Geoffrey R. Stone

  • September 9, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Geoffrey R. Stone. He is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law for the University of Chicago, the former ACS Board Chair and current Co-Chair of the Board of Advisors for the ACS Chicago Lawyer Chapter, and a Co-Faculty Advisor for the University of Chicago Law School ACS Student Chapter

    *This post originally appeared on the Huffington Post. 

    In the context of ongoing deliberations over a proposed amendment to the Constitution to authorize the government to enact laws regulating campaign expenditures and contributions, a sharp, even bitter, rift has emerged between different generations of the ACLU's leadership over the ACLU's understanding of the First Amendment. The rift is not about whether to adopt the proposed constitutional amendment (neither side of the intra-ACLU debate has endorsed it), but about the ACLU's position on the constitutionality of campaign finance reform today.

    The current leadership of the ACLU takes a strong pro-free speech position that, like the position of Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Chief Justice John Roberts, looks askance at most forms of campaign finance regulation that would limit the freedom of individuals to spend as much as they want in the political process to advance their political beliefs.

    The six individuals who led the ACLU from 1962 to 1993 endorse a rather different view. In a letter sent on September 4 to the leadership of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, they embraced a position that, like the position of Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, recognizes that limitations on campaign expenditures and contributions may be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the democratic process.

  • August 4, 2014

    by Caroline Cox

    In The Washington Post, Maurice Possley of The Marshall Project writes that new evidence raises doubts about the 2004 Texas execution of Cameron Todd Willingham. “This case could be the first to show conclusively that an innocent man was put to death in the modern era of capital punishment.”

    Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law for the University of Chicago,  former ACS Board Chair and current Co-Chair of the Board of Advisors for the ACS Chicago Lawyer Chapter as well as Co-Faculty Advisor for the University of Chicago Law School ACS Student Chapter, explains in The Daily Beast that the flood of judicial rulings holding bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional are not the result of public opinion shifts. Rather, the Supreme Court opened the door to these decisions long before support for gay marriage became more mainstream.

    Collin Eaton, writing for The Houston Chronicle, reports that BP has asked the Supreme Court to reverse lower court rulings on the approved settlement class for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. The petition asserts that claimants should have to show that their losses were directly tied to the spill.

    The Tennessean’s Brian Haas reports on the Tennessee Supreme Court retention election, noting the large amount of money conservative groups have spent to campaign against the justices.

    Christine Vestal of Stateline discusses the challenges many state health insurance exchanges face in light of the Halbig v. Burwell ruling. Consumers in 36 states risk losing future premium subsidies if the Supreme Court rules in favor of Affordable Care Act opponents. 

  • July 14, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago

    *This piece is cross-posted at Huffington Post

    A recent Washington Post article reported that the state constitutions of eight states -- Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas -- expressly prohibit individuals who do not believe in God from holding public office.

    The Arkansas constitution, for example, provides that "no person who denies the being of a God shall hold any office in... this State," the Mississippi constitution stipulates that "no person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office in this State," the Tennessee constitution states that "no person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards and punishment, shall hold any office in... this state," and so on.

    Are such provisions constitutional? The history of such laws goes back to the very founding of our nation, for a central question facing the Framers of our Constitution concerned the appropriate role of religion in government. For more than a thousand years, it had been the norm for Christian societies to have an established religion. At the time of the American Revolution, nine of the 13 colonies still had an established church, and most colonies expressly limited the right to hold public office to members of their established church. Over the next decade, though, Americans increasingly questioned the appropriate role of religion in the affairs of government.

    A critical debate occurred in Virginia, where a lengthy struggle culminated in the adoption in 1785 of Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom. The preamble of Jefferson's bill condemned those "legislators and rulers" who have "assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as... true and infallible," and then "endeavored to impose them on others."

  • March 28, 2014
    Guest Post
    by Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Professor of Law and an ACS Faculty Advisor at the University of Chicago Law School; former Chair, ACS Board of Directors
     
    This post originally appeared at The Daily Beast.
     
    President Obama announced this morning that he will propose legislation calling for significant changes in the NSA’s telephone metadata program. This is good news, indeed.
     
    The enactment of these proposals would strike a much better balance between the interests of liberty and security. They would preserve the value of the NSA’s program in terms of protecting the national security, while at the same time providing much greater, and much needed, protection to individual privacy and civil liberties.
     
    The proposals are based on recommendations made by the president’s five-member Review Group, of which I was a member. To understand why we came up with these suggestions, it is necessary first to understand how the program operates.
     
    Under the telephone metadata program, which was created in 2006, telephone service companies like Sprint, Verizon and AT&T are required to turn over to the NSA, on an ongoing daily basis, huge quantities of telephone metadata involving the phone records of millions of Americans, none of whom are themselves suspected of anything.
     
    Even though the program to-date has functioned properly, history teaches that there is always the risk of another J. Edgar Hoover or Richard Nixon.
     
  • February 20, 2014
    Guest Post
    by Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Professor of Law and an ACS Faculty Advisor at the University of Chicago Law School; former Chair, ACS Board of Directors
     
    * This post originally appeared on The Huffington Post.
     
    A few days ago on the campus of the University of Mississippi, someone (reportedly two males) draped a Confederate flag on a statue honoring James Meredith and hung a noose around its neck. Meredith was the African-American student who courageously desegregated the University of Mississippi in 1962, weathering a storm of ugly protest, riots and threats of violence. This act was, by any measure, deeply disrespectful and hateful.
     
    University of Mississippi Chancellor Dan Jones responded by stating of those who did this: "Their ideas have no place here, and our response will be an even greater commitment to promoting the values that are engraved on the statue—Courage, Knowledge, Opportunity, and Perseverance."
     
    This poses an interesting question. How should the University of Mississippi respond? What does it mean to say that these "ideas have no place here"? Assuming the individuals who did this were students, should the university expel or otherwise discipline them? Are there "ideas" that "have no place" on a university campus?