Fourteenth Amendment

  • April 24, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    The Editorial Board of The Washington Post remarks on the confirmation of Loretta Lynch as the next attorney general, calling the vote “embarrassing not to Ms. Lynch, who clearly deserved confirmation, but to the Republicans who voted against a nominee who should have breezed through.”

    Tom Donnelly explains at Slate how the history behind the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment created the conditions necessary for modern marriage equality.

    At The New Republic, Brianne J. Gorod uses previous decisions of the Supreme Court to show that state bans on same-sex marriage cannot trump the protections found in the U.S. Constitution.

    Lawrence Hurley discusses at Reuters how the United States’ biggest financial firms have clearly sided with marriage equality “by urging the court to strike down state laws banning same-sex unions.”

    In The New York Times, Jonathan Sherman urges the Court to end its ban on cameras during oral arguments.  

  • January 28, 2015

    by Caroline Cox

    In The New York Times, Alan Blinder reports that Georgia completed the execution of Warren Hill, a man with a lifelong intellectual disability. The Supreme Court denied a request to stay Hill’s execution earlier this week.

    Richard Kreitner argues at The Nation that courts should begin to enforce Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to save the right to vote.

    Sahil Kapur discusses in Talking Points Memo how the Obama administration is using a 2012 dissent by Justice Scalia in the new Affordable Care Act case.

    At Lyle Denniston Law News, Lyle Denniston writes that an Alabama state judge has vowed resistance to the “tyranny” of same-sex marriage rulings.

  • September 17, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Gabriel J. Chin, Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. This post is part of our 2014 Constitution Day symposium.

    Americans know their history and want to change it. No ancient injustice is ever settled; Lenny Bruce and the Scottsboro Boys were pardoned long after their deaths.  There is a constant flow of high school and college diplomas awarded to elderly people who were denied them decades ago for illegitimate reasons, including University of California students of Japanese ancestry who were unable to finish because they were interned in World War II, high school students expelled for participating in civil rights marches,  excluded because of their race, or who could not graduate because the schools were shut down entirely rather than allow racial integration. My students and I are petitioning the California Supreme Court to posthumously admit Hong Yen Chang to the bar, over a century after they excluded him because of his race.  The examples go on and on.

    In this context, the popularity of the Constitution is remarkable. It is studded with oppressive, offensive measures. One would think that those who, say, protest the disgraceful name of the pro football team in Washington, would insist, independently of the substantive meaning of the Constitution, that the document be revised and restated to eliminate the parts protecting slavery or which are otherwise inconsistent with widely shared contemporary views of justice.

    Part of the reason the Constitution stays the same is because it is hard to amend. But there is more than that.  Women and men, people of all races, and others who were once outside the Constitution but are now part of it can live with it because they feel the meaning of the words can change over time.

    For example, people who support non-discrimination might nevertheless regard the Fourteenth Amendment as something of an embarrassment; in Section 2, it seems to grant constitutional approval of the denial of the vote to female citizens. Similarly, the Fugitive Slave Clause is still in force (and of course the Thirteenth Amendment permits slavery for those convicted of crime).

    Ultimately, arguably the most offensive part of the Constitution is one of the most popular, the preamble. The Constitution, it said, was ordained and established by “we the people of the United States” for “ourselves and our posterity.” The republic was white and male, by text, tradition, and canonical statutes (such as the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress and signed by George Washington, which limited the privilege of naturalization to “free white persons”). When the words were written, they unmistakably excluded African Americans, Asians, Native Americans and women, and they were intended to have that effect, evidently, for so long as the Framers’ posterity trod the earth. 

  • April 24, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Liliana M. Garces, William C. Kidder and Gary Orfield

    Garces is an Assistant Professor of the Higher Education Program and Research Associate of the Center for Study of Higher Education at Penn State College of Education. Kidder is the Assistant Executive Vice Chancellor at UC Riverside. Orfield is the Professor of Education, Law, Political Science and Urban Planning and Co-Director of the Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles at UCLA.

    Chief Justice Hughes famously said that a dissenting opinion is “an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” Dred Scott, the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy, KorematsuIn these and other landmark race-related cases, dissenting Justices spoke eloquently to “the intelligence of a future day” in laying bare the errors in the holding and reasoning of the Court’s majority opinions.

    Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Schuette, joined by Justice Ginsburg, is both brooding and compelling in the way it speaks to an intelligence of a future day, a day when, “as members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter.”

    We deeply regret the decision by the Supreme Court upholding Michigan’s ban on race-sensitive admissions as constitutional and overturning the Sixth Circuit’s en banc ruling that the referendum violated the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection. On the heels of recent voting rights and campaign finance decisions—decisions that not only create enormous barriers but further weaken minority political power and increases the power of money—the Schuette ruling exemplifies how legal decisions can ignore the stark realities of our nation and the deep racial inequalities that continue to exist in America. 

  • October 8, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Mark Ladov, is counsel for the Justice Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.


    The nation will be paying close attention to the Supreme Court’s review of the University of Texas’s admissions policies when it hears oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (UT) on October 10.  Most of the conversation will focus, as it should, on what the Court has to say about race, education and opportunity in the twenty-first century.  But Fisher is also important for what it will teach us about the Roberts Court’s faith in the rule of law and the principle of stare decisis (or the binding effect of past precedent).

    UT’s admissions program considers the race of its applicants, but only alongside a variety of factors (including class, family history, work experience and individual talents) that shape a student’s identity and potential.  As Joshua Civin explained well in this blog, the alternative so-called “race-neutral” approach would actually demean students’ individuality, by forcing them to censor references to race and culture out of their college applications.  

    It is well established that UT’s admissions policies are good for our multi-racial democracy, and wholly consistent with the Constitution’s equal protection clause.  That is not just the opinion of over 70 amici briefs siding with the university.  It is also the view of the Supreme Court, which addressed these exact issues less than a decade ago in Grutter v. Bollinger

    In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s similarly holistic admissions policy.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion enthusiastically affirmed principles first announced by Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke(1978).  She explained the importance of diversity for giving all students the best education possible, and for training a diverse set of leaders for America’s future.  

    UT has followed these instructions to the letter.  The Fifth Circuit found exactly that when upholding the constitutionality of its admissions program.  As my colleague Sidney Rosdeitcher points out, in a thorough review of the facts and law of this case, “it would be an assault on the principles underlying stare decisis” for the Supreme Court to reach beyond the issues raised in this case to overturn or limit Grutter.