Martin Magnusson

  • February 22, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Martin Magnusson. Mr. Magnusson is an associate at Day Pitney LLP.
    In 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty that outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. As a signatory to that treaty, the United States agreed also to criminalize private individuals' production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Accordingly, Congress enacted legislation that made it illegal for any person knowingly to "develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon."

    Thankfully, the United States has had few occasions to bring chemical-weapons charges under this law. One such prosecution, though, is currently before the United States Supreme Court, which will hear oral argument today in Bond v. United States.

    The defendant in that case, Carol Anne Bond, was a microbiologist who had been married for several years but couldn't bear a child. When Ms. Bond's best friend announced that she was pregnant, Ms. Bond was excited. When Ms. Bond discovered that her husband was the child's father, though, her mood understandably soured. She vowed to get revenge against her one-time best friend and tried, at least 24 times, to poison her with lethal chemicals that she stole from work and ordered online.

    Ms. Bond was ultimately charged with possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of the criminal statute that implemented the United States' treaty obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. At the district court, Ms. Bond unsuccessfully argued that when Congress passed this statute, it exceeded its powers under the Constitution. The district court rejected that argument, but Ms. Bond continued to pursue it on appeal.

    Ms. Bond's position makes intuitive sense: The Tenth Amendment expressly provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." And, unlike other federal statutes that address assaults, the law under which Ms. Bond was prosecuted includes no requirement that the alleged assault occur within the special jurisdiction of the United States, that the assault have an effect on interstate commerce, that the victim be a person or institution with recognized federal status, or that some other federal interest be involved. It also includes no requirement that the government prove a federal interest as an element of the offense. As such, the law criminalizes conduct with very little connection to a legitimate federal interest.

  • January 11, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Martin Magnusson. Mr. Magnusson is an associate at Day Pitney LLP.
    Under the Fourth Amendment, police need a warrant to enter a person's home without that person's consent. An exception to this rule exists for so-called exigent circumstances. Under the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, police are excused from getting a warrant when faced with situations that call for immediate action. An important example of exigent circumstances is the destruction of evidence. If the police had to get a warrant before entering a home in which they believe evidence is being destroyed, the evidence would be probably gone by the time that they return with the warrant.

    Tomorrow, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Kentucky v. King, a case that explores the boundaries of the exigent-circumstances exception. According to the trial court's findings of facts in that case, police officers smelled burning marijuana outside an apartment. Instead of seeking a warrant to search the apartment, though, the police officers "banged on the door of the apartment . . . identifying themselves as police officers and demanding that the door be opened by the persons inside." The officers then heard "things being moved in the apartment." They subsequently described the sounds as that of "people moving around as opposed to furniture being moved." From these sounds, "[i]t seemed to the officers that the occupants . . . may have been in the process of destroying evidence." After no one answered the door, the police forcibly entered the apartment. Inside, they found Hollis King smoking marijuana.

    Before the Supreme Court, Mr. King argues that the police officers' warrantless entry into his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence discovered during their warrantless entry must therefore be suppressed. His position is that if the police create the exigent circumstances that purportedly call for immediate action, there really isn't any emergency and the exigent-circumstances exception is inapt. The logic of Mr. King's argument is hard to argue with: If the police could circumvent the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement by manufacturing emergencies, then the warrant requirement wouldn't be very meaningful.

    Although the King case has received little press attention, its resolution could affect anybody who is visited by the police. As Professor Orin Kerr has noted:

    When the police bang on a door, shout that they are the police, and demand entry, they do what they do when they have a warrant. To someone inside, that noise from outside creates the impression that the police are following the "knock and announce" rule they have to follow when executing warrant. Under the rule, if no one answers the door in 15-20 seconds, the police will break down the door and enter. If I'm in an apartment and I hear that outside, I'm not just going to sit there in my apartment and keep watching TV or surfing the Internet or watching the paint dry. Rather I'm either going to run to the door immediately to stop the police from breaking it down (which I have only a few seconds to do before they enter) or else I'm going to prepare myself for a bunch of cops violently entering a few seconds later. Either way, I'm going to move around and make some noise.

  • June 25, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Martin Magnusson. Mr. Magnusson is an associate at Day Pitney LLP.

    The Supreme Court recently issued its much-awaited opinion in Skilling v. United States, in which it addressed two hotly debated criminal-law issues:

    • What is the test for whether pretrial publicity and community prejudice will prevent a criminal defendant from obtaining a fair trial?
    • Is the honest-services-fraud statute, an important federal law in prosecuting public corruption, unconstitutionally vague?

    The facts of Skilling are rooted in the 2001 collapse of Enron, which caused shareholders to lose nearly eleven billion dollars. In the wake of this scandal, the Government conducted an investigation in which it uncovered an elaborate conspiracy to prop up Enron's stock prices. The Government subsequently prosecuted several Enron employees who participated in that conspiracy, including former CEO Jeffrey Skilling.

    The Government indicted Mr. Skilling for, among other things, conspiring to deprive Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right of his honest services. This charge is predicted on 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which expands the mail-fraud and wire-fraud statutes to reach "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."

    Mr. Skilling's trial was set to take place in Houston, where Enron had been headquartered. Mr. Skilling, though, moved for a change of venue, contending that the collapse of Enron had so dramatically affected the Houston community that he could not get a fair trial there. Mr. Skilling supported his motion for a change in venue with hundreds of news reports detailing Enron's downfall and with affidavits from experts who had studied community attitudes in Houston in relation to community attitudes in other potential venues.

  • November 23, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Martin Magnusson, an associate at Day Pitney LLP.

    The False Claims Act allows private citizens to prosecute fraud on behalf of the federal government. It dates back to the 1860s, when Congress passed the act to address fraud on the part of government contractors who supplied the Union Army during the Civil War.

    Liability under the False Claims Act is robust: Damages are trebled, civil penalties are assessed for each violation, and the whistleblower can recover his or her attorney's fees. Because the whistleblower also shares 15 to 30 percent of the government's recovery, the False Claims Act is a powerful incentive for whistleblowers to step forward with inside information about fraud and abuse in government contracts. The financial incentives that underlie the False Claims Act, though, are generally reserved for whistleblowers with nonpublic information about fraud in government contracts. The so-called "public-disclosure bar" prevents non-whistleblower plaintiffs from bringing opportunistic suits based on information that is already public knowledge.

    But the exact parameters of the public-disclosure bar are unclear and have divided federal courts. This term, the United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue in Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson.