First Amendment

  • March 22, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Anthony Renzo, Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Professor Renzo specializes in constitutional law and litigation.
    In an opinion framed in terms of the majestic First Amendment principles of informed decision-making and debate on matters of public concern, the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps ruled that the First Amendment protects picketing that targeted the funeral of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, killed in action in Iraq. The pickets were members of the Westboro Baptist Church, who chose Matthew's funeral to generate media attention for their message that God killed Matthew Snyder "in shame, not honor" because his parents and America tolerate homosexuality, divorce, and adultery. Under First Amendment cover, the Court ruled that this was speech on matters of public concern and was immune from state tort liability, however personally painful to the family of the deceased.

    In 2007, Westboro's founder, Fred Phelps, and several members of his family traveled from Kansas to Maryland to picket Matthew's funeral. Their signs carried their message: "God Hates Fags," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You." Westboro targeted Matthew Snyder, a private figure whose views on these issues were unknown, for the purpose of generating a national audience for their message. In the process Westboro hijacked the narrative that would accompany the Snyder family's burial of their son. Unfortunately, the theft of Matthew's memory by Westboro did not end with the publicity generated by the funeral picketing. Following the funeral, Westboro posted an online account of the meaning of their funeral picket, a self-described "epic" entitled "The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help the Inhabitants Connect the Dots!" In this "epic," interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations, Westboro denounced Matthew and his parents by name:

    "Mr. and Mrs. Snyder ... raised him (Matthew) for the devil.

    "Albert and Julie RIPPED that body apart and taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery. They taught him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity...They also, in supporting Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater."

    Albert Snyder, Matthew's father, filed a lawsuit for damages against Westboro and the Phelps, claiming that this campaign to demonize the Snyders during a time of grief and vulnerability inflicted emotional distress and invaded their privacy. A federal district court jury found the defendants liable for three torts: intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy, awarding Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $2.1 million, but otherwise denied Westboro's post-trial motions.

    Westboro appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed. The circuit court concluded that Westboro's speech, including the Web site epic, was protected by the First Amendment as speech on matters of public concern. A majority of the three judge appeals' court panel ruled that Westboro's personal attacks on the Snyders were made in the context of expressing its religious opinions on controversial issues of broad public interest that could not reasonably be interpreted as expressing verifiable facts about Albert Snyder. As such, according to the Fourth Circuit, this public-concern speech could not be penalized by any form of state tort liability.

    In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, an eight Justice majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, but only after limiting the scope of its ruling to the funeral picketing. The Court refused to consider the online epic, claiming that Snyder had failed to include the epic within the scope of his petition for certiorari. Dissenting Justice Alito referred to the Court's refusal to consider the epic as "strange," pointing out that the epic was "not a distinct claim but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability." Agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that the epic could not be divorced from the general context of the funeral message, Alito chastised the Court for not making an "independent examination of the whole record" as required when appellate courts review cases raising First Amendment issues.

  • March 16, 2011
    The House Judiciary Committee is preparing to ponder a resolution urging the public display of "In God We Trust," Politico reports.

    Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.) is sponsoring H.R. 274, which urges that "In God We Trust," be plastered throughout as many public buildings as possible, including public schools. In a press release on the resolution, Rep. Forbes claims, "The religious underpinnings of our nation are not evident merely because of the existence of a phrase ‘In God We Trust.' Rather, the very foundation upon which our nation was built was a trust in God."

    Aping Religious Right rhetoric, Forbes added that the nation has witnessed a "growing effort to strip references to America's religious heritage, including our national motto, from federal buildings, documents and ceremonies across the nation."

    The Rev. Barry Lynn, head of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, knocked the House for expending time on the resolution.

    "This is divisive and a diversion from important national issues," Lynn said in a press release. "No wonder public opinion of Congress is so low. We face a dire economic situation, the threat of a government shut-down and world instability, and House members are wasting time on symbolic religious issues.

    "Millions of Americans believe in God and millions do not. I doubt if any of them will make their decision about religious belief based on a politician's non-binding resolution," he continued.

  • March 8, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Marc Stern, Associate General Counsel for Legal Advocacy, American Jewish Committee (AJC).
    Notwithstanding a district court's wholly predictable -- and correct -- entry of a preliminary injunction banning implementation of Oklahoma's ban on the judicial invocation of Sharia and foreign law in deciding cases, the legislatures of roughly a dozen additional states are now considering broader versions of the anti-Sharia proposal. These proposals, although differing in details, would eliminate the most evidently unconstitutional feature of Oklahoma's provision -- its singling out of one faith for condemnation, see Larson v. Valente -- but generally would ban state courts from considering any religious law in decision-making. They would also ban invocation of foreign law, eliminating commercial parties' ability to bind themselves to another nation's laws, a ubiquitous feature of international business contracts.

    These laws are at one level superfluous. (Law professor Martha F. Davis, co-author of a recent ACS Issue Brief on the matter, writes that because citations of Shariah law and international law "are hardly rampant in state courts" that lawmakers are either "wasting valuable time or they have some other purpose.") No American court can compel citizens (other, than in some circumstances, religious institutions as regards internal governance) to abide by religious law. Paradoxically, these proposals would add nothing to the ample protection the Constitution already affords against coerced religious adjudications, but would be an obstacle to its consideration in the one case in which courts insist that church law governs -- internal church disputes.

    A further paradox -- some would say hypocrisy -- is that the advocacy of these laws comes from groups on the far fringes of evangelical Protestantism, like the American Center for Law & Justice, groups which are not at all shy about pressing government to prefer Christian ideas and expression over all others. (Think of support for the use of a Christian cross as a war memorial for all American soldiers killed in America's wars, including non-Christians).

