Guest Post

  • July 13, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Theo Shaw, a William H. Gates Public Service Law Scholar, University of Washington School of Law; and one of the young students charged in the “Jena 6” case. Follow him on Twitter @theorshaw

    Glenn Ford, imprisoned nearly half his life for a murder he didn’t commit, died earlier this month after a battle with lung cancer. Socially, though, he died 30 years ago – in part because of our nation’s underfunded public defender systems and prosecutorial misconduct, and lack of accountability.

    As an intern for the Innocence Project New Orleans (IPNO) in 2010, I worked on multiple cases where prosecutorial misconduct and lawyers’ ineffectiveness resulted in wrongful convictions. Some of our clients received ineffective legal representation because our nation’s public defender systems are so terribly underfunded lawyers are compelled to represent more people than is ethically possible, which increases the likelihood of wrongful convictions.

    Compounding those injustices are government abuses of power. During Ford’s initial trial, prosecutors withheld evidence favorable to his defense. Disturbingly, Ford’s nightmare isn’t unique. During my summer with the IPNO, I befriended John Thompson. He spent 18 years in prison—14 of those years on death row—for a crime he didn’t commit. In his case, prosecutors also withheld evidence favorable to his defense; and the gross injustice of government abuse is a reality for many more defendants.

    After his release, Ford filed a petition seeking compensation for his wrongful imprisonment. Ford's request was denied because, according to District Judge Katherine Dorroh, he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was factually innocent. This is clear for me: a criminal justice system built on the principle of Equal Justice Under Law should require more – for justice and fairness.

    For our society to banish these injustices it must face reality and take action. 

    In our juvenile and criminal justice systems, race and poverty significantly determines outcome. In fact, there are important cause and effect relations between race and poverty. It’s undeniable and ethically inexcusable that for indigent and racial minorities in our justice systems, both historically and within our contemporary society, the right to counsel is violated almost daily.

    As a prospective public interest lawyer, I am strongly committed and passionate about the right to competent legal representation and equal justice for indigent people, racial minorities, juvenile offenders, condemned prisoners, and those wrongly convicted in our legal system. This means I am just as committed to fighting systemic poverty, challenging racial discrimination in our criminal justice system, and ending human rights abuses in our juvenile and adult detention facilities, practices such as solitary confinement, guard abuse, and degrading conditions of confinement.

    My vision and hope for a just society is also fueled by a deeply held universal concern (across race) for all persons who have had or will have their constitutional rights violated. Hence, I am committed to using my knowledge (legal and otherwise) to be a powerful and compassionate voice for every person accused of a crime. In this way I hope to help this country realize the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright

     

     

  • July 8, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Saul Cornell, the Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University

    The so called new originalism has generated a good deal of academic buzz over the past few years.  (As is true for most forms of originalism the actual impact of the theory on the behavior of courts has been quite modest.)  It is hard to find much support for originalism among professional historians. Judged from the perspective of history, most new originalist scholarship seems methodologically simplistic and ideologically tendentious. Rather than move constitutional theory forward, new originalism represents a serious intellectual step backwards

    In the current issue of The Virginia Law Review Professor Lawrence Solum of Georgetown, a prominent new originalist, responds to some of this recent historical criticism. Solum’s variant of new originalism is the most sophisticated of the many rival theories now floating around.  Moreover, he maintains that his originalist approach to history rests on truths derived from philosophy and linguistics, insights that he claims historians have neglected. Although Solum has dressed up his theory in a ponderous philosophical jargon, his approach has done little more than wed the old law office history to a new law office philosophy. Stripped of its pretentious vocabulary, Solum’s theory leaves us at the same old impasse: originalism remains an ideology pretending to be a scholarly methodology.

    Solum describes his theory as follows:

    Because constitutional communication (like legal communication generally) is simply a form of human communication, theories of constitutional interpretation must be reconciled with the general theory of the way linguistic communication works that has been developed in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics.

