by Brandon L. Garrett and Lee Kovarsky. Garrett is a professor of law at the University of Virginia School of Law and Kovarsky is an assistant professor of law at the University of Maryland School of Law. They are co-authors of a habeas corpus casebook, Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-conviction Litigation, which was just published by Foundation Press.
This week, the Supreme Court handed down habeas decisions on two different gateways through procedural obstacles to federal habeas review. The first decision involved an “innocence” gateway. In McQuiggan v. Perkins, the Court held that, despite a constitutional claim’s untimeliness, a federal court could reach the claim’s merit if there exists a reasonable chance that the inmate was wrongfully convicted. The second gateway is a “bad lawyering” gateway. In Trevino v. Thaler, the Court held that inadequate state post-conviction representation can excuse the default of a trial-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claim if, as a practical matter, a state post-conviction proceeding was the only forum for a state inmate to raise it. In each case, the Court avoided mechanical readings of statutes or precedents in favor of interpretations that reflect the byzantine reality of modern habeas corpus review.
In the “innocence gateway” case, Floyd Perkins was serving a life sentence in Michigan. Perkins argued that he had new evidence proving his innocence: witnesses would say that another man was the killer, that the other man had bragged he had done it, and that the other man was trying to wash blood-stained clothes the day after the killing. Perkins had been convicted largely based on testimony of the other man, as well as two others who said they overheard Perkins admit his guilt. Perkins argued that his new evidence of innocence entitled him to merits review of his IAC claim, which was untimely under the one-year federal limitations period. He could not, however, show that he had acted with “due diligence” in bringing this evidence to the attention of the judge. He argued that new evidence of innocence should excuse the untimely filing, notwithstanding the technical defects in the petition.