Gaberial J. Chin

  • July 18, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Gabriel J. Chin, Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law

    *Noting the 50th anniversaries of Freedom Summer and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ACSblog is hosting a symposium including posts and interviews from some of the nation’s leading scholars and civil rights activists.

    Practicing the art of the possible rather than seeking perfection may be an inevitable feature of civil rights legislation. Even the greatest and most honored laws have loopholes; the Thirteenth Amendment, for example, allows slavery based on conviction of crime, any crime, and the exception was liberally exploited in the former Confederacy after Redemption. The Fifteenth Amendment seems to countenance discrimination on the basis of sex, and a protection in earlier versions of the right to hold office was stripped out before enactment.        

    Nevertheless, I’ll take them; I do not criticize the Reconstruction Amendments or their makers for being merely as good as was possible at the time. Similarly, it would not have been better to give up what was good in the 1964 Act simply because of its deficiencies. At the same time, recognizing a law’s compromises and gaps is essential to understanding its real import, and to thinking about how policy can be shaped to fully reflect the principle at stake.

    Among the important compromises in the bill are exemptions from the employment discrimination prohibition of Title VII for businesses of less than 15 people, and the exemption from the Public Accommodations provision of Title II for small, owner-occupied motels and lodging establishments. Presumably, these exceptions exist for the benefit of racists who grew up in a racist system through no fault of their own. Congress might reasonably have concluded that forcing close contact between racial minorities and these racists might have been more trouble than it was worth.  But these exemptions should have been time-limited; at this point, all but the oldest business owners spent their entire lives, or at least their adulthoods, in a nation were discrimination has clearly been against the law and public policy. The case for continued compromise of the policy is not obvious.

    Another major gap in the Civil Rights Act is the lack of protection against discrimination of members of the LGBTQ community. Clearly, this was no oversight. The desegregation struggle was to some degree a Cold War propaganda effort. Fair treatment on the basis of race was a “cold war imperative,” and so too was controlling the potentially subversive effects of sexual minorities. Thus, the 1965 Immigration Act, a close cousin of the Civil Rights Act, eliminated discrimination on the basis of race in immigration law, but simultaneously clarified and strengthened a prohibition on gay and lesbian immigration. The Civil Rights Act makes little sense unless it recognizes a fundamental human dignity and equality. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act closed unjustified gaps in the coverage of the original law, and the prohibition on gay immigration is gone. Continuing to allow discrimination against gays and lesbians in the Civil Rights Act is indefensible.

  • March 21, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Gabriel J. Chin, Professor of Law, University of California Davis School of Law

    This week, the Supreme Court heard argument in Arizona v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, a case at the intersection of two lines of cases which have been prominent on the Court’s docket in recent years. The case is an example of a challenge to Arizona’s apparently endless cornucopia of anti-immigrant legislation. It also tests measures which, according to some conservatives, are designed to preserve the integrity of the ballot box, but according to others are calculated to suppress the minority vote.

    The case involves Arizona’s Proposition 200, passed in 2004, which requires prospective Arizona voters to provide proof of United States citizenship before registration. But the federal National Voter Registration Act of 1993 directed the federal Election Assistance Commission to create a federal form for voter registration (current version here). That form requires applicants to provide a date of birth and other identifying information, and an oath that the applicant is a citizen, but does not require independent documentary proof of citizenship.  Federal law requires states to “accept and use” the federal form. The critical question is whether “accept and use” means that a properly completed form is sufficient for voter registration unless the state independently proves that it is fraudulent, or, rather, that the form is the beginning of an application process during which the state may freely add supplemental requirements and inquiries.

    A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which included retired Justice O’Connor, invalidated Prop. 200’s proof-of-citizenship requirement, over a dissent by Chief Judge Kozinski. En banc, the Ninth Circuit held 9-2 that the requirement was invalid, this time with Chief Judge Kozinski in the majority. Both the panel and the court en banc Circuit upheld a separate provision of Prop. 200, requiring registered voters to show identification at the polls.

    It is common ground that the federal government has broad power over federal elections.  As the Brennan Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center wrote in a brief for me and other constitutional law scholars, under the Elections Clause (Article I, Section 4), Congress may regulate federal elections and supersede state electoral laws. The Framers recognized the national implications of state electoral improprieties, and granted the national government the power to protect itself.  Neither Arizona nor any of the justices questioned the century of precedents to this effect. Instead, the case seemed to turn on the intent of Congress.

  • February 26, 2013

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Professor Justin Levitt says Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides elasticity – that is covered jurisdictions complaining about federal intrusions have a way to “bail-out,” by showing that their proposed changes to voting laws would not discriminate against minority voters. And Prof. Gabriel J. Chin says the Supreme Court, when it considers the constitutionality of Section 5 in Shelby County v. Holder, should refrain from overreaching, allowing Congress to do its job, which in part entails enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

    See their posts and others in the ACSblog symposium on the Shelby County case, which the justices will hear oral argument in tomorrow.

    Janai S. Nelson, a professor of law at St. John’s University School of Law, in a post for Reuters also provides some excellent insight into the viability of Section 5. (Section 5 requires certain states and towns, mostly in the South, with long histories of racial discrimination in voting to obtain “preclearance” for proposed changes to their elections laws and procedures from the Department of Justice or a federal court in Washington.)

    She notes that a major aim of Section 5 centers on ensuring that “new voting laws will not ‘retrogress’ – or harm – minority voting rights.”

    And as many have noted, during the 2012 elections the Department of Justice successfully employed Section 5 to prevent discriminatory elections laws from going into effect in several covered jurisdictions, such as Texas, Florida and South Carolina. (See the ACS Voting Rights Resources page for more information on this case and the landmark law.)

    Section 5, Nelson continues, has “changed the discourse around race in backrooms and in courtrooms by requiring that electoral decision-makers are not only aware of race but also are conscious of the racial harm. Indeed, Section 5’s anti-regression standard directs jurisdictions subject to oversight either to advance or, at a minimum, protect minority voting rights.”

    As noted here, Alabama officials are arguing against Section 5 partly by saying that racial discrimination is no greater in Alabama than in other states and therefore it should be dumped or greatly reworked to not burden Alabama or the other covered jurisdictions. The NAACP LDF, which is representing Alabama voters in Shelby County, says Alabama officials are turning a blind eye to the persistent efforts to harm minority voters in the state – like rewriting voting districts to dilute the minority vote, while giving more power to white voters.

    Nelson also adds that progress made in the covered jurisdictions should not lead one to conclude that Section 5 has done its job and is now an unconstitutional tool the federal government is unnecessarily wielding.

    The fact, she writes, “that the record of discrimination in covered jurisdictions has diminished is evidence that Section 5 is working – not that it has exhausted its usefulness.”

    Nelson, and other staunch supporters of the Voting Rights Act, is nailing it – Section 5 is working and the Supreme Court’s right-wing bloc, if it could keep its ideological leanings in check, would not block Congress’s constitutional authority to ensure the promise of both Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.