Incorporation

  • March 5, 2010
    Guest Post

    By David H. Gans, Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights, and Citizenship Program at the Constitutional Accountability Center. He is the lead author of the report, The Gem of the Constitution: the Text and History of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and co-author of CAC's brief in McDonald. This article is cross-posted at CAC's blog, Text & History.

    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which raises the question whether the Second Amendment's guarantee of a right to bear arms applies to states and local governments. Going into argument, incorporation of the Second Amendment right seemed a given - after all, states already have to obey virtually every right in the Bill of Rights. The critical question was whether the Court would breathe new life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and honor the part of the Fourteenth Amendment's text that clearly protects substantive fundamental rights from state infringement.

    The Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to be the centerpiece of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it was written out of the Constitution by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases. The decision has been regarded as one of the worst in the Court's history, and roundly condemned by the Amendment's framers in the 1870s, Justice Harlan in the early 20th century, and Justice Black in the 1940s. The overwhelming consensus among scholars across the ideological spectrum - reflected in a law professors' brief filed by CAC in McDonald - is that Slaughter-House obliterated the text and history of the Clause through a profoundly incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.

    Unfortunately, the Privileges or Immunities Clause received a chilly reception from the Court on Tuesday, especially from those Justices who most profess to take the Constitution's text and history seriously. Justice Scalia belittled the Clause, accusing Alan Gura, McDonald's attorney, of "bucking for some place on some law school faculty" by advancing an argument that was "the darling of the professoriate." Scalia, supposedly the Court's chief originalist, wouldn't even consider the merits of the argument. Chief Justice Roberts, too, refused to follow the Constitution's text and history where it leads. He explicitly worried that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow for broad protections of substantive liberty; he preferred to rely on the Due Process Clause, since that text is about process, and does not easily lend itself to protecting substantive fundamental rights. While Roberts and Scalia were content to rely on substantive due process to protect gun rights, they seemed to want to reserve the opportunity to bash the doctrine in future cases involving rights they don't recognize. Other Justices were less overtly hostile, but none seemed willing to revive the Clause.

    In light of its reception at the Court, was Gura too bold?

  • March 4, 2010

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Professor Winkler signed an amicus brief filed in McDonald v. City of Chicago supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    [Part I of "Supersizing the Second Amendment?" is available here.]

    So why do I still say that gun control advocates are also seemed to be big winners?

    Because the Justices seemed to think that, regardless of incorporation, state and local governments would retain wide leeway to enact gun control. The only words used as much as "fundamental" and "implicit in ordered liberty" in the argument were "reasonable regulation."

    Numerous Justices expressed their support for the idea that the Second Amendment did not prohibit reasonable regulation of firearms. Justice Kennedy said that lawmakers still "have substantial latitude and ample authority to impose reasonable regulations." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that she "thought that Heller allowed for reasonable regulation." Justice Scalia didn't use that catchphrase, but went out of his way to say that Heller "was very careful not to impose" severe limits on the federal government "precisely because it realized that" gun violence "is a national problem."

    There are two ways to think about "reasonable regulation." The first is what I've long endorsed: the Second Amendment should be governed by the formal "reasonable regulation" standard uniformly used in state constitutional law. Forty-two states have constitutional protections for the individual right to bear arms and all of them apply a deferential standard by this name. Under that test, any regulation will be allowed to stand so long as it doesn't effectively destroy or nullify the individual's right to have a gun for self-defense. Some types of weapons can be banned so long as individuals have access to others. Applying this test, almost all gun control survives.

  • March 3, 2010

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Professor Winkler signed an amicus brief filed in McDonald v. City of Chicago supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the latest big gun case, McDonald v. City of Chicago. The Court will decide whether the individual right to keep and bear arms recognized in 2008's D.C. v. Heller extends to the states. I was at oral argument and there seemed to be two big winners: gun rights advocates and gun control advocates.

    The gun rights folks, like the NRA, seemed poised to win the case. Of the five Justices who voted with the majority in Heller, all appeared to be inclined to hold that the right to bear arms is a "fundamental" right such that it applies to state laws. (Well, not all of the five: Justice Clarence Thomas said nothing, extending his streak of silent oral arguments that dates back to 2006.)

    Just like in the Heller oral argument, Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing vote, showed his cards. "If [the right to bear arms is] not fundamental, then Heller is wrong, it seems to me." Chief Justice John Roberts said, "I don't see how you can read Heller and not take away from it the notion that the Second Amendment, whether you want to label it fundamental or not, was extremely important to the framers in their view of what liberty meant."

    As Paul Clement, representing the NRA said, the question of whether the right to bear arms was fundamental or not was "remarkably straightforward." The fact that Clement was there at all was a surprise. The NRA was not formally a party to the suit. More striking still was that Clement was representing the NRA. After Clement, then serving as Solicitor General, filed a brief in Heller suggesting that D.C.'s handgun ban might be constitutional, gun rights activists branded him a traitor. Now he is their lawyer.

  • February 24, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Lawrence Rosenthal, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Professor Rosenthal filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in McDonald v. City of Chicago in support of Chicago.

    In its 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, a closely divided Supreme Court, applying what the majority characterized as "the original understanding of the Second Amendment," invalidated D.C.'s prohibition on the possession of handguns. Relying on eighteenth-century sources, the Court defined the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear arms" as "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," and held that a prohibition on handguns was unconstitutional. The Court cautioned, however, that the Second Amendment is only a limitation on the powers of Congress, and reserved decision on the question whether it also applied to state and local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that its nineteenth-century decisions had refused to apply the Second Amendment to state and local laws, but added that these cases "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases."

    The Court will now confront the applicability of the Second Amendment to state and local laws in McDonald v. City of Chicago. At issue is the constitutionality of Chicago's handgun ban. Chicago and its amici rely on the approach to incorporation of the first eight amendments within the Fourteenth that the Court has taken for nearly a century - asking whether a particular right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Under this approach, many of the rights in the first eight amendments have been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause - but not all.