. Chin and Marc L. Miller. Chin is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, School of Law, and Miller is Vice Dean and Bilby Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. SeeSB1070 in the Supreme Court,” their pre-oral argument analysis for ACSblog.


    The argument in the SB1070 case went 20 minutes over its scheduled hour.  Most of the justices' questions addressed Section 2, which requires local police to investigate the immigration status of anyone stopped by the police who they suspected of being undocumented. 

    Justices Kennedy and Scalia each asked the fundamental question of whether “a state must accept within its borders a person who is illegally present under federal law.” Paul Clement answered no, frankly claiming for the states the powers of deportation and border control.

    Justice Scalia agreed. 

    This question is at the heart of the case. All provisions of SB1070 are roundabout ways of forcing undocumented aliens to leave.  If Arizona has direct regulatory authority over illegal immigration, they need not operate indirectly; Arizona should just pass a law requiring the undocumented to leave, punishing them if they refuse.

    Arizona did not do this because it doubts it has that power.  Such a claim would be at odds with the traditional approach, as represented, for example, by Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist & O’Connor dissenting in Plyler v. Doe,who wrote: “A state has no power to prevent unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are reserved exclusively to Congress and the Executive.”

    But if states do not have the power to regulate directly, then, as Mr. Clement recognized when answering this question, their claim to be able to do so indirectly is undermined.

    In the modern electronic glow that seeks to cast major cases into six word headlines and sound bites, many commentators have observed that the justices supported Section 2. It was common ground among the justices and counsel that an officer acting on her own (rather than by statutory mandate) may question a suspect about immigration status, at least so long as it does not prolong a detention.

    But looking at the exchanges between the Justices and the advocates, a more nuanced picture emerges.

  • April 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Gabriel J. Chin and Marc L. Miller. Chin is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Davis, School of Law, and Miller is Vice Dean and Bilby Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. They authored The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration through Criminal Law, which recently appeared in the Duke Law Journal and addresses these arguments, and others, in more detail. The views expressed are solely those of the authors.


    Arizona v. United States, being argued Wednesday, will decide whether SB1070 is preempted by federal law.  We have previously co-authored papers about its complex provisions, and various legal doctrines that might be brought to bear on it, from the non-delegation doctrine to double jeopardy. But Arizona v. United States is, ultimately, a simple case.  Here is what we hope the Supreme Court understands.

    SB1070 is preempted -- it is unconstitutional -- because it usurps powers that the Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and other federal statutes assign exclusively to the federal government. The Framers, Congress and the Court have consistently recognized that the security of the nation and fairness to non-citizens require that decisions and enforcement be under federal direction and control.

    Four provisions of SB1070 are at issue. Three provisions involve direct immigration enforcement.

    • Section 2 requires that state and local police investigate the status of suspected undocumented non-citizens who have been detained;
    • Section 6 authorizes police to arrest non-citizens believed to be deportable; and
    • Section 3 criminalizes the presence of non-citizens in Arizona if they have not registered under federal law.

    The fourth provision (§ 5) criminalizes working in Arizona without authorization, which is not a crime under federal law.

  • March 28, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    So it appears just based on oral argument action, if you believe pundits, such as CNN’s Jeffrey Toobin that the high court’s conservative justices are ready to trash precedent and accept the simplistic arguments of the challengers that the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision is a wild overreach by the federal government.

    As noted in this ACSblog post, UCLA constitutional law professor Adam Winkler says we shouldn’t be surprised that the high court’s right-wing majority may be leaning this way. It has already proved it has no problem shunning precedent or being out-of-touch, for example see Citizens United v. FEC.

    In a piece for The Huffington Post, ACS President Caroline Fredrickson argued against the idea that the minimum coverage provision is “unprecedented,” as its challengers like to call it.

    “What is truly radical,” Fredrickson says, “is the economic theory the state and individual challengers are pushing, which calls for a greatly limiting the ability of Congress to address national concerns. It’s an argument that longs for the days when courts actively shut down congressional attempts to solve national problems.”

    Geoffrey Stone, a constitutional law expert and a member of the ACS board, explains, also in a Huffington Post article, why the law’s minimum coverage provision, which will require Americans who can afford to do so to starting carrying health care insurance in 2014, is seemingly so unappealing to the high court’s conservative wing. Primarily the conservative wing appears to be obsessed with a slippery slope – if folks can be required to purchase health care insurance then what’s next?

    Stone notes that the “slippery slope is a means of reasoning, not a conclusion. Every principle and decision has a slippery slope: The question is whether we can get off the slope before it reaches bad outcomes. In this instance, this is easy. The decisions of millions of individual Americans not to purchase health insurance (even though they can afford it) have a dramatic impact on the cost of health care for everyone else and on interstate commerce. This is clearly an appropriate matter for federal attention under the Commerce Clause.”

  • March 12, 2010

    "His silent presence on the bench has evolved into a weirdly compelling example of performance art," writes ACS board member Linda Greenhouse of Justice Clarence Thomas' persistent silence during oral argument. The fourth anniversary of Thomas' silence from the bench passed quietly last month, but not without being noticed.

    Writing in The National Law Journal, Tony Mauro recently gave new life to a Florida Law Review article entitled "Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument." There, freshly minted law school graduate David A. Karp argued that Thomas' silence permits him to shield anachronistic or even bizarre legal perspectives from criticism. Rather than debuting his opinions during oral argument, the piece notes, where they could be challenged by counsel and his colleagues on the bench, Thomas saves his outlook from public scrutiny until it is proferred in an official opinion.

    One such opinion, released last month, went overlooked until this week. In Wilkins v. Officer Gaddy, North Carolina inmate Jamey Wilkins alleged that he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "[w]ithout any provocation" by a prison guard. The district court judge who initially reviewed Wilkins' allegations dismissed them, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this ruling in an unpublished one-paragraph opinion.