Sherrilyn Ifill, President and Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, released a statement praising the Senate Judiciary Committee for its favorable report of Debo Adegbile to be the Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division. In the statement, Ifill says Adegbile “has precisely the type of broad civil rights experience that is required at this pivotal moment in our country.”
Last summer, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a key provision of the Voting Rights Act that required federal review of voting laws in states with a history of voter discrimination. Adam Ragusea of NPR reports from Macon, Georgia on the repercussions felt by the city’s minority voters.
Human Rights Watch explores the legal and ethical implications of a growing trend among probation companies to “act more like abusive debt collectors than probation officers.”
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first bill signed into law by President Obama in 2009 and has been a vital tool in the battle against wage discrimination ever since. Writing for Roll Call on the anniversary of the bill’s passage, Lilly Ledbetter and the American Civil Liberties Union’s Deborah J. Vagins reflect on the legacy of the Ledbetter Act, the importance of the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act and the necessity of executive order.
Last year, the Senate eliminated its 60-vote supermajority requirement for most judicial and executive appointments after Senate Republicans chose to filibuster an egregious number of President Obama’s nominees. In an article for The Blog of Legal Times, Todd Ruger explains why it is likely that the Senate’s power to filibuster nominations will remain applicable to our nation’s highest court.
Writing for the Center for American Progress, Joshua Field examines the current state of the Voting Rights Act, post-Shelby County. In his report, Field addresses the need to combat voting-related discrimination and the role our federal courts must play going forward.
In an article for The National Law Journal, Tony Mauro examines the ACLU’s First Amendment fight against the Supreme Court’s ban on protesting on the Court’s plaza.
Last week, I attended the argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley, a case challenging Massachusetts’ law creating a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion clinics.
The law limits anyone from occupying the space around the entrance or driveway of an abortion clinic. These limits apply whenever people identify as pro-choice or anti-choice, and have exceptions for patients, those accompanying them into the clinic, clinic staff, those on official business, and pedestrians who happen to cross a clinic’s path while on their way somewhere else. Anyone can still distribute literature, hold signs, protest, or engage in conversation—just not within that 35-foot neutral zone to let patients through.
During the oral arguments, Justice Antonin Scalia acknowledged that “if it was a protest, keeping them back 35 feet might not be so bad.” But then he added that this particular case is, in his view, “a counseling case, not a protest case.”
This distinction is not warranted. Whether people shout loudly or talk softly is not the point. The statute’s goal is to diffuse congestion, not regulate speech. It simply ensures that patients have safe passage into clinics when exercising their own constitutional rights.
In the decades since abortion was legalized in the U.S, doctors and clinic staff have been constantly threatened with harm, patients have been routinely harassed, and abortion clinics have suffered bombings, arson, and blockades. In fact, according to the National Abortion Federation, there have been eight murders, 17 attempted murders, 42 bombings, 181 incidences of arson, and thousands of incidents involving other criminal activities since 1977.
by Alan E. Brownstein, Professor of Law, Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and Equality, UC Davis School of Law
Massachusetts law creates a 35 foot buffer zone around the entrances of clinics that provide abortion services. As written and applied, the law prohibits even a single individual standing on a public sidewalk near a clinic’s entrance from calmly trying to counsel women against having an abortion. During last week’s oral argument in McCullen v. Coakley, many Justices appeared to be convinced that a regulation prohibiting such seemingly quiet and persuasive speech violated the First Amendment.
Massachusetts argued the law was a permissible content-neutral attempt to eliminate congestion preventing people from safely entering and leaving clinics. The regulation satisfied intermediate level scrutiny, the appropriate standard of review, because the law served an important state interest, allowed adequate alternative avenues of communication, and did not ignore less restrictive alternatives – that is, the law did not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further its purposes.
The Court seemed unconvinced. Several Justices returned repeatedly to a single inquiry: If the state’s goal was to prevent people from blocking access to the clinics, why couldn’t it draft a narrower, more precise law prohibiting obstruction? One or two peaceful “counselors” would not block access to a clinic. Yet the challenged law substantially burdened their ability to communicate their message. Perhaps loud protestors with signs could communicate their message 35 feet away from the targeted audience, but soft spoken counselors needed to be closer to the women they were addressing. Even Justice Kagan, who seemed somewhat sympathetic to the state’s position, suggested the 35 foot size of the buffer zone was problematic.
The United States Supreme Court will soon hear oral argument in Harris v. Quinn, concerning the rights and responsibilities of unionized home healthcare workers in Illinois. Others have already spoken well on the subject in this ACSblog series. And it seems to me that this case, flying under the legal radar until it is heard, is poised to let activist conservative justices undo the legal solidarity fabric that undergirds American labor relations.
I’ve been a union and workers’ lawyer for more than twenty-five years. I’ve represented construction and heavy-industry workers, the backbone of the traditional labor movement. I’ve represented some white-collar employees. But for most of my career, I’ve been by the side of so-called low-skilled, low-wage workers- retail clerks, meatpackers, healthcare aides- people who do hard, dirty, and dangerous duties that many won’t touch. Maybe, like me, you used to do manual labor, but now you use your eyes, fingers and creativity on the job much more than your back and knees. If so look at this issue through your memories and through the eyes of those who do truly hard work for very little.
The kernel of the Harris issue is workers paying for union services. Since there’s a lot of misinformation about union membership, union security and union participation, a little background is needed. No one has to become a member of a labor union: that’s your First Amendment right. If you don’t want to join, you don’t have to. In southern and western states (and now Midwestern states like Michigan and Indiana), the nearly half of America that is “right-to-work,” you can work in a union shop and get union benefits and services for free. But, in the rest of the country, if your workplace has a union and a contract with a union security clause, you have to pay an amount roughly equivalent to union dues to work there. You don’t have to join, you don’t have to agree, you don’t have to go to meetings, you don’t have to participate. But paying for union services isn’t optional.