material support provision

  • August 30, 2011
    Guest Post

    By David Cole, a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Cole was counsel for the Humanitarian Law Project in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and will be a panelist during an ACS Symposium this Thursday on legal policy shifts in the ten years since 9/11. Learn more about the symposium here.


    In the early days after September 11, some commentators argued that while we had sacrificed greatly in terms of privacy and other rights, at least the First Amendment remained strong. Unlike World War I, for example, people were free to express their opposition to the “war on terror” without fear of being sentenced to ten years in prison, as Eugene Victor Debs was in 1918. But maybe World War I was not the right benchmark.  In at least one significant area -- speech and association deemed to provide “material support” to terrorist groups -- our First Amendment rights are considerably less robust in the wake of 9/11 than they were before. And the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision upholding as constitutional the Bush and Obama administrations’ overly broad interpretation of that law sets dangerous precedents for speech rights in the future.

    The “material support” law gives the executive the power to designate as a “foreign terrorist organization” any group that is foreign, has used or threatened to use a weapon against person or property, and whose activities undermine our “national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests.” The last criterion, the courts have said, is not judicially reviewable. Once a group has been designated, the law makes it a crime to provide it with virtually any kind of assistance, regardless of the intent or likely effect of the aid on terrorism. The law defines “material support” broadly to include pure speech advocating only lawful, peaceful activity, including “expert advice” or “training” of any kind. 

  • July 8, 2010
    Late in its term, the Supreme Court upheld a law that bars many forms of aid, including humanitarian, to groups the federal government has categorized as terrorist ones. The "material support," law had been challenged by groups and individuals who argued, in part, that the law is so broad it violates their free speech and association rights.

    Writing for a 6-3 majority in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that the federal government may "prohibit all forms for aid to designated terrorist groups, even if the support consists of training and advice about entirely peaceful and legal activities." But in a dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer blasted the majority opinion for upholding a law that suppresses activities that "are of a kind that the First Amendment ordinarily protects."

    During the 2010 ACS National Convention a panel of experts explored the material support law's constitutional impacts. Following the panel, "Material Support Provisions and the First Amendment," David D. Cole, a law professor at Georgetown University Law Center and the attorney who helped represent the groups and individuals challenging the material support provisions, talked with ACSblog about the history of the law. Cole said the federal government, stretching back to the Clinton administration, has shown "very little interest in narrowing the law," and in fact has argued for the broadest reading of the law. Cole concluded by saying that he hoped Congress would eventually find the will to rein in the law. Cole's interview is below, or it can be downloaded as a podcast here. Video of the entire panel discussion is available here.

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  • November 17, 2009
    Next year the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in two cases challenging provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT as constitutionally suspect. Today, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a brief in one of the cases, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, arguing that the provision barring "material support" is too broad, vague and thus violates the Constitution's First Amendment.

    In a press statement about its brief, CCR cooperating attorney David Cole said, "This statute is so sweeping that it treats human rights advocates as criminal terrorists, and threatens them with 15 years in prison for advocating nonviolent means to resolve disputes. In our view, the First Amendment does not permit the government to make advocating human rights or other lawful, peaceable activity a crime simply because it is done for the benefit of, or in conjunction with, a group the Secretary of State has blacklisted."

    The CCR's statement also notes, "The lower courts held unconstitutionally vague the law's prohibition on the provision of ‘services,' ‘expert advice or assistance,' and ‘training,' reasoning that these terms could easily encompass a wide range of lawful speech, such as providing training in international law. The Obama administration sought Supreme Court review of that decision."

    In analysis of both cases, SCOTUSblog's Lyle Denniston writes that the groups and individuals involved in the cases -- the other being Humanitarian Law Project, et al., v. Holder -- are attempting to work with organizations that are on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. "They are," Denniston writes, "the Kurdistan Workers'; Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Those two groups, the brief said, ‘engage in a wide range of lawful, nonviolent activity,' and the groups and individuals in the case ‘seek to further only such activity.'"

    Ahilan T. Arulanantham, an attorney for the ACLU of Southern California, says that a frequently overlooked consequence of the "material support" provision of the Patriot Act is its effect on the rendering of humanitarian aid in certain parts of the world. 

    In an Issue Brief released by ACS, Arulanantham maintains:

    The current material support statute, with its limited exceptions and extremely broad intent requirement, leads to truly irrational results. A humanitarian organization may send medicine to perform dialysis, but risks prosecution if it also seeks to send either the doctor or the equipment needed to perform the dialysis itself. Surely we do not enhance our nation's security by enacting statutes that lead to such absurd, and cruel, results.