    This second round of anti-Sharia law proposals solve the problem of singling out Sharia law by banning a wide spectrum of religious law from the courts, including, under an Arizona bill, karma. (To judge from a recent New York Times article, the latter may upset trial lawyers, who seem to have a commitment to such practices.) And by banning foreign law, the category of that which is prohibited is broader than just religious law, perhaps just broad enough to qualify as a neutral law of general applicability, which would pass constitutional muster under the unfortunate decision of Employment Division v. Smith, as a ban on religious law alone would not.

  • March 2, 2011
    The over-the-top anti-gay group called the Westboro Baptist Church convinced a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court that its speech aimed at tarring gays, Jews, Catholics and American soldiers is protected by the First Amendment.

    In an 8-1 opinion issued this morning, the high court led by Chief Justice John Roberts found that the content of Westboro's speech "plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than matters of ‘purely private concern.'"

    For decades Fred Phelps and his tiny Kansas-based church, made up largely of his relatives, have traveled the country initially targeting the funerals of persons who had died of AIDS with signs reading "God Hates Fags." Eventually after antiviral drugs helped, in this country, to lessen the number of AIDS-related deaths, Phelps and his family turned to protesting funerals of soldiers, and with two American wars, the opportunities to amplify their vitriol again increased. According to its website "godhatesfags.com," Phelps and his family picket funerals of soldiers as part of a campaign attacking America for allegedly being tolerant of gays. Beyond posting invective on its web site, the small group travels the country to hoist signs at soldiers' funerals reading "God Hates the USA," and "Semper fi fags." When Phelps and his family brought their act to a Maryland funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, his father, Albert lodged a lawsuit against the group and won a jury verdict of $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. The jury verdict was overturned by an appeals court, citing First Amendment protection for Phelps.

    Writing for the majority in Snyder v. Phelps, Roberts said the content of Westboro's messages "may fall short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight - the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy - are matters of public import," and ultimately protected by the First Amendment. "Such speech," Roberts wrote, "cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt."

    Justice Samuel Alito was the only member to dissent. "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case," he wrote.

    Alito continued that Phelps' band has a freedom to "write and distribute books, articles, and other texts," and disseminate its commentary in other public ways, such as posting its commentary on its web site.

    "It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate," Alito said.

    Alito also questioned the majority's conclusion that the Phelps outfit was engaging in speech of public concern. He wrote that evidence showed that the group went "far beyond matters of public concern," and "specifically attacked Matthew Snyder because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United States military. Both Matthew and petitioner were private figures, and this attack was not speech on a matter of public concern."

    Tom Goldstein, founder of SCOTUSblog provides some initial reaction to the opinion, noting:

    The Court left undecided two important issues that it concluded were not squarely presented. First, recognized that the government may regulate the "time, place, and manner" of speech and that the State of Maryland (where this protest was held) subsequently enacted a statute governing the circumstances in which funeral protests may be held. The Court did not decide the constitutionality of that statute or other similar federal and state laws. The Court may have been motivated to grant review in the case and still affirm in order to issue an opinion that, unlike the arguable implications of the court of appeals' decision, did not call such statutes into question.

    Second, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had also brought suit on the basis of statements made by the defendants on a website. But it concluded that the issue had been waived by not preserving it in the petition for certiorari and only briefly mentioning it in the merits briefing. The Court was therefore able to limit its decision strictly to the context of funeral protests.

  • March 1, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Frank D. LoMonte, Executive Director of the Student Press Law Center, a nonprofit advocacy and legal-services organization based in Arlington, Va.
    An under-the-radar case awaiting oral argument before the Supreme Court in April portends grave risk for the constitutionality of every open-government and ethics law in the nation.

    Sound dire? Consider the breathtaking scope of the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in the case now styled on appeal as Commission on Ethics of the State of Nevada v. Carrigan. If the Nevada court's July 2010 ruling is affirmed, any statute burdening the ability of elected officials to vote when and how they wish - even if the "burden" is to penalize voting in favor of a crony's rezoning application - will be presumptively unconstitutional.

    That's because the Carrigan court reached the unprecedented conclusion that casting a vote as a member of a city council is an act of First Amendment expression that cannot be constrained by a statute mandating recusal where the circumstances raise an apparent conflict-of-interest. To reach that result, the court applied not the relaxed balancing-of-interests test that typically governs restrictions on public employee speech, but strict scrutiny. Predictably, Nevada's mandatory recusal statute flunked that exacting review.

    If Carrigan is correctly decided, then open-meetings statutes undoubtedly will be the next targets. This is not an academic concern. Local elected officials made this very argument in a 2006 challenge to Texas' open-meetings law that ultimately was dismissed as moot; a sequel case, City of Alpine v. Abbott, is pending before the Western District of Texas now.

    All this originates in the town of Sparks, Nevada -- an old railroad switching post, now a fast-growing suburb of 90,000 four miles east of Reno -- where, until 2005, Michael Carrigan sat as one of five City Council members. Weeks before Carrigan's second and final term expired, the council scheduled a vote on a land-use application for a casino resort, The Lazy 8, submitted by a developer that employed Carrigan's longtime confidant and campaign manager as its lobbyist.

    Carrigan openly acknowledged the potential conflict, but voted anyway (on the developer's side, which lost). The Nevada Commission on Ethics censured Carrigan for failing to abstain, and he brought suit challenging the rebuke as a First Amendment violation.