Missouri v. Frye

  • August 2, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    The U.S. Supreme Court’s pair of March decisions establishing the right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations was considered by many the most significant criminal process precedent since Gideon v. Wainright. But the lawyer whose argument prevailed in one of those cases was not feeling positive vibes from the Justices during her oral argument – her first ever before the high court.

    In an American Constitution Society video webinar on her experience litigating Lafler v. Cooper, state appellate defender Valerie Newman said it was the justices’ hostility that surprised her the most.

     “It was not a pleasant experience,” she said. “… I tell people the experience felt to me like there were nine lions, even though Justice Thomas never talked, and I was the piece of meat that was thrown into the ring and they were just all scratching at me to see who could get the biggest piece.”

    Newman held her ground and stood by the argument she had been making since the beginning: that “the Sixth Amendment applies to all stages of the criminal process, and plea bargaining is a stage of the criminal process. If the defendant receives deficient advice that affects the defendant’s decisions down the line, then the defendant is entitled to relief.”

    In this case, because her client had been advised to go to trial based on misinformation from his lawyer that he could not be convicted, Newman had to argue that the trial itself caused the harm – a notion that incited particular hostility from Justice Scalia.

    “I thought Justice Scalia, if he could, would have reached over the bench and strangled me,” Newman said. “That’s how visibly distraught he was at my argument. And even the justices I thought would be on my side, like Justice Breyer, Justice Breyer yelled at me at one point.”

  • March 26, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Mary Schmid Mergler, senior counsel for The Constitution Project’s Criminal Justice Program. Mergler is the coauthor with Christopher Durocher of the ACS Issue Brief previewing several several of this term's Supreme Court cases, The ‘Right-to-Counsel Term.’"


    This week the Supreme Court issued three critically important decisions implicating the constitutional right to counsel. Martinez v. Ryan affects the right to counsel during the state collateral appeal process, while Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye will impact the right to counsel long before appeal, before trial even, during plea negotiations. 

    Martinez v. Ryan

    As a fundamental rule in post-conviction review of state criminal convictions, a federal court cannot consider claims that were denied in state court based on an established state procedural rule—a doctrine known as procedural default. The only way for the federal court to consider a claim that has been procedurally defaulted is to find that “cause” existed to excuse the default and “prejudice” resulted.  Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. Thompson, attorney errors during collateral proceedings do not constitute “cause” to excuse procedural default, since no constitutional right to counsel on collateral appeal exists. 

    In Martinez’s case, the first time he was permitted under Arizona law to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel (IATC) claim was on collateral appeal; Arizona prohibits IATC claims from being raised on direct appeal. However, without Martinez’s consent, the attorney appointed to represent him on collateral appeal waived his IATC claim, so when he raised it in a successive state petition, it was denied for not having been raised in the initial appeal. And when he subsequently raised it in a federal habeas petition, it was denied based on the doctrine of procedural default. 

  • October 4, 2011
    Guest Post

    By The Constitution Project’s Mary Schmid Mergler and Christopher Durocher. Schmid, senior counsel, and Dorucher, government affairs counsel, are the authors of an ACS Issue Brief released today, “The ‘Right-to-Counsel Term.’"


    Today, the Supreme Court is hearing argument in two cases related to the right to counsel, the first two in a collection of cases this fall that has earned the October 2011 Term the nickname “Right-to-Counsel Term.” Three other cases are slated for argument later this fall.  We examine these cases in greater depth in our new ACS Issue Brief.

    Martinez v. Ryan and Maples v. Allen kick-off the Right-to-Counsel Term by raising the question of what, if any, right to effective counsel a defendant can expect in post-conviction proceedings.  In Martinez, the Court will consider whether the right to counsel should extend to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a first state habeas petition if the defendant was prohibited from raising such claims during his direct appeal (when the state is required to provide him with counsel).  In Maples, the Court is being asked to decide whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to an equitable exception to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) procedural default rules when a defendant has been completely abandoned by counsel.  In both cases, the defendants have legitimate claims that they were prevented from raising on post-conviction appeal due to counsel’s errors.  And in both cases, fundamental fairness requires that these individuals, who will otherwise lose their right to challenge their convictions due solely to the errors or carelessness of their counsel, be permitted to raise those claims.