Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

  • March 25, 2013

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The U.S. Supreme Court may rule soon on the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions policy employed by the University of Texas at Austin, but as the AP’s Mark Sherman reports that justices are ready to consider another case involving a race-conscious admissions – this time a state ban on the use of such policies.

    The justices have already heard oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, regarding a white woman’s challenge to the university’s admissions policy, which takes an array of factors, including race, into account when building its student body. SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston notes that while the justices in Fisher could potentially produce a broad ruling, they could as easily craft a narrow one that may “not go much beyond that plan.”

    The Michigan case, Schuette v. Michigan Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, however could prove to be a platform for a more sweeping announcement on race-conscious admissions policies. Denniston writes that the Michigan case “involves a move by a state to deny its public colleges and universities any right to use race as a factor in choosing the incoming class of students. It thus has the potential to produce a far more sweeping decision.”

    As Sherman notes, the Michigan movement to pass a law outlawing race-conscious admissions policy “has its roots” in the high court’s 2003 opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger. In Grutter, a majority of the Court led by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor upheld the University of Michigan law school’s race-conscious admissions policy. The majority concluded that the school’s use of race it its admission policy supported a compelling educational interest and did not violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.

    After the Grutter opinion, opponents of race-conscious admissions policies formed to advocate for a ballot initiative, Proposal 2, banning the state’s universities and colleges from using such policies. After voters approved the initiative, a group of civil liberties groups, including the NAACP LDF, formed to lodge a lawsuit against Proposal 2. Eventually the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled against Proposal 2, saying it subverted equal protection rights.

    LDF’s President and Director-Counsel Sherrilyn Ifill said today that Michigan’s Proposal 2 “unconstitutionally gerrymanders Michigan’s political process and relegates the critical topics of racial diversity and access to educational opportunity to a separate, distant, and far more cumbersome playing field – one that is unplayable for all practicable purposes.”

    LDF notes Proposal 2 has already led to a decline of minority enrollment, citing a University of Michigan study that shows African-American “undergraduate enrollment fell from 6.7 percent in 2006 to 4.5 percent in 2010.”

    The justices heard oral argument in Fisher last fall.

  • February 25, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Atiba R. Ellis, Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. This post is part of an ACSblog symposium on Shelby County v. Holder.

    In Shelby County v. Holder, the opponents of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Actargue that this provision acts as a bludgeon that crushes the ability of the covered jurisdictions to legislate freely concerning the electoral process. The premise of this argument is that the America – and especially the jurisdictions covered by Section 5 – has triumphed over the problem of race. The voter suppression that existed in 1965 no longer exists.  An America that can elect an African-American president no longer needs to micromanage the election processes of certain states and localities on the basis of race. The opponents’ claim is that we live in a post-racial world, and a Congress that fails to recognize this has overstepped its constitutional role. 

    These two premises – that race is a relic of the past and that Congress has overreached its power to manage the electoral process – are false.

    Yet it is appealing to believe that we as a country have triumphed over the problem of race. This narrative tempts all of us, liberals and conservatives, to move on to other problems and feel good about ourselves. For the political right, if race is no longer a problem, then the ridicule conservatives suffer because they are typecast as being “bad on race” is no longer valid. For the political left, the triumph over race represents the realization of the liberal vision of racial harmony. The end effect is that once we believe this view, we avoid race discussions and eschew race-conscious remedies despite the facts. 

     

  • October 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Mark Ladov, counsel for the Justice Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.


    All eyes were on Justice Kennedy at this week’s oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.  As readers of this blog well know, the Supreme Court holds the opportunity to rule on the future of race-conscious inclusive admissions policies — and once again, Justice Kennedy is presumed to be the swing Justice who will decide on the direction of the Court. It is always dangerous to predict rulings based on the Justices’ questions at oral argument, a point driven home by last term’s surprise ending to the Affordable Care Act litigation. And Justice Kennedy, in particular, seemed to keep his cards close in the questions he posed. But the oral argument does suggest that the forthcoming ruling will hinge on one key question: whether the University has persuaded the Court that race-conscious admissions policies remain necessary to achieve a “critical mass” of diversity in its classrooms and campus.

    The concept of “critical mass” comes directly from the Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, where the Court affirmed the ability of University of Michigan Law School to use a race-conscious but individualized review to ensure a “critical mass” of diversity in its student body. The term did not refer to a specific number, but to an aspiration: that a class filled with sufficient diversity would ensure that no individual felt isolated or was forced to “represent” his or her race; that racial stereotypes would break down within a truly varied student body; and that the university would fully realize the educational benefits of diversity for all students.

    UT provided the Court with plenty of evidence that it has yet to reach this critical mass. The university used survey evidence to show that African American and Latino students continue to feel unrepresented on campus. UT showed that minority enrollment plummeted when the school relied solely on a plan to admit the top ten percent of every high school class; this policy fosters a certain level of diversity, but only because Texas high schools remain so segregated by race and class. The school looked closely at its demographics to see that certain classes and programs remain segregated. UT did not rely on any one single fact or figure, but instead followed Grutter’s instruction to look broadly at whether the benefits of diversity on its campus could still be improved.

  • October 10, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    In 2003 a much different U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of universities to shape their student bodies, in part, by relying on race-conscious admissions policies. Today, a more conservative court examined the constitutionality of the University of Texas at Austin’s admissions policy, which considers race among many other factors.

    The university’s admissions policy is being challenged by a white woman, Abigail Fisher, who says her constitutional rights were subverted by the school’s admissions policy. An array of groups has lodged friend-of-the court briefs both for and against the policy. Conservatives have long hoped to end race-conscious admissions policies arguing they violate the Constitution’s equal protection clause. But in its 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger opinion, the high court led by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor upheld the University of Michigan law school’s race-conscious admissions policy, finding that the school’s compelling interest in creating a vibrant educational experience was not an affront to the equal protection clause. The Grutter majority “recognized that racial and ethnic diversity is a compelling state interest of public colleges and universities,” and that the Court’s precedent supported giving deference to schools’ decisions on their educational missions.

    But that opinion failed to dissuade rightwing pundits, activists and outfits from continuing to claim that it is long past time for universities to stop taking race into account when creating student bodies.

    In an extensive piece for Media Matters, Sergio Muñoz describes the “Myths and Facts” about race-conscious admissions policies.

    For example rightwing or libertarian activists have long argued that a “correct” reading of the Constitution forbids race-conscious policies. Muñoz notes that frequent National Review writer Roger Clegg says that race-conscious “government actions are ‘untenable’ with the Constitution.” But Muñoz, citing an amicus brief filed by the Constitutional Accountability Center, notes that for decades the high court has recognized that such policies are permissible pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. “As our brief explains, not only does the Amendment’s text permit government to enact race-conscious policies to fulfill the Constitution’s promise of equality, but the Framers of the Amendment themselves enacted such measures.”

  • October 8, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Mark Ladov, is counsel for the Justice Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.


    The nation will be paying close attention to the Supreme Court’s review of the University of Texas’s admissions policies when it hears oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (UT) on October 10.  Most of the conversation will focus, as it should, on what the Court has to say about race, education and opportunity in the twenty-first century.  But Fisher is also important for what it will teach us about the Roberts Court’s faith in the rule of law and the principle of stare decisis (or the binding effect of past precedent).

    UT’s admissions program considers the race of its applicants, but only alongside a variety of factors (including class, family history, work experience and individual talents) that shape a student’s identity and potential.  As Joshua Civin explained well in this blog, the alternative so-called “race-neutral” approach would actually demean students’ individuality, by forcing them to censor references to race and culture out of their college applications.  

    It is well established that UT’s admissions policies are good for our multi-racial democracy, and wholly consistent with the Constitution’s equal protection clause.  That is not just the opinion of over 70 amici briefs siding with the university.  It is also the view of the Supreme Court, which addressed these exact issues less than a decade ago in Grutter v. Bollinger

    In Grutter, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s similarly holistic admissions policy.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion enthusiastically affirmed principles first announced by Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke(1978).  She explained the importance of diversity for giving all students the best education possible, and for training a diverse set of leaders for America’s future.  

    UT has followed these instructions to the letter.  The Fifth Circuit found exactly that when upholding the constitutionality of its admissions program.  As my colleague Sidney Rosdeitcher points out, in a thorough review of the facts and law of this case, “it would be an assault on the principles underlying stare decisis” for the Supreme Court to reach beyond the issues raised in this case to overturn or limit Grutter.