    The first problem with such a claim is that it mistakenly asserts that there is a clear consensus in the philosophy of language about how to approach issues of meaning. This statement is clearly false. Philosophers remain deeply divided over these types of questions. Even if one assumes that some variant of Gricean pragmatics (the model Solum favors) is the correct theory to understand constitutional communication, Solum’s adaptation of Gricean ideas is questionable at best, and arguably is simply wrong-headed. The claim that constitutional communication is just another form of ordinary communication and must conform to the models used to comprehend ordinary language seems equally problematic. There are many forms of communication that do not conform to the rules governing ordinary language, for example, poetry, politics, and oratory.  (Indeed the very idea of a universal model of ordinary communication that transcends boundaries of time, space, and place itself seems deeply ethnocentric and has been challenged by many anthropologists.)

    The final problem with Solum’s model stems from his rendering of the current state of linguistic theory. Solum appears to have ignored the entire sub-fields of  socio-linguistics and linguistic anthropology. Rather than support his theory, empirical work in these two fields undermines virtually every one of Solum’s assumptions and claims about how language works. Indeed,  if one looks at Solum’s  model it clearly violates some of the most basic research protocols in these sub-fields by assuming the existence of a broad consensus on linguistic matters and ignoring the existence of rival speech communities within the dominant linguistic community under examination -- Founding era America. Although English speakers in America in 1788 may have been part of the same linguistic community, they were not all members of the same speech community. Indeed, the degree of linguistic consensus Solum posits for post-Revolutionary era America exceeds anything linguistic anthropologists have ever documented in decades of field research. Solum’s theory is really a form of American exceptionalism on steroids. Such a consensus model is not only hard to reconcile with the empirical evidence gathered by anthropologists about linguistic diversity in virtually every complex literate society, it does not fit the available historical evidence about Founding era constitutional culture. The Founding era was not characterized by consensus, but was defined by profound conflicts over the meaning of constitutional terms, constitutional interpretive methods, and constitutional aspirations. New originalists, including Solum have never grasped this basic fact which historians demonstrated decades ago. 

  • July 8, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Mary Kelly Persyn, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe

    “Law serves human values.” 

    Hon. Peter Rubin, ACS founder and (since 2008) justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in an address to the Columbia Law School ACS Student Chapter, January 19, 2006.

    From its founding, ACS has advocated for true equality of opportunity, the taproot of American democracy. Rejecting the formal equality yielded by more conservative readings of our Constitution and laws, instead we seek equity—an authentically fair chance for all.

    But equity evades easy solutions, and inequity is spread so broadly across so many dimensions it’s difficult to know where to start. The answer, as I’ve written previously in this space, may well lie in approaches informed by collective impact—a modern Archimedes’ lever. Consider the work of Nadine Burke Harris, M.D., MPH, FAAP, a pediatrician who started a clinic in the Bayview neighborhood of San Francisco following her residency at Stanford. On Thursday, July 2, Dr. Burke Harris visited Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe to address an audience filled with United Way of the Bay Area Women’s Leadership Council members, ACS Bay Area Lawyer Chapter members, and their guests.

    The Bayview is a neighborhood rich in family and community ties. But it is poor in resources and health, and suffers one of the the highest crime rates in the city. After Dr. Burke Harris opened the Bayview Child Health Center, she began to see the links links between early childhood adversity and health. She began to see children coming to the clinic with high rates of asthma, ADHD, and other childhood illnesses at many times the rate of the general population. “Doctora,” one of her patients explained, “it seems like my daughter’s asthma is worse when her daddy punches a hole in the wall.” That’s obviously terrifying for a child—but why would asthma follow?

    As Dr. Burke Harris recounts, the answer materialized when a colleague came to her with the 1998 Kaiser study called “Adverse Childhood Experiences,” or ACEs. This  was the “aha” moment that would ultimately change the course of her career and lead to creation of the Center for Youth Wellness.

  • July 3, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Charlotte Garden, Associate Professor of Law and Litigation Director of the Korematsu Center for Law & Equality, Seattle University School of Law

    The Supreme Court granted cert. on Tuesday in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, a case about the constitutionality of union “fair share fees” in the public sector. Friedrichs will be one of next Term’s blockbusters – we can expect a decision in the last part of the Term, when the Court hands down its most closely watched cases. Here’s what’s at stake:

     

    1. What the case is about

    Like many states, California permits its teachers who vote for union representation to bargain collectively over many of their working conditions. (Conversely, California teachers’ unions are not permitted to bargain over some key work rules, such as teacher tenure, which is set by statute.) An elected union must fairly represent every employee in its bargaining unit, and in exchange, the union and the state may agree to require each represented worker to pay his or her share of the union’s representation costs. This is a common way for states to structure their labor relations, and it was approved by the Supreme Court in a 1977 case called Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. On the other hand, Abood also held that unions cannot require workers to pay for their other activities, such as organizing other workplaces, and political advocacy.

