First Amendment

  • January 19, 2012
    BookTalk
    Creation without Restraint
    Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation
    By: 
    Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp

    By Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, law professors at The University of Iowa College of Law


    Promoting rivalry in innovation requires a fusion of legal policies drawn from patent, copyright, and antitrust law, as well as economics and other disciplines. Creation without Restraint looks first at the relationship between markets and innovation, noting that innovation occurs most in moderately competitive markets and that small actors are more likely to be truly creative innovators. Then we examine the problem of connected and complementary relationships, a dominant feature of high technology markets. Interconnection requirements, technological compatibility requirements, standard setting, and the relationship between durable products and aftermarket parts and supplies all involve interconnection, or “tying.” But views about the practice tend toward two extremes. Some see tying as inherently anticompetitive, while others view it as unexceptionally benign. In fact, bundling products or technologies is essential in high technology markets and most of it is socially beneficial, but some possibilities of abuse nevertheless remain. 

    Identifying good substantive legal rules for facilitating innovation is often very difficult. Two generations ago antitrust law addressed problems of complexity by shifting the focus to harm. The courts reasoned that they could often avoid unmanageable substantive doctrine by considering whether the plaintiff had suffered the appropriate kind of injury. Plaintiffs who are injured by more rather than less competition should be denied a remedy. In the case of patent and copyright law, the appropriate question is whether an infringer’s conduct served to undermine the right holder’s incentive to innovate, with incentives measured from before the innovation occurred. Some IP infringements do no harm to the incentive to innovate; others actually make the right more rather than less valuable. In these situations relief should be denied without inquiry into the merits of the infringement case.

    Patent and copyright law are both in crisis today – major problems include overissuance, overly broad and ambiguously defined protections, and rules that permit both patentees and copyright holders to make broad claims on unforeseen innovations that lie in the future. The result has been that many patents are valueless, while others have very considerable value precisely because they enclose ideas or technologies that rightfully belong in the public domain. Patent law could be greatly improved if inventions were tied to real, nonobvious technology actually in the patentee’s possession at the time its application was filed, and if patentees were obliged to give comprehensible and timely notice of their inventions. Copyright law would be greatly improved by an aggressive theory of harm that reduces the scope of the derivative works right and increases the scope of fair use. In Eldred the Supreme Court suggested that the First Amendment should not be an important copyright infringement defense because the Constitution’s IP clause and the initial copyright act were passed “close in time,” leading to an inference that Congress must have considered these concerns. But the original copyright act bears little resemblance to the expansive coverage granted by the current Act, passed almost two centuries later.

  • January 13, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    This week the U.S. Supreme Court issued at least a couple of opinions and heard oral argument in another case that deservedly grabbed court-watchers’ attention. The high court’s opinion allowing a Michigan church to fire a teacher for discriminatory reasons, and oral argument in the FCC case involving indecency on television are among the actions that garnered a great deal of notice.

    But federal appeals court Judge Edith Jones, writing for a three-judge panel of that court, ruled in favor of one of the country’s most onerous anti-abortion laws. The law, which requires women to undergo an ultrasound and then view images from it, even if they have no interest in doing so, was upheld against a class action challenge lodged by the Center for Reproductive Rights.

    Judge Jones, as NARL’s blog for choice, points out has a staunch anti-abortion background. In 1993, the blog noted that Jones, as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, voted to uphold a Mississippi law requiring “young women seeking abortion care to receive permission from both parents – even if she comes from a home where there is physical or emotional abuse.” And in a 2004 case, Jones wrote, as NARAL’s blog notes, “One may fervently hope that the Court will someday … re-evaluate Roe and Casey [Supreme Court opinions upholding a woman’s constitutional right to abortion] accordingly.”

    Earlier this week in Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, Jones leading the unanimous panel overturned U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks preliminary injunction against the Texas law finding that it likely violated the First Amendment. Sparks wrote, “The Act compels physicians to advance an ideological agenda with which they may not agree, regardless of any medical necessity, and irrespective of whether the pregnant women wish to listen.”

    Today at the urging of Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott, the federal appeals court panel sped up the effect of its opinion, saying the stringent anti-abortion could be immediately enforced.

