Fix the Senate Now

  • April 25, 2013

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Last year, Sen. Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) took to the Senate floor to bemoan his Republican colleagues’ ongoing use of the filibuster to block or greatly delay the president’s nominations to executive branch agencies, the federal bench, and to defeat consideration of legislation.

    Reid then praised some of the senators who have been pushing for filibuster reform, such as Sens. Tom Udall (D-N.M.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.). The plan, in part, would force senators to work harder to sustain a filibuster. Merkley calls it a “talking filibuster.” In a press release, Merkley explains how his proposed changes would blunt the use of the filibuster. (Sen. Merkley is one of the featured speakers at the 2013 ACS National Convention in June.)

    As it stands now Republicans have crafted a new norm of requiring a supermajority to end debate and allow up-or-down votes on legislation and nominations. The compromise gun bill was killed because of this new norm, though some wobbly pundits suggested the president was at fault. Indeed the late Bob Edgar blasted the use of the filibuster as essentially shutting the place down and his group lodged a lawsuit to force reform of the procedural tool.

    At the start of the 113th Congress, Merkley and other senators urged a simple majority vote to change the Senate’s rules on the filibuster. Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), said “a revolution has occurred in the Senate in recent years. Never before was it accepted that a 60 vote threshold was required for everything. This did not occur through Constitutional Amendment or through a great public debate. Rather, because of the abuse of the filibuster, the minority party – the party the American people did not want to govern – has assumed for itself absolute and virtually unchecked veto power over all legislation, any executive branch nominee, no matter how insignificant the position, and over all judges, no matter how uncontroversial.” 

  • January 28, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Sandy Newman. Mr. Newman is the President of Voices for Progress, and was one of the leaders of the Fix the Senate Now Coalition.

    Senators Tom Udall, Jeff Merkley and Tom Harkin have been extraordinary leaders of a hard-fought effort to reform the Senate rules. ACS, while not taking a position on specific proposals, worked to educate Senators about the constitutional history and the extent of current filibuster abuse. More than sixty organizations involved in an informal Fix the Senate Now coalition joined in supporting their proposals. It is therefore unsurprising that, with the defeat of the Udall, Merkley, and Harkin resolutions yesterday, the initial takeaway is that "reformers lost."

    My take: Yesterday was a day of considerable progress in the latest round of a multi-round fight to make the Senate work.

    Reformers won modest changes in the rules themselves by way of a deal negotiated between the leadership of both parties. They showed that they had nearly majority support for more substantial reforms. And they won an assurance that instead of Democrats playing by one rulebook when they are in the majority, only to have the Republicans subjugate them with different rules later, both parties will play by the same rules.

    Reformers did not prevail on a key procedural issue. They knew that, as in past rules reform battles, those opposed to reform would filibuster the proposed changes. Reformers relied on judicial and Senate precedents affirming that, because a previous Senate can't constitutionally limit the powers of today's Senate, a majority is sufficient to break a filibuster - if it does so before the Senate implicitly ratifies the old rules by operating under them. This procedure, the "Constitutional Option," differed from the 2005 "Nuclear Option," in which the Republicans attempted to throw out the rules in the middle of a session, after the new Congress had already ratified them.

    Senators Udall, Merkley and Harkin had put forward a proposal fair to both parties, one that they knew was unlikely to garner unanimous Democratic support. They had hoped to win the support of some Republicans for both the substantive proposals and the Constitutional Option, especially since so many Republicans had supported the far more radical Nuclear Option. In the end, even Republicans who had publicly called for reform refused to back their reform proposals.