    The Friedrichs plaintiffs are asking the Court to overrule Abood and hold that public sector workers have a First Amendment right not to pay for union representation at all. (I described the case for ACSBlog in more detail here.) If the plaintiffs win, it would not mean that unions could stop representing non-paying workers; instead, it would mean that unions would have to represent them for free. One danger, then, is that so many workers might decide to free ride that their unions will collapse. That would harm workers, for whom unions help provide a route to the middle class, and also state employers who rely on collective bargaining as an effective method of workforce management.

     

    1. Why now?

    Twice in the last three years, in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000 and Harris v. Quinn, Justice Alito has authored majority opinions calling Abood into doubt. In response, groups opposed to public sector unions filed cases around the country arguing that Knox and Harris should be extended. Friedrichs was one of these cases; the plaintiffs are represented by the Center for Individual Rights and Michael Carvin, who also argued King v. Burwell and NFIB v. Sebelius. Their litigation strategy was to get to the Supreme Court as quickly as possible, and they accomplished it by admitting that their claims were foreclosed below and pressing for quick adverse decisions. But the lack of discovery in the district court will make for a thin record in front of the Supreme Court, which might have ultimately benefitted from evidence on topics like whether it is difficult to opt out of the non-mandatory portion of union fees, or the role of agency fees in promoting stable labor relations.

     

  • July 2, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Kelli Garcia, Senior Counsel, National Women’s Law Center

    The Supreme Court earlier this week stayed enforcement of key provisions of HB2—Texas’ sweeping anti-abortion law—pending the Court’s decision whether to hear an appeal in the case.  Only 9 abortion clinics would have remained open in the state had the law gone into effect leaving over 1.3 million women of reproductive age more than 100 miles from the nearest abortion clinic.

    The Fifth Circuits Unsound Reasoning

    Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit had overturned most of a district court’s decision striking down this dangerous requirement. The law requires that abortion providers obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the abortion clinic and the requirement that clinics providing abortion services meet the standards for ambulatory surgery centers. The Fifth Circuit also held that the requirements could be applied to the sole abortion provider in El Paso, Texas because women in that region would be able to travel to an abortion provider in Santa Teresa, New Mexico. However, the Court did enjoin the state from requiring the sole abortion provider and clinic in the Rio Grande Valley to comply with the admitting privileges requirement and two of the requirements for ambulatory surgery center.

    These restrictions, often called targeted regulations of abortion providers or TRAP laws, are opposed by major medical organizations including  the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Medical Association (AMA) because they “imposes[] government regulation on abortion care that jeopardizes the health of women.” As both ACOG and the AMA note, abortions are an extremely safe procedure and complications requiring hospitalization are incredibly rare. There is no medical reason to require abortion providers to have admitting privileges nor is there any reason for abortion facilities to comply with more stringent requirements than other medical facilities that perform procedures with similar, or even greater, risks.

    Yet in upholding the abortion restrictions, the Fifth Circuit ignored the medical evidence, stating that the district court erred in weighing the burdens imposed by the restrictions against the medical efficacy of the restrictions.  The Supreme Court has never upheld a law that limits abortion services without first establishing that the law furthers a valid state interest. In addition, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have held that the courts must “weigh the burdens against the state’s justification, asking whether and to what extent the challenged regulation actually advances the state’s interest.” Such an inquiry is necessary to determine whether the restrictions impose an undue burden on a woman’s constitutionally protected right to abortion. As the Supreme Court stated in City of Akron, “The existence of a compelling state interest in health . . . is only the beginning of the inquiry. The State’s regulation may be upheld only if it is reasonably designed to further that state interest.”

    Texas Abortion Restrictions Threaten Womens Health

    Although the stay is good news for Texas women, it doesn’t undo the damage done by other abortion restrictions including provisions of HB2 that have already gone into effect.  Since 2013, when HB2 was passed, more than 20 abortion clinics in the state have closed.  As a result of these closures, many women seeking abortions were turned away from clinics and some of those women were unable to obtain abortions.