    Blasting the Fifth Circuit’s opinion as extreme, the Center for Reproductive Rights said it was mulling an appeal.

  • January 13, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Leslie C. Griffin, Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center


    The EEOC and Cheryl Perich lost 9-0 in the Supreme Court when the Court dismissed schoolteacher Perich’s Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. The Court for the first time approved the ministerial exception, a rule that the state and lower federal courts had used for forty years to dismiss lawsuits by “ministers” against their religious employers, including churches, elementary and secondary schools, universities and hospitals.

    One of the arguments in the amicus brief I filed on Perich’s behalf concerned the Court’s leading free exercise precedent, Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the Court held that two Native American drug counselors who used peyote in a religious ritual could be denied unemployment compensation benefits because the criminal laws prohibit drug use. The most famous language from Smith is that all citizens are subject to “neutral laws of general applicability” because to permit exceptions from the criminal law “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”

    Many supporters of religious freedom detested Smith for its incursion on free exercise. In other words, they believed that religious freedom should trump the law. In contrast, I agreed with Smith’s holding that religious belief should not be superior to the law of the land. I defended Smith because I think our constitutional system depends on a shared system of law. To exempt religious citizens from the laws undermines the rule of law. For the ministerial exception, I argued that, just as Alfred Smith had to obey neutral drug laws of general applicability, so too did Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School and other religious employers have to obey the antidiscrimination laws.

    Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion for a unanimous Court squarely rejected that argument. Although the Chief Justice conceded that the ADA is a neutral law of general applicability, which presumably could be applied to Hosanna-Tabor under Smith, he quickly distinguished Hosanna-Tabor from Smith:

    a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. See id., at 877 (distinguishing the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lend[ing] its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”).

    This is a strange argument in the context of the ministerial exception. In terms of religious freedom, the ingestion of peyote is a profound religious ritual with a long American history predating the Constitution. In sharp contrast, the ministerial exception involves cases where employees allege disabilities discrimination, retaliation, pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, unequal pay, race discrimination, gender discrimination, and other civil rights violations. Women clergy, for example, sue for pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment and unequal pay. Other ministers sue for disabilities discrimination. Many of these “ministers” have been schoolteachers or non-ordained personnel who did not realize they were “ministers” until their lawsuits were dismissed.

  • January 11, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Daniel Mach, director of ACLU’s Program on Freedom of Religion and Belief, wrote for ACSblog last summer about religious organizations' ability to shield themselves from anti-discrimination laws, citing their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. He asked whether religious institutions have a “categorical free pass to discriminate against certain people, regardless of the reason.”

    Today, in what The New York Times’ Adam Liptak suggested may be the U.S. Supreme Court’s “most significant religious liberty decision in two decades,” sided with a Michigan church’s effort to avoid defending itself against an employment discrimination charge lodged by a teacher it had fired after she took sick leave, and for informing the church she planned to persue an employment discrimination claim against the church.

    In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a unanimous Court led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. found, in this instance, that a so-called “ministerial exception,” provided the Redford, Mich. church protection from Cheryl Perich’s employment discrimination claim. (When Perich took sick leave to treat a disability, the church eventually hired a replacement teacher. After Perich presented church officials with a letter from her physician that she was cleared to start work again, church officials urged her to resign and except payment of a portion of her health insurance premiums. When she refused to do so, church officials informed her they were considering letting her go, and she responded by warning them she planned to lodge an employment discrimination complaint.)

    Since the passage of the Civil Rights of 1964 and other employment discrimination laws, Roberts explained that the federal appeals courts “have uniformly recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”

  • January 10, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    The U.S. Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments today on the constitutionality of sanctioning television and radio broadcasters for indecency, even where the use of an expletive is unscripted and “fleeting” or “isolated.”  

    The decision in this case has the potential to be “really quite a blockbuster” if it reopens past Supreme Court precedent that gave the government special latitude to regulate matters that are broadcast on the public airwaves, explained former acting solicitor general Neal Katyal during the American Constitution Society’s recent Supreme Court preview.

    In the lower court decision holding the Federal Communications Commission policy unconstitutional, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that technology has changed since the Supreme Court decided in FCC v. Pacifica that broadcasting is a unique medium.

    Constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky explains this argument in a recent column for The National Law